India Is Asia’s Dharamshala – Why Not Learn To Love It?

The benevolence of politicians and bureaucrats is sometimes no benevolence at all. For some time now, there has been a trickle of Hindus from Pakistan coming to India on short-term visas, but their real purpose has never been in doubt: to flee discrimination and violence against Hindus in Pakistan.

Earlier this week, the home ministry granted a one-month visa extension to 480 Pakistani Hindus who have been seeking permanent resident status here.  An Indian Express report quoted a ministry official thus: “They will not be deported. Since it takes time to take any decision on their appeals, we have extended their visas for a month.”

Sorry, sir, this is no longer about 480 people. For the last 65 years, India has been facing an influx of people fleeing either religious persecution or ethnic strife or economic conditions in all our neighbouring countries. But we have simply refused to evolve a policy to address all these issues. We want to do everything on a case-by-case basis, or, better still, ignore the problem till it gets resolved illegally: by people acquiring Indian residency by stealth.

Given the numbers of illegal migrants – perhaps running into millions now – we have probably become the world’s biggest dharamshala, but that is something to be proud of. It validates the idea of inclusive India. What we cannot be proud of is that we have allowed this to happen by accident and exception, rather than by a clear-sighted policy.

Our inward immigration policy is a mess. We have separate policies (or default approaches) for Tibetans, for Nepalese, for Sri Lankan Tamils, for Bangladeshis, for Pakistani Hindus and for the rest. Then there are Muslim Rohingyas from Myanmar and Afghans (a motley group comprising Sikhs, Hindus and even Muslims) and what not – and we don’t have a clue what to do with them.

For a country that was artificially partitioned in 1947, it should have been obvious that people will migrate here and there. As a secular alternative to all our less-than-secular neighbours, we have always known that immigration will be more inward and less outward. As a democratic oasis in a largely undemocratic or autocratic south Asian region, we should have had policies to accept refugees fleeing persecution.

As a rapidly globalising country, we have known since 1991 that Indian companies need to recruit foreign professionals to work here just as we expect foreign governments to allow Indians to work in their countries.

But what we have now is a patchwork and illogical system that has been adapted to exigencies of specific situations at specific times.

The Tibetans were allowed in in Nehru’s time. But do we have a policy in case it finally becomes clear that they will never get an autonomous state inside China and can’t return? What if they have to stay here permanently? Will they be given full Indian citizenship?

The Nepalese, under the 1950 India-Nepal Friendship Treaty, are allowed almost free access inside India – almost like Indian citizens. This is the most liberal policy we have with our neighbours, and has remained on the statute book even though our political relationship with Nepal has gone from good to uncertain after the Communists entered government and ended the Hindu monarchy.

When it comes to Bangladesh, we have three policies – or non-policies: one for Assam, another for some north-eastern states, and yet another for the rest.

Under the Assam Accord of 1985, anyone who came to Assam before 1 January 1966 will be allowed to stay and become Indian citizens. Those who came between this date and 24 March 1971 were to be detected but not deported. They would be deleted from electoral rolls, but could get back after 10 years. The rest were to be detected and deported.

The accord has more or less been a dead letter, since politicians in need of immigrant votes refused to implement it. As for the remaining north-eastern states, migration is either fully illegal and politically accepted, or we have restrictions that apply even to Indian citizens.

In Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh, Indians need inner line permits to visit those states even as tourists. The Bangladeshis who enter India traipse around tribal Meghalaya, but have found an easy perch in Tripura. Together with pre-1947 migration, they have relegated the locals to minority status. As for Kashmir, Indians can tour the state but can’t buy property or settle there. Even if they marry Kashmiris, they can’t acquire property there.

As for potential workers and immigrants from the rest of the world, we have the most restrictive policy on board, where the intention is to debar foreigners from working here – unless they earn more than $25,000 per annum. This rules out any kind of work visa for foreigners in India beyond highly qualified technical personnel or short-term consultants – so forget about allowing for easy migration.

As a liberal, democratic country, India has an obligation to run a truly liberal and open immigration policy that does not discriminate. This is a country that took in persecuted people from ancient times to the modern era (Zoroastrians, Jews, Tibetans). We have even accepted invaders as our own.

This should be the broad backdrop against which we should frame a unified immigration and work permit policy. The policy should include the following:

First, we must have a clear policy for taking in refugees from persecution. It does not matter which religion or ethnic group the person belongs to. It is ironic that political parties are willing to plead the case of Bangladeshi Muslims, who can only be chasing economic opportunities here, but not Hindu refugees from Pakistan. At a later stage, we should be willing to take in even Muslim refugees from Pakistan – for who knows what will happen if the Taliban takes over Pakistan? Obviously, this policy needs safeguards, but if there is a will, we can put one in place.

Second, we must have a system of regularising long-term migrants who are settled here. The Assam accord specifically provided for that, but we didn’t implement it. We neither put in place an impenetrable fence to keep future immigrants out nor a system of formally recognising the Bangladeshis’ need to find work here – through a system of work permits or guest workers with no citizenship rights.

Third, India needs to work out a free-movement agreement (especially for tourism and work) with all its neighbours barring Pakistan. Setting a high salary limit of $25,000 for work permits may be all right for westerners, but not for our neighbours in South Asia. The threshold needs to be much lower.

Fourth, residency permits and citizenship norms need to be easier. Currently, it takes 12 years for a foreigner to get citizenship by naturalisation, and seven years if they are married to an Indian citizen. One wonders why this waiting period needs to be so long. Seven years is too long a wait for a marriage to be seen as legitimate enough to warrant grant of citizenship to the foreign spouse.

Isn’t it high time we opened our front doors to the world instead of winking at their entry through the back door?

A MISERABLE LIFE, WHEN PROTECTOR BECOMES PREDATOR

By M H Ahssan & Kajol Singh

A tailor. A farmer. A bootlegger. Often just young men going about their day. brutally tortured, then acquitted. INN captures the impunity with which this happens. And why society needs to react.

If the protector becomes (the) predator, civilised society will cease to exist… Policemen who commit criminal acts deserve harsher punishment than other persons who commit such acts, because it is the duty of the policemen to protect the people and not break the law themselves. - Supreme Court of India, 2010

On 14 May, police rounded up four men in Etah district of Uttar Pradesh, 260 km west of the state capital, Lucknow, in connection with a month-old case of murder. Three days later, one of them, a 33-year-old farmer named Balbir Singh, lay dead in a hospital in Lucknow. “The police gave him electric shocks and injected acid and petrol in his body,” says his brother- in-law, Sunul Kumar. “They forced him to sit on an electric heater that burnt his body horribly.” According to Kumar, Singh told him before dying that the police wanted him to confess his involvement in the murder.

A Tale Of TMC And AIADMK Pact: The Hard Poll Bargainers

By Mahesh Mahtolia | Delhi

CLOSE LOOK Elections to 16th Lok Sabha are just started of phase one in Assam and Tripura. In later of this month it will make an impact and grip the poll fever across the country. These elections will decide the political careers of many stalwarts and will signal the end of many others. Many regional parties see this as their chance to cash in and make most of the situation. 

It is these small parties who are bargaining with the large national parties - Congress and BJP. Most are seeking seat sharing arrangements which will only benefit them locally. They usually lack any national perspective or agenda.

ALSO READ: Why 2014 Polls Could Spell The End Of Congress In India?

Terrorism in India: An Uncertain Relief

By M H Ahssan

While India's relations with most of her neighbours remain fraught with tensions, her most urgent security crises remain overwhelmingly internal. Indeed, even international friction increasingly articulates itself through sub-conventional and terrorist wars that are predominantly internal, in that they manifest themselves principally on Indian soil. Islamist extremist terrorism sourced from Pakistan and, over the past few years, increasingly from Bangladesh, falls into this category.

A relief, in numbers
The recent trajectory of internal conflicts in India has been mixed. Overall, fatalities connected with terrorism and insurgency declined marginally from 2,765 in 2006 to 2,598 in 2007, and dramatically, from their peak at 5,839 in 2001.

In Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), for over a decade and a half the bloodiest theatre of terrorism in the country, there was strong relief, with terrorism-related fatalities – at 777 – falling below the 'high intensity conflict' mark of a thousand deaths for the first time since 1990. At peak in 2001, fatalities in J&K had risen to 4,507. Clearly, 2007 brought tremendous relief to the people of the state, but a great deal remains to be achieved before normalcy is restored.

In India's troubled Northeast, wracked by multiple insurgencies, the situation worsened considerably, with fatalities more than doubling, from 427 in 2006 to 1,019 in 2007, principally because of a dramatic escalation in terrorist activities in Assam and Manipur.

Effects of the war on terror
The numbers alone, however, do not give a clear picture of the magnitude of the challenges confronting New Delhi. Indeed, the sheer spread of Islamist terrorist incidents across India – linked to groups that originally operated exclusively within J&K – is now astonishing, with incidents having been engineered in widely dispersed theatres virtually across the country.

The trend in J&K has little correlation with specific changes in operational strategies or tactics, or with the range of 'peace initiatives' the Government has undertaken domestically and with Pakistan. This is demonstrated by the fact that the downward trend in violence has been consistently sustained since 2001, irrespective of the transient character of relationships between India and Pakistan, or any escalation or decline of operations within J&K, and has been maintained even through periods of escalating tension and provocative political rhetoric. This trend commenced immediately after the 9/11 attacks in the US and the subsequent threat by the US for Pakistan to "be prepared to be bombed back into the Stone Age."

It was this threat, a steady build-up of international pressure, and intense international media focus on Pakistan's role in the sponsorship of terrorism, which combined to force Pakistan to execute a U-turn in its policy on Afghanistan, and dilute visible support to terrorism in J&K. Thereafter, the unrelenting succession of crises in Pakistan have undermined the country's capacities to sustain past levels of terrorism in J&K – particularly since a large proportion of troops had to be pulled back from the Line of Control and International Border for deployment in increasingly violent theatres in Balochistan, NWFP and the FATA areas. Pakistan's creeping implosion has undermined the establishment's capacities to sustain the 'proxy war' against India at earlier levels.

Regrettably, if Western attention is diverted from the region, or if the Islamists in Pakistan are able to carve out autonomous capacities and regions, free of their dependence on the state's covert agencies, or if there is a radical escalation in the 'global jihad' in the wake of the proposed US withdrawal from Iraq in the foreseeable future, the 'jihad' in Kashmir and across India could, once again, intensify dramatically.

Bad governance and marginalization
Similarly, there is overwhelming evidence that the limited 'gains' in terms of declining Maoist violence outside Andhra Pradesh, are the result, not of any significant initiatives on the part of the state's agencies, but rather, of a Maoist decision to focus on political and mass mobilisation in order to "intensify the people's war throughout the country, intending to cumulatively cover virtually the length and breadth of India.

Far from confronting this subversive onslaught, the incompetence of Governments – most dramatically the West Bengal Government and its actions in Nandigram, but less visibly in several other States – has presented the Maoists with proliferating opportunities to deepen subversive mobilization and recruitment.

Despite the dramatic macroeconomic growth experienced over the past decade and a half, vast populations have remained outside the scope of minimal standards on a wide range of developmental indices. Indeed, the processes of 'development' have themselves been severely disruptive; what we are witnessing today is at once a process of globalisation and marginalisation; the rise of oppressed castes through political processes, and parallel increases in the intensity of oppression; unimagined wealth and distressing poverty.

Need stronger political mandate
Nevertheless, in at least two major theatres of insurgency, Tripura in the Northeast and Andhra Pradesh in the South, local administrations have backed the police to execute extraordinarily successful counterinsurgency campaigns. Clearly, where the will and the vision exist, the Indian state has the capacity to combat violence and terrorism.

Unfortunately, a widening crisis of governance afflicts much of India today, with a continuous erosion of administrative capacities across wide areas. There is, moreover, an insufficient understanding within the security establishment of the details of insurgent strategy and tactics, and the imperatives of the character of response. The deficiencies of perspective and design are visible in the fact that no comprehensive strategy has yet been articulated to deal with insurgency and terrorism. The security forces have, at great cost in lives, made dramatic gains from time to time, but there have been continuous reverses, usually as a result of repeated political miscalculations and the refusal to provide the necessary mandate to the forces operating against the extremists.

India’s Communist Parties Must Regain Lost Ground in the Next Elections

By Subhash Kapila

The current bleak Indian political landscape where the ruling Congress Party has miserably failed in governance in all fields despite a continuous six years in power and a listless, disunited and politically ineffective main Opposition Party, the BJP, unable to politically apply brakes on a wayward Congress Government leads one to a single inescapable conclusion.

In the first spell of Congress Government rule from 2004-2009 Congress Government’s waywardness was held in check by its compulsions to rely for political survival on the 60 odd votes of the Communist Parties which were then a part of the ruling UPA I Coalition. The ruling Congress Party was more mindful of the brakes that the Communist Parties would apply on its economic policies and personal foreign policy predilections of the Congress Prime Minister, than any opposition emerging from the BJP. The Congress Party’s unilateralism was therefore held in check by an in-house political equation within the UPA.

Regrettably, with the Communist Parties seats in Lok Sabha having been reduced considerably and the Communist Parties reluctance to unite with the BJP to present a united political opposition to Congress Government unilateralist policies, India stands robbed of any political mechanism to shackle the Congress Government’s political waywardness. The Prime Minister never tires from reeling off economic statistics of India’s economic growth but remains studiously silent on the back-breaking double digit inflation under which the lives of average Indians are reeling.

Since the BJP hardly provides any sense of optimism that it can resurrect itself to regain power in the General Elections in2014 and the Communist Parties political reluctance to be seen as one with the BJP, one can then only hope for that the Communist Parties once again regain their lost political space so that should the Congress Party once again comes into power they can only do so on the strength of a solid Communist Parties bloc.

A solid Communist Parties bloc of 60-70 seats in Parliament would also ensure that the motley collection of casteist parties from the Hindi heartland presently being exploited by the Congress Party to survive in power are not in a position to distort India’s electoral arithmetic. This political rump of casteist parties from the Hindi heartland have thrived on political corruption which provides the Congress Party to use state instruments of investigative agencies to politically coerce them to support the Government.

The Communist Parties to regain lost political space in the Parliament would have a lot of homework to do and it is not such a difficult task since there is adequate time available for the next elections and political circumstances currently obtaining can be exploited by them.

The Communist Parties need to get out of their traditional political groove of West Bengal, Kerala and Tripura States and move to wider political fields all over India. There is enough economic misery and poverty in States like Assam, Orissa, Jharkhand, Chattisgarh, Southern belt of Uttar Pradesh and even parts of Madhya Pradesh which provide fertile grounds for political expansion of Communist Parties. The strength of Communist Parties lies in their committed political cadres who can spearhead the widening of the Communist Parties political base in such areas.

The Communist Parties should adopt a cardinal principle that they would not go in for seat- sharing adjustments or support coalitions in which the Hindi belt casteist parties are involved. They have let down the Communist Parties in favor of the Congress Government to escape corruption persecutions.

The CPI (M) as the largest Communist Party has to take a lead in the direction of regaining the lost political space in Parliament. They have good educated, intelligent and articulate leaders like Prakash Karat, Brinda Karat and Sitaram Yechuri. All of them are relatively young and capable of sustained physical and mental election campaigns. What is required of them is to spend more time out of their offices in New Delhi and do political legwork in the areas mentioned above.

Needless to say that to achieve their political target of regaining lost political space would require a well-planned and co-coordinated political strategy to be sustained over a long period of time. Innovation would be required of them to catch the political imagination of a vast majority of Indians disgusted with lack of good governance by the ruling Congress Party and frustrated that the ‘Party with a Difference’ has failed to provide effective political opposition to checkmate the Congress Government’s political unilateralism.

Bangladesh: A Second Liberation?

By M H Ahssan

If one is looking for a single sentence to sum up the significance of the results of the December 29, 2008, parliamentary elections in Bangladesh, it should read: this is a second liberation. The first one, on December 16, 1971, rid it of Pakistan’s colonial rule and the nightmare of genocide and mass rape unleashed by the Pakistani Army since the night of March 25 that year. The results of the December elections have liberated Bangladesh from an inexorable descent into Talibanesque social medievalism and a reign of terror unleashed by Islamist fundamentalists. The country now has a chance to return to the Liberation War’s legacy of secularism, modernity, gender and social justice, political democracy and cultural pluralism, and friendship with neighbouring countries, particularly India. This is precisely the path the voters wanted their country to take.

The verdict has been overwhelmingly decisive. The Awami League (AL) has won 230 of the 299 seats (out of a total of 300 seats in the Jatiya Sangsad or National Parliament) to which elections were held on December 29, and 49.2 per cent of the votes polled, as against 62 seats and 40.13 per cent, respectively, in the 2001 election. The Grand Alliance it spearheaded has won 262 seats, with the Jatiya Party accounting for 27 (against 14 in 2001) seats, with five going to ‘others’ in the coalition. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) of Begum Khaleda Zia, which won 193 seats in 2001, now has just 29, with its share of votes declining from 40.97 per cent to 32.74 per cent. Its principal ally in the Four-Party Alliance, Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh (JeI-B or Jamaat) has had its seats reduced from 17 to two.

The Jamaat, along with its student’s wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS or Shibir), constitute the matrix within which terrorist organizations like Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B), Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), and Ahle Hadith Andolan Bangladesh (AHAB), evolved. Leaders like Mufti Abdul Hannan and Bangla Bhai, aka Siddiqul Islam, Operations Commanders of the HuJI-B and JMJB respectively till their arrest and eventual executions, Abdur Rahman of JMB, Muhammad Asadullah al-Galib of AHAB graduated either from the Jamaat or the Shibir or both.

The JeI has suffered major blows in the recent election. Its Amir (chief), Matiur Rahman Nizami, General Secretary, Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mujahid, and fire-eating stalwart, Delwar Hussain Saydee, have lost. It will, however, be foolish to believe that the party has been wiped out, or that the BNP has been hobbled permanently. Though the Jamaat has won only two seats, its share of votes polled has actually increased from 4.28 per cent in 2001 to 4.55 per cent in 2008. Besides, it has never been a dominant electoral force. Its strength lies in its huge economic empire which, as Professor Abul Barkat of Dhaka University has shown, yields an annual net profit of Taka 12 billion, at least 10 per cent of which is spent on organizational matters like holding regular party activity, running military training centres and maintaining about 500,000 party workers. As long as this empire, built with funds received from abroad during the 1970s and 1980s, remains intact, the JeI will continue to have the ability to make waves in Bangladesh’s politics as a highly-organised marginal force, which can tilt the balance whenever the AL’s popularity wanes.

Some of the entrepreneurial ventures linked to the Jamaat have also been funding terrorist activity. On April 5, 2006, Bangladesh Bank (the country’s Central Bank) had fined the Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd., which is joined at the hip with the Jamaat, Taka 100,000 for hiding suspicious transactions by terrorists violating money-laundering laws. According to the report, this was the third time that the Islami Bank had been penalized for covering up terrorist activity. Many in Bangladesh believe that a thorough investigation into its functioning — as also that of other Jamaat enterprises — is bound to reveal the party’s, as well as the Shibir’s, umbilical ties with organizations like the HuJI-B, JMB, JMJB and AHAB, which, though banned, continue to be active.

JeI leaders’ denials of ties with Islamist terrorist outfits have always lacked credibility. Referring to the notorious terrorist, Bangla Bhai aka Siddiqul Islam, Operations Commander of JMJB, Motiur Rahman Nizami, then Bangladesh’s Industries Minister, had said at a Press Conference in Dhaka on July 22, 2004, that Bangla Bhai was "created by some newspapers as the Government has found no existence of him". Ali Ahsan Mohammed Mujahid, on the same occasion, stated that the Government would certainly take legal action against Bangla Bhai ‘if he was traced out’. Among others present at the Press Conference were the Jamaat’s Assistant Secretary General Kamaruzzaman, and leaders like Abdul Kader Mollah, ATM Azharul Islam and Nayeb-e-Ameer Maqbul Ahmed.

That Bangla Bhai was not a media creation was proved beyond doubt after he was arrested and, following a trial, hanged with six others, including Abdur Rahman, on March 29, 2007.

However, it is useful to note, also, that Sheikh Hasina did not take any significant action against the Jamaat during her previous tenure as Prime Minister from 1996 to 2001. In fact, she had even allied with the Jamaat in 1994 and 1995 to launch an agitation against Begum Khaleda Zia’s Government, demanding the establishment of a caretaker Government to hold parliamentary elections.

It is, perhaps, different now. Under relentless and often murderous attack, during the regime of the BNP-led coalition Government, of which Jamaat was a assertive partner, the AL now has reason to demand stringent action. Sheikh Hasina too is likely to listen.

She will also be under pressure to act against Jamaat leaders like Matiur Rahman Nizami and Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mujahid, on another count — the promise in the Awami League’s manifesto for the parliamentary election to bring Bangladesh’s war criminals to justice. Both have been accused of war crimes along with several other leaders of the party. It will not be easy to bring them to book. Supporters of war criminals have become firmly entrenched in Bangladesh’s premier intelligence agency, the Directorate General of Forces’ Intelligence (DGFI), which has close links with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate. They, as well as their fellow travelers, who have infiltrated into the armed forces and civilian administration, will fight bitterly to frustrate the new Government’s efforts.

On her part, Sheikh Hasina will not be without support. The Sector Commanders’ Forum, an organization spearheaded by the sector commanders of the Mukti Bahini, during the 1971 Liberation War, has sustained an intense campaign for the trial and punishment of war criminals over the last two years. Thanks to them and efforts by the Muktijuddher Chetana Bastabayan O Ekattorer Ghatak Dalal Nirmul Jatiya Samanyay Committee (National Coordination Committee for the Realisation of the Consciousness of the Liberation War and the Eradication of the Killers and Agents of ‘Seventy One’), popularly known as Nirmul Committee, evidence will not be difficult to come by. Besides, Ian Martin, the United Nations Secretary General’s Special Envoy, has promised Sheikh Hasina, whom he met on January 1, 2009, to congratulate her on her victory, all help in bringing the war criminals to justice.

The question is of political will. Sheikh Hasina’s and the AL’s credibility will be severely dented if they are seen to be unable and/or unwilling to act firmly. Besides, war criminals, left alone, will try to stage a comeback and resume the campaign of murder and terror they had unleashed in Bangladesh between 2001 and 2006. Sheikh Hasina, who has survived several attempts on her life, including the grenade attack on a rally she was addressing in Dhaka on August 21, 2004, which left 24 persons dead, should have no illusion on the score. Besides acting against war criminals, she will also have to dismantle the Jamaat’s economic empire, which sustains the party’s activities and openly promotes a jihadi mindset.

The Sector Commander’s Forum has urged the incoming Government to begin the trial of the war criminals as soon as possible. In a statement on January 2, congratulating the AL-led Grand Alliance on their landslide victory, it said that the soul of the martyrs would remain unsatisfied and the sovereignty of the country insecure until the war criminals were tried.

The issue of the trial of war criminals has a significance that goes far beyond bringing to book people who have been involved in genocidal violence that cost the lives of three million people and involved the rape of 425,000 women, though that is monstrous enough. Those designated war criminals are also leaders of the Jamaat, the spawning ground and ideological fountainhead of Islamist terrorism in Bangladesh. Their trial and punishment will, consequently, help to neutralize the threat of a regression into near-anarchical violence and medievalism that still hangs over Bangladesh.

It will also, perhaps, help relations with India, which the Jamaat leaders have designated as Bangladesh’s enemy. This is clear from the Jamaat’s view on Bangladesh’s defence articulated by Abbas Ali Khan, who became its officiating Amir after it was revived in May 1979, after being banned in the wake of the country’s liberation. Khan writes in the party’s official website,

The very word defence raises the pertinent question, ‘defence against whom?’ Had there been several states around Bangladesh, the answer to this question might not be permanently the same. But as she is almost surrounded by one state, the answer can’t be but one. Whenever any kind of aggression comes it shall come from India alone. Consequently the psychology of the defence forces of Bangladesh must be anti-Indian. But only a negative feeling is not sufficient for developing this psychology to the spirit of highest sacrifice for the country. Nobody can deny that the Muslim sentiment or the Islamic spirit is the only positive element necessary for building up the correct and effective psychology of the defence forces. It is the spirit of jihad which can inspire them to sacrifice their life with the hope that they will be amply rewarded after death.

Understandably, relations between India and Bangladesh were tense during the entire period of the four-party coalition Government headed by Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, who is also bitterly hostile toward India and has never been averse to resorting to communal politics. A week before the elections, she had said urged voters campaigning in Sylhet, to vote for her alliance to "save Islam and the country", adding, further, "You will have to decide whether to cast your vote for setting up a puppet government for serving certain quarters at home and abroad, who had been conspiring against Bangladesh."

During Begum Zia’s second innings as Prime Minister, Bangladesh continued to provide sanctuary, training, and assistance to terrorist outfits of northeastern India, prominently including the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and the All-Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF). Her Government had arbitrarily rejected lists of terrorist camps provided by India, stating that the latter did not exist, and had allowed wanted terrorists like Anup Chetia, Arabinda Rajkhowa and Paresh Baruah of the ULFA to move about freely and acquire massive business interests in Bangladesh. The country had also emerged, during her second tenure as Prime Minister, as a major staging ground for cross-border terrorist strikes in India, with the HuJI-B having a hand in most attacks since 2002.

In response to a question from an Indian journalist, Sheikh Hasina stated, at a Press Conference on December 31, that Bangladesh would not allow any terrorist outfit to use its soil (for attacks) against any country, including India. She also proposed the establishment of a joint task force by South Asian countries for combined action against terrorism. While nobody will question her intentions, her ability to deliver remains to be seen. She had closed down some camps of North-East Indian insurgent groups in Bangladesh after taking over as Prime Minister in 1996. But these had reopened not long thereafter, while she remained in power. Sources close to her had told this writer at that time that her hand was forced by a section of the Army and the DGFI – which may well have been the case. Both had acquired a very sizeable component of pro-Pakistan fundamentalist Islamist elements during the 15 years of thinly-disguised military rule in Bangladesh, from the end of 1975 to the beginning of 1991, when Khaleda Zia became Prime Minister for the first time. The latter’s tenure as Prime Minister, from 1991 to 1996, had seen a further consolidation of these elements, which Sheikh Hasina could only contain up to a point, and not fully curb, when she was Prime Minister from 1996 to 2001.

A part of the reason lay in the fact that the ISI was riding high. Having coordinated the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union on behalf of the United States, it had, in cooperation with the CIA and the transport mafia of Quetta, set up the Taliban in 1994. Given the background of the murder of her father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and her entire family in 1975, barring her and her sister Rehana, who were not then in Bangladesh, Shiekh Hasina might well have hesitated to take on Pakistani elements in the Army and the DGFI, which were closely linked to Pakistan.

The regional and international canvas is different now. Post 9/11, the United States has declared war on al Qaeda and the Taliban. The ISI, which has spawned Islamist terrorist outfits like the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), and which has close links with al Qaeda and Taliban, is no longer the CIA’s blue-eyed boy. Sheikh Hasina will have extensive global support if she takes on Islamist terrorist organizations in Bangladesh linked to al Qaeda and Taliban. Indeed, it was pressure from the United States and the European Union countries which had forced Begum Zia to act against the JMJB, JMB and AHAB in February 2005 and the HuJI-B several months later. Also, but for international pressure the Army-backed Caretaker Government would not have come into being on January 11, 2007; nor would it, perhaps, have held the elections on December 29.

Sheikh Hasina is now clearly in a position not only to act against Islamist terrorists but even to cleanse the Army and the DGFI of elements favouring the Taliban, al Qaeda and their local franchise holders, and who are linked with the ISI. Many in Bangladesh have lauded Sheikh Hasina’s holding out the proverbial olive branch to the BNP by offering it the post of Deputy Speaker and a share in ministerial appointments; others advocate, albeit sotto voce, caution, recalling the general amnesty Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had proclaimed on November 30, 1973, which had enabled war criminals, including those convicted and sentenced, to come out from jails and the woodwork, to work surreptitiously for a revival of pro-Pakistan and fundamentalist politics. History rarely forgives those who fail to be firm when they need to.

A stern approach toward jihadi groups that use Bangladesh’s territory to mount terrorist attacks against India, and send agents and arms across the porous India-Bangladesh border, will go a long way in creating a climate in which all outstanding issues between the two countries can be sorted out; so will the withdrawal of sanctuary and assistance so long given to Indian insurgent groups. This applies particularly to the issue of illegal migration from Bangladesh which has acquired a sharp and bitter edge because of the cover it provides to infiltration by terrorists and smuggling of arms and money, and because of the ISI’s known plan to carve out a Muslim-majority state comprising parts of north-eastern India, Myanmar and Bangladesh.

Of course, it will not be easy to resolve these issues. But a beginning can be made with Bangladesh’s recognition of the existence of the problems, which it has been denying so far. This will require extraordinary political will. But so will effectively dealing with the terrorist groups and their patrons, cleansing the administration of corruption and worse, coping with continuing price rise, and the global meltdown that can hit the country particularly hard because of its dependence on the export of ready-made garments to the West and remittances from non-resident Bangladeshis. Accelerated economic cooperation with India, which is likely to be hurt far less, can provide Bangladesh with a much-needed cushion.

There is no reason why this should not come about, given the huge reservoir of goodwill that exists for Sheikh Hasina in India. But she must address New Delhi’s concerns as well, particularly since most of these affect her own and Bangladesh’s well-being as well. The stage is now set for scripting a new scenario of friendship and cooperation between India and Bangladesh. It will be great pity if the play turns into a tragedy.

For A Post-Colonial Congress

Can the century-old party reinvent itself at Jaipur and meet the challenges at its door?

The Congress’s three-day brainstorming conclave – chintan shivir – in Jaipur from today couldn’t have been better timed. The political crisis in Jharkhand presents new possibilities. Meanwhile, nine other states go to the polls in 2013: Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh, Delhi, Karnataka, Meghalaya, Tripura, Nagaland and Mizoram. The outcome in Congress-ruled Rajasthan and Delhi and BJP-governed Karnataka could provide early clues to the 2014 general elections. 
    
A bruising budget session meanwhile looms. Finance minister P Chidambaram will have to defer around Rs 50,000 crore of Plan expenditure to beyond April 1, 2013 in order to keep the fiscal deficit below 5.5% of GDP. Instructions to cut or defer expenses have already gone out to every Union ministry. But the Congress’s real problem is not economics; it is politics. The precise timing of the 16th Lok Sabha elections will be decided by Mulayam Singh Yadav and Mayawati without whose support the UPA government would fall. 
    
At the Jaipur chintan shivir, UPA chairperson Sonia Gandhi confronts three problems but has solutions to only two. The first problem is the choice of the UPA’s prime ministerial candidate in 2014. If the Congress wins more than 170 seats, the answer is Rahul Gandhi. If it doesn’t, the answer becomes more complicated. The focus will turn to finding an interim CEO for the party to replace Manmohan Singh who will be 82 years old in September 2014. 
    
Singh was leader of the opposition in the Rajya Sabha between 1998 and 2004 before being elevated to the prime ministership. Sonia may have to pick one from among her senior ministers for a similar role if the Congress can’t form a government in 2014 and it is necessary to sequester Rahul from long-term electoral damage. The chintan shivir will give us a good idea who that CEO could be: the reliable if colourless defence minister A K Antony, the ambitious and controversial P Chidambaram, or a dark horse like the external affairs minister Salman Khurshid.
    
Sonia’s second problem is rebuilding the party organisation in the states from the grassroots. Of the key state assembly elections scheduled to be held in 2013, the Congress is likely to do badly in all except Karnataka where B S Yeddyurappa’s breakaway Karnataka Janata Party and the Janata Dal (S) could create a hung assembly. The BJP faces a rout and the Congress, though lacking a charismatic local leader, may be able to stitch together a coalition government. 
    
Sonia’s third problem is public perception. The UPA is widely regarded as corrupt. It is held responsible for inflation. It has presided over an economic slowdown. And it has encouraged the worst excesses of crony capitalism. The game-changer Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) scheme will provide balm but is not the surgery the Congress needs to redeem public trust. 
    
In 1947 Mahatma Gandhi, freedom achieved, wanted to disband the Congress and form new political organisations to contest free elections. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel agreed. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru did not. Nehru’s view prevailed. In 1969, Indira Gandhi split the Congress to sideline the syndicate of regional satraps led by K Kamaraj and S Nijalingappa. The organisational and state-level decline of the Congress began in 1969 though Indira’s 1971 election victory and the euphoria over the Bangladesh war disguised it for nearly a decade. 
    
Nehru inherited a colonial administration. After Independence, it continued to serve the government in power. Colonial laws had been written to often protect British injustice, not deliver justice to Indians. Many remain cast in stone 150 years later, delaying and denying justice to ordinary Indians. Yet, Nehru did not impose chief ministers on states. The party’s local organisation was given a relatively free hand to choose regional leaders. Indira reversed that policy. She imposed state chief ministers, suspended intra-Congress elections, dismissed opposition state governments under Article 356 and undermined the judiciary. 
    
The important lesson for Sonia to absorb at the chintan shivir in Jaipur is to not follow her mother-in-law’s autocratic policies and hew instead to Nehru’s liberal, transparent leadership. Nehru made many errors: Jammu & Kashmir, China and even sowing the seeds of dynasty by appointing members of his family to high office – from Indira to sister Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit. The last thing the battered Congress needs is to emulate Nehru’s few missteps and ignore the many excellent examples of governance he set. 
    
In 1998, Sonia took charge of a party fraying at the edges. Fifteen years later, having become the longest-serving president in Congress history, the party’s edges have frayed further. In 1999, the Congress won 114 seats in the Lok Sabha, the lowest in its history. To avoid falling below that in 2014, Sonia has to solve the leadership problem, strengthen the organisation at the grassroots in the states and restore public confidence. 
    
With its vast army of workers and an overflowing party treasury, the Congress remains a formidable force. It has been underestimated before – in 1980 and again in 2004 – when it was supposed to lose the general elections but didn’t. It can resolve its first two problems – leadership and reorganising the states – with the right strategies. The third – public perception – may prove more intractable. On that could rest its fate in 2014. 

HORRIFYING INCIDENTS OF RAMPANT SEXUAL ABUSES

By M H Ahssan, Kajol Singh, Ashol Rai

Shocking statistics. Devastating stories. Our dirty national secret. INN bring you a horrifying report on the rampant sexual abuse of children in India. 

To begin with, hear the story of one child. On 17 December 2012 — just one day after the gangrape of a young paramedic in New Delhi shook the world — a three-and-a-half-year old baby girl returned from school with her clothes streaked with vomit and blood.

Her father, Gagan Sharma (name changed), had moved from Kolkata to a slum in west Delhi in 2003 in search of a better life. The little girl had been listless and reluctant to go to school for weeks. Now, when her mother asked her what had happened, she told the story haltingly, riven by fear.

Saradha Redux: Why Rose Valley Is A 'Ponzi Scheme'?

By Vivek Kaul (Guest Writer)

The Securities and Exchange Board of India(Sebi) in a significant order yesterday directed Rose Valley Hotels and Entertainments Limited (RVHEL) and its directors to stop raising deposits through any of its existing investment schemes.

Sebi also directed RVHEL and its directors not to launch any new schemes, not to dispose of any of the properties or alienate any of the assets of the schemes and not to divert any funds raised from public at large which are kept in bank account(s) and/or in the custody of the company.

ISLAMIC HERITAGE - PHOTO FEATURE

By M H Ahssan

From Kerala to Kashmir and from Tripura to Gujarat, India has a vast and rich heritage of Islamic architecture.



Taj Mahal, Agra, Uttar Pradesh, 17th century.

India is an enchanting land watered by the streams of compassionate philosophies since ancient times. Flourishing communities of the Islamic, Christian, Zoroastrian and Jewish faiths exist here. The Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina and Sikh faiths were born here. It has a great cosmopolitan heritage of culture and art.



The best-recognised monument in the Indian subcontinent is the Taj Mahal, the tomb of Arjumand Banu Begum (also known as Mumtaz Mahal), wife of the Mughal emperor Shah Jahan. He was also later laid to rest here. The pearly clarity of the white marble structure acquires different hues with the changing colour of light, from sunrise to sunset.

Although Mughal architecture of north India is famous, the fascinating richness of Islamic architectural heritage in other parts of the country is not so well known. The vastness of India's Islamic architectural heritage is unbelievable. India has more beautiful medieval Islamic architectural heritage than any other country. This is a fact which neither Indians nor the rest of the world is fully aware of.



QUTB MINAR, DELHI, early 13th century. In 1206, Mohammed Ghori was assassinated and his realm was divided among his slaves. One of them, Qutbuddin Aibak, assumed control over Delhi. He built the Qutb Minar near the Quwwat-ul-Islam ("might of Islam") mosque. One of the world's tallest minarets, it is 72.5 metres high.

It is a known fact that the most famous Islamic monument of the world, the Taj Mahal, is in India. But what is not equally well known is that one of the oldest mosques in the world is also in India, in Kerala. In fact, India has a vast and rich Islamic architectural heritage, from Kerala in the south to Kashmir in the north, from Tripura in the east to Gujarat in the west.



AGRA FORT, UTTAR Pradesh, 16th-17th century. Akbar, one of the greatest Mughal emperors (reign 1556-1605), was a brilliant intellectual and ruler. A remarkable monarch whose empire rivalled that of Asoka, he built a network of fortresses and palaces between 1565 and 1571. The first of these was the fort at Agra. His successors Jahangir and Shah Jahan added many sections within the fort. Here is a part of the white marble section of Agra Fort, which was built during the reign of Shah Jahan.

Islamic architecture is characterised by a few visible symbols. One is the arch, which frames the space; the second symbol is the dome, which looms over the skyscape; and the third is the minaret, which pierces the skies. Minarets were actually symbols in the middle of deserts. They represented fire, which was lit atop them to guide travellers. The dome represents the infinite and also the sky. As tomb architecture represents both the finite and the infinite, the dome has a very important role to play.



GATEWAY OF AKBAR'S Tomb, Sikandra, near Agra, Uttar Pradesh, 17th century. The impressive structure was built by his son Jahangir, who closely supervised the work, which was completed in 1613. Akbar did not impose his faith on his subjects. He forged matrimonial ties with Rajput rulers. Some of his closest confidants and advisers followed faiths other than his own.

Islam did not come to India from the north as is commonly believed. It came through Arab traders to the Malabar region in Kerala, and Muslims flourished as a trading community there. You can still see traces of that community amongst the Moplas of Kerala, who trace their ancestry to the Arabs.



ZIARAT OF SHAH Hamadan, Srinagar, Kashmir. In the mountainous kingdom of Kashmir, Islamic architecture was heavily influenced by ancient Hindu and Buddhist stone architecture. Wood was used extensively in the mosques and tombs of the Kashmir Valley. Shah Hamadan from Persia is known to have laid the foundations of Islam in the Kashmir Valley. The saint is deeply revered by the people. Built on the bank of the river Jhelum in Srinagar, the ziarat is a beautiful example of Kashmiri wooden architecture. It is in the ziarats of the saints of Kashmir that the people of the valley worship. Over the centuries, both Hindus and Muslims have equally revered the ziarats.

Since ancient times, India has had considerable trade contact with the Arab world. In the 1st century A.D., the Roman historian Pliny the Elder wrote about the existing routes to India and the July monsoon winds that traders used to catch to reach the Indian coast. He spoke about a ship that left the coast of Arabia and took 40 days to reach Muziris, which was then the name of present-day Kodungalloor.



GOL GUMBAZ, BIJAPUR, Karnataka, 17th century. The Gol Gumbaz, literally meaning "Round Dome", is one of the most impressive monuments in India. Built during the reign of Muhammad Adil Shah in the mid-17th century, it is the mausoleum of the ruler. It is one of the largest domes ever made in the world.

With the advent of Islam, Arab traders became the carriers of the new faith. The first mosque in India was built at Kodungalloor by the Chera King Cheraman Perumal in A.D. 629, within the lifetime of the Prophet. This is one of the oldest mosques in the world.



TOMB OF SHER Shah Suri, Sasaram, Bihar, 16th century. Sher Shah Suri (1486-1545) defeated the Mughal emperor Humayun in 1537 and created an empire. Even though he reigned only for five years, he laid the foundations of an Indian empire for later Mughal emperors. His lasting legacy is the Grand Trunk Road that he laid from Sonagarh in Bangladesh to Peshawar in Pakistan. Of Afghan origin, Sher Shah was born in Sasaram. His tomb is situated at the centre of an artificial lake. The location of the tomb in the middle of the water is a reference to Paradise with its plentiful waters, as described in the Quran.

Kayalpattnam is an ancient town about a kilometre from the mouth of the Tamiraparani river. Arab traders built the Kodiakarai Mosque here as early as Hijri 12, or A.D. 633. It is the first mosque to be built in Tamil Nadu and ranks among the oldest mosques in the world. Kayalpattnam has many other early mosques. In fact, Kerala on the west coast of India and Tamil Nadu on the east coast have numerous mosques, made through the ages. At Nagore, on the east coast, is one of the grandest dargahs ever made.



HUMAYUN'S TOMB, DELHI. It was built in the 16th century by Haji Begum, the emperor's eldest widow. It is closely related to the previous architecture of Delhi, of the 14th and 15th centuries.

Islam came to the north of India through different invasions, starting with the invasion of Mahmud of Ghazni, who came as far as Gujarat. Thereafter, there was the peaceful contribution of different Sufi saints, traders and other individuals who moved to the northern region of India because of political instability or dynastic changes that were taking place in and around Central Asia and Afghanistan at that time. Gradually, a small community developed and increased its strength once Turkish rule was established in north India.


JAMI MASJID, CHAMPANER, Gujarat, 15th century. A new capital was built at Champaner by Sultan Mahmud Begarha towards the end of the 15th century. The Jami Masjid is one of the most striking buildings here. The symmetrical appearance of the whole is enhanced by the exquisite details of its parts. The surface is profusely decorated with fine carvings. It is one of the most exquisite monuments of Gujarat.

The Quwwat-ul-Islam Mosque was the first mosque built in north India, in A.D. 1193. A number of Quranic verses are beautifully etched on the mosque. Some medieval writers say they are so beautifully carved that it looks as if they are written on wax.

MAHMUD GAWAN MADARSA, Bidar, Karnataka, 15th century. Founded in 1472 by Mahmud Gawan, the Persian minister of Muhammad Shah III, it was built by engineers and craftsmen from Gilan on the Caspian Sea. The structure closely resembles the madrassas of Persia and Uzbekistan.

The most impressive monument in the Qutb complex in present-day Delhi is the Qutb Minar itself. It was made in the early 13th century by Qutbuddin Aibak, the sultan of Delhi. At 72.5 metres, it is one of the tallest minarets in the world. The traveller Ibn Batuta, who came to India after journeying all over the Islamic empire, starting from Africa and covering Samarkand and Damascus, has recorded that nowhere in the world has there been a minaret as impressive as the Qutb Minar.



STONE JAALI, MOSQUE of Sidi Saiyyad, Ahmedabad, Gujarat, 16th century. One of the unique features of Islamic architecture in Gujarat is the use of intricate stone jaalis with exquisite carving. Naturalistic carvings of foliated designs with delicate leaves and shoots derive directly from earlier indigenous traditions.

Close to the Qutb complex is the tomb of Ghiyasuddin Balban, another 13th century ruler of Delhi. Balban ruled from 1266 to 1286. His tomb marks a very important development in the field of architecture. Before this tomb was built, a number of arches had been made in Indian Islamic buildings, but these were not “true arches”. In Balban's tomb, for the first time in India, a keystone, which is fundamental to the true load-bearing arch, was used at the top of the arch. Subsequently, the “true arch” began to be used in numerous structures across the country.



BIBI KA MAQBARA, Aurangabad, 17th century. The mausoleum of Emperor Aurangzeb's wife Rabia ul Daurani was built by her son Prince Azam Shah between 1651 and 1661. Set at the centre of a charbagh enclosure, the white marble mausoleum was inspired by the Taj Mahal. It is known as the `Taj Mahal of the Deccan'.

The Alai Darwaja was built by Allauddin Khilji as part of the extension of the Qutb complex in 1305. It is very fascinating from the point of view of architecture. In the 13th century, owing to Mongol attacks in West Asia and Central Asia, a large number of craftsmen had to flee from their lands. Many of them were given refuge in this part of India and were very fruitfully employed in the making of the Alai Darwaja. We see here the introduction of the horseshoe arch in Indian monuments.

The Deccan
Meanwhile, Islamic influence continued to grow further south, in the Deccan. The end of the 15th century saw the establishment of five sultanates in the Deccan: Ahmadnagar, Bijapur, Golconda, Bidar and Berar. The sultan of Bijapur was a descendant of the Ottoman dynasty of Istanbul. The sultan of Golconda was a Turkman prince who had taken refuge in India. The sultans were followers of the Shia sect of Islam and were close allies of the Safavid rulers of Iran. A distinct culture thus developed in the cosmopolitan community of the Deccan.


JAMA MASJID, JUNAGARH, Sourashtra, Gujarat, originally built in the 13th century. Junagarh is located at the foothills of the Girnar hills. The name literally means "old fort". The plan of this is in the Arab style, which was not repeated in Gujarat after its subsequent conquest by the Delhi Sultanate.
The streets of the Deccani sultanates were filled with Turks, Persians, Arabs and Africans. In India, the Deccan became the greatest centre of Arabic learning and literature. In fact, Iran and Central Asia only had single courts. If you were a soldier, a religious figure, an intellectual or an artistic person and you could not find a sponsor in what is now Iran or Uzbekistan, chances were that you could find some sort of patronage in the Deccan. Thus there was a continuous migration of people, ideas and artistic devices from the Near East to the Deccan.

A remarkable example of an architectural transplant from Central Asia is the madrassa of Mahmud Gawan, in Bidar, built at the end of the 15th century. It would be very hard to tell the difference between this and the madrassas of Uzbekistan or eastern Iran. The similarities between the two are not only in form or in other architectural elements such as corner minarets, the square courtyard in the middle and four great arched portals, but also in the decorations of the exterior with blue-and-white tiles.

Sultan Ibrahim Adil Shah II ruled Bijapur from 1580 to 1627. He was a contemporary of the Mughal emperor Akbar. A visit to his rauza, or tomb, is a pilgrimage for someone deeply interested in Indian art, for some of the finest miniature paintings ever made in India were made during his rule.



IBRAHIM RAUZA COMPLEX, Bijapur, Karnataka, 17th century. The monumental heritage of the Deccan is distinctive and quite different from that of the Mughals. The architectural styles that are seen in Bijapur, Bidar, Gulbarga and Hyderabad are closely related to those of Persia and Turkey. Ibrahim Adil Shah II ruled the kingdom of Bijapur from 1580 to 1627. He was one of the most humane and cosmopolitan kings in history. He was a magnanimous patron of the arts. Painting, poetry and music flourished during his reign. In his autobiography, the great sultan calls himself the "son of Ganesa", a Hindu deity.
The Gol Gumbaz in Bijapur is the tomb of Sultan Muhammad Adil Shah, who ruled from A.D. 1627 to 1657. This is the largest dome ever built in the Islamic world. It is the second largest dome in the world, after the one at Saint Peter's Basilica in Rome. It measures 37.92 metres on the inside.

The massive Bidar fort was built in the 14th and 15th centuries. It is one of the most formidable forts in the country. It has walls that run for 5.5 km around. Inside, it has beautiful palaces, two mosques, a madrassa, ornamental gardens and hamams.



TURKISH MAHAL, BIDAR Fort, Karnataka, 15th-16th century.
Timur, when he came to India, was struck by the beauty of its historical cities. In his autobiography, Malfujaate Taimoori, he says, “I ordered that all the artisans and clever mechanics who are masters of their respective crafts should be picked out from among the prisoners and set aside. And accordingly some thousands of craftsmen were selected to await my command. I had determined to build a Masjid-e-Jami in Samarkand, the seat of my empire, which should be without rival in any country. So I ordered that all the builders and stonemasons of India should be set apart for my own special service.” In some other records it is said that he took about 3,000 artisans from India and employed them in the construction of the Jami Masjid at Samarkand.

Mughal architecture
The dynasty founded by Babur became one of the greatest the world had seen. It ruled a vast empire whose fame spread far and wide. The culture and the art it created helped shape future developments in all spheres of life in the Indian subcontinent.

Humayun's Tomb, which might be considered the first great masterpiece of the Mughals, is very much related to the previous architecture of Delhi. It is closely linked to the Lodhi and Tuglaq architectures of the 14th and 15th centuries. Mughal architecture presents us with a fusion of local elements, building techniques, styles and traditions with imported traditions and styles. The genius of Mughal architecture is that it sustained this incredibly rich mingling of different traditions throughout its history.

Agra was the imperial capital of Akbar in the mid-16th century. The fort here was one of the most powerful in north India. In 1565, Emperor Akbar ordered the reconstruction of the fort. The fort has palaces of Akbar, Jahangir and Shah Jahan. The most prominent among all the structures are the white marble buildings of Shah Jahan. The Khas Mahal, made of pure marble, is one of these elegant buildings. It is flanked by the palaces of Shah Jahan's daughters Roshanara and Jahanara.



THE BIDAR FORT is one of the most impressive forts in the country. Completed in 1532, it was the largest architectural undertaking of the Bahamanid dynasty. It has palaces, two mosques, a madrassa and many royal tombs inside.

In 1571, Emperor Akbar decided to build a new capital city. And a magnificent city was built at a site not very far from Agra. It was called Fatehpur Sikri. This was Akbar's most ambitious architectural project. By the end of the 16th century, there were a quarter of a million people living in the new city.

In the building of Fatehpur Sikri, no cost was too much, no effort too great, for Akbar. He wished to build the city true to his conception. As a matter of fact, miniature paintings of that period show the emperor amidst the workers, supervising the construction of the city himself. Fatehpur Sikri is one of the best ordered and symmetrically laid-out cities of the entire medieval world.

The world's best-known tomb stands testimony to a timeless love story. The Taj Mahal was built in 1648 by the Emperor Shah Jahan in memory of his beloved wife Arjumand Banu Begum, known to the world as Mumtaz Mahal. The construction of the Taj Mahal was a stupendous engineering feat. It is built of marble and is finely inlaid with semi-precious stones. As many as 20,000 workers and master craftsmen laboured for 17 years to erect this magnificent edifice. Several hundreds of mosques and Islamic tombs of great beauty are spread throughout India.

Coming to the west of the country, in Gujarat is the World Heritage Site of Champaner of the 15th century. In the east there is the impressive Nakhoda Masjid and several others in Kolkata. There are famous dargahs in Hajo and other places in Assam. In the north-eastern region of India, in Agartala in Tripura is the beautiful Gedu Mia Ki Masjid.

In the mountainous State of Kashmir, Islamic architecture was influenced by ancient Hindu and Buddhist traditions. The resultant form was combined with influences from Persia and Turkistan. Wood was used extensively in the mosques and tombs of Kashmir.

India has a vast, living heritage of Islamic architecture. These monuments are a great treasure of India's culture and many of them are recognised as World Heritage Monuments. We see in these the confluence of local talent and inspiration from Iran, Arabia and Central Asia. These mosques, tombs, madrassas, palaces and fortresses are a unique heritage of Islamic architecture.

The Horror of Indian Jails: Dark Sub-Culture Dominated By Murky Underworld Of Organized Gangs And Criminals Supported By Poor Legal Aid And Careless Machinery

Right to Justice bill: Helplessness, psychological disorders torture Indian prisoners. An extensive investigation by INNLIVE reporters across the country has exposed a dark sub-culture thriving in jails across the country, not very different from the murky underworld of organised gangs and criminals. In the absence of proper legal aid, the poor and the vulnerable, especially women and youngsters, unwittingly become part of the sordid system.

Any discussion on prisoners in a sympathetic manner evokes a sharp response: "Why should you worry about these people? They are dangerous criminals, murderers and rapists, why complain if they are ill treated ? They deserve it." 

'Nearly 20 Lakh Private Arms Licensed In Half India': RTI

By Ashmit Sinha | INNLIVE

ALARMING SITUATION Governments across Indian states have issued 19.80 lakh private gun licences in 324 districts, or in just under half the country’s 671 districts.

States that have suffered terrorism and those with poor social indicators top the list. Uttar Pradesh, which has 16.50 per cent of the country’s population, has issued 11.23 lakh private licences, according to a government affidavit filed in the Allahabad High Court last year. The district-wise data were received over four years from queries sent to 600 districts; many didn’t respond. For the 324 that did, the average works out to 6,113 licences per district.

Should President's Rule Be Imposed To Create Telangana?

By M H Ahssan / INN Live

Contrary to the prevailing opinion, in this country, new state formation has never been smooth. Nor were the procedures exactly similar. Each state formation was unique and had followed a different sequence of steps.

The only thing common to all the state formations so far in Independent India has been the rigid applicability of Article 3 in its truest sense, where Parliament is given the supreme authority to carve out states irrespective of the opinion of the involved State Assemblies.

While the NDA followed a convenient procedure in the creation of Uttarakhand, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand in 2000, where the state assemblies initiated the demand for separation, such a procedure is neither legally mandated nor is constitutionally prescribed and deviates from most other prior state formations. 

How BJP Duped EC With White Lotus, Varanasi On Polling?

By M H Ahssan | INNLIVE

EYE OPENER When the Election Commission finally filed an FIR against Narendra Modi on 30 April for waving a white lotus around while addressing a press conference, it wasn't like the BJP, its prime ministerial candidate and pretty much every party hadn't already been making the most of loopholes in its model code of conduct. 

The case that was finally lodged against Modi was under sections 126- 1(a) 126- 1(b) of the Representatives of People's Act for holding up the party symbol while addressing a press conference. He now faces a maximum punishment of up to 2 years in jail or could be let off with a rap on the knuckles and a fine. 

Terrorism in India: An Uncertain Relief

By M H Ahssan

While India's relations with most of her neighbours remain fraught with tensions, her most urgent security crises remain overwhelmingly internal. Indeed, even international friction increasingly articulates itself through sub-conventional and terrorist wars that are predominantly internal, in that they manifest themselves principally on Indian soil. Islamist extremist terrorism sourced from Pakistan and, over the past few years, increasingly from Bangladesh, falls into this category.

A relief, in numbers
The recent trajectory of internal conflicts in India has been mixed. Overall, fatalities connected with terrorism and insurgency declined marginally from 2,765 in 2006 to 2,598 in 2007, and dramatically, from their peak at 5,839 in 2001.

In Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), for over a decade and a half the bloodiest theatre of terrorism in the country, there was strong relief, with terrorism-related fatalities – at 777 – falling below the 'high intensity conflict' mark of a thousand deaths for the first time since 1990. At peak in 2001, fatalities in J&K had risen to 4,507. Clearly, 2007 brought tremendous relief to the people of the state, but a great deal remains to be achieved before normalcy is restored.

In India's troubled Northeast, wracked by multiple insurgencies, the situation worsened considerably, with fatalities more than doubling, from 427 in 2006 to 1,019 in 2007, principally because of a dramatic escalation in terrorist activities in Assam and Manipur.

Effects of the war on terror
The numbers alone, however, do not give a clear picture of the magnitude of the challenges confronting New Delhi. Indeed, the sheer spread of Islamist terrorist incidents across India – linked to groups that originally operated exclusively within J&K – is now astonishing, with incidents having been engineered in widely dispersed theatres virtually across the country.

The trend in J&K has little correlation with specific changes in operational strategies or tactics, or with the range of 'peace initiatives' the Government has undertaken domestically and with Pakistan. This is demonstrated by the fact that the downward trend in violence has been consistently sustained since 2001, irrespective of the transient character of relationships between India and Pakistan, or any escalation or decline of operations within J&K, and has been maintained even through periods of escalating tension and provocative political rhetoric. This trend commenced immediately after the 9/11 attacks in the US and the subsequent threat by the US for Pakistan to "be prepared to be bombed back into the Stone Age."

It was this threat, a steady build-up of international pressure, and intense international media focus on Pakistan's role in the sponsorship of terrorism, which combined to force Pakistan to execute a U-turn in its policy on Afghanistan, and dilute visible support to terrorism in J&K. Thereafter, the unrelenting succession of crises in Pakistan have undermined the country's capacities to sustain past levels of terrorism in J&K – particularly since a large proportion of troops had to be pulled back from the Line of Control and International Border for deployment in increasingly violent theatres in Balochistan, NWFP and the FATA areas. Pakistan's creeping implosion has undermined the establishment's capacities to sustain the 'proxy war' against India at earlier levels.

Regrettably, if Western attention is diverted from the region, or if the Islamists in Pakistan are able to carve out autonomous capacities and regions, free of their dependence on the state's covert agencies, or if there is a radical escalation in the 'global jihad' in the wake of the proposed US withdrawal from Iraq in the foreseeable future, the 'jihad' in Kashmir and across India could, once again, intensify dramatically.

Bad governance and marginalization
Similarly, there is overwhelming evidence that the limited 'gains' in terms of declining Maoist violence outside Andhra Pradesh, are the result, not of any significant initiatives on the part of the state's agencies, but rather, of a Maoist decision to focus on political and mass mobilisation in order to "intensify the people's war throughout the country, intending to cumulatively cover virtually the length and breadth of India.

Far from confronting this subversive onslaught, the incompetence of Governments – most dramatically the West Bengal Government and its actions in Nandigram, but less visibly in several other States – has presented the Maoists with proliferating opportunities to deepen subversive mobilization and recruitment.

Despite the dramatic macroeconomic growth experienced over the past decade and a half, vast populations have remained outside the scope of minimal standards on a wide range of developmental indices. Indeed, the processes of 'development' have themselves been severely disruptive; what we are witnessing today is at once a process of globalisation and marginalisation; the rise of oppressed castes through political processes, and parallel increases in the intensity of oppression; unimagined wealth and distressing poverty.

Need stronger political mandate
Nevertheless, in at least two major theatres of insurgency, Tripura in the Northeast and Andhra Pradesh in the South, local administrations have backed the police to execute extraordinarily successful counterinsurgency campaigns. Clearly, where the will and the vision exist, the Indian state has the capacity to combat violence and terrorism.

Unfortunately, a widening crisis of governance afflicts much of India today, with a continuous erosion of administrative capacities across wide areas. There is, moreover, an insufficient understanding within the security establishment of the details of insurgent strategy and tactics, and the imperatives of the character of response. The deficiencies of perspective and design are visible in the fact that no comprehensive strategy has yet been articulated to deal with insurgency and terrorism. The security forces have, at great cost in lives, made dramatic gains from time to time, but there have been continuous reverses, usually as a result of repeated political miscalculations and the refusal to provide the necessary mandate to the forces operating against the extremists.