Importing Efficiency: Can Lessons from Mumbai's Dabbawalas Help Its Taxi Drivers?

Mumbai has 150,000 licensed taxi drivers. It has 5,000 dabbawalas, organized porters who carry cooked lunches to office workers. The former, along with about 450,000 auto-rickshaw (three-wheeler taxi) drivers, are constantly in the news for reports of bad behavior, overcharging and even violence. The dabbawalas, on the other hand, are icons of efficiency. They have even made it to the Harvard Business Review as a case study.

Taxis are vital to the city, as public buses cannot cope with rider demand. Mumbai’s local trains transport more than 6 million people each day, according to figures provided by the Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation (MSRDC). At the station of embarkation from the local train, many commuters take a share-a-cab (four to a taxi) to reach their final destination. Anthony Quadros, president of the Mumbai Taximen’s Union, estimates that there are 1.2 million regular taxi users in Mumbai. In this city, nothing is certain but death and taxis.

The dabbawalas don’t have an equivalent in other cities. The 100-year-old organization takes cooked food from people’s homes and supply centers (which could be a housewife-turned-home entrepreneur) and delivers the meals to offices. In this realm, a mistake carries stiff consequences, particularly because religion dictates which foods many people can or can't eat. But the dabbawalas are very close to a no-mistake regime and they have built a great deal of trust.

“The dabbawalas even carry forgotten spectacles and mobile phones,” says Pawan Agrawal, CEO of the Mumbai Dabbawala Education Centre, an offshoot of the Dabbawala Association. “Sometimes, customers even send home their salary with the empty tiffin box. That’s customer service.” Agrawal, who is a spokesperson for the dabbawalas and has done a study on the group's logistics and supply chain management efforts, says that the number of customers in Mumbai has crossed 200,000.

On a superficial level, the two cohorts seem to have a lot in common. Both come from marginalized and oppressed socio-economic groups. Their average education is up to the eighth grade. They belong to a low-skill, working class category and service the city’s middle class. Why, then, are the two groups' reputations so radically distinct?

“The difference stems from the difference in their cultural backgrounds,” says Ramesh Kamble, a professor of sociology at Mumbai University. In India, there are still some professions that are dominated by certain communities. In many Indian cities -- Delhi and Kolkata, for instance -- taxis are run by owner-operators and there traditionally was a preponderance of turbaned Sikhs from Punjab. Today, particularly in Mumbai where the people tend to be a shade more entrepreneurial and adventurous, many of those drivers have moved away, some to the U.S. and Canada.

In Mumbai, most of the taxi drivers are now migrants from the north Indian states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh (UP). This springs into public consciousness every time the parochial political parties in the state start a “Maharashtra for Maharashtrians” campaign. The first target of the agitating mobs is often the taxi driver. The dabbawallas, on the other hand, belong. According to Agrawal, all but six of the 5,000 dabbawalas come from a particular community of Maharashtrians.

“North India is extremely feudal, with a hierarchical and patriarchal culture. Reclaiming that culture becomes necessary to find space in that group at the place of migration,” says Kamble. “However, in Maharashtra, since the 1920s we have had various kinds of movements, such as the textile workers’ movement, the Dalit [low caste] movement and the feminist movement. The dabbawalas are also deeply influenced by the Bhakti [devotion] movement. Their efficiency is not entirely a management marvel; it is rooted in their cultural values. The same work ethic exists among porters at Mumbai’s railway stations because these working classes have similar cultural contexts.”

But not all seem to agree with the cultural hypothesis. Stefan H. Thomke, a professor of business administration at Harvard Business School and author of a case study titled, "The Dabbawala System: On Time Delivery, Every Time," believes that while the fact that new members are recruited from 30 villages in and around Pune contributes to the organization’s performance, there are many other critical factors that reinforce each other and must be considered. “Most importantly, the dabbawala’s performance can only be understood if we study the entire system -- their culture, management, organization and processes -- and how these factors interact with each other,” Thomke notes. “You cannot copy one single factor ... and hope to replicate performance without regard to others.”

The dabbawalas themselves say that the charge of being a non-inclusive organization is misplaced. Most people believe that you need to belong to the Warkari Sampraday (loosely translated as the Pilgrim Group) to be a dabbawala. Not true, according to Agrawal. The only recruitment criterion is a “guarantee” -- essentially, a verbal assurance of the candidate’s character -- by an existing member. “Most people tend to refer their friends or family members who belong to the same community. It has just worked out like that.”

Advantages of Community
But Agrawal says having employees from the same community has several benefits. “Our values, inclinations and psychology are similar. So there is better understanding and teamwork," he notes. "It doesn’t require talent; it’s just common sense. We wouldn’t be Six-Sigma certified without that coordination. In fact, since we began with one customer and one dabba [lunchbox] in 1890, this has become almost like a family business.”

Quadros of the taxi drivers' union says the one-community culture makes it easier for leaders to manage and retain their employees. “We don’t have that kind of control over our taxi drivers. It’s very difficult, especially with the newer generation.... They drive taxis for about five to 10 years, earn what they can and then do something else. They have no interest in the taxi trade or helping to improve it. The dabbawalas are not migrants; that helps.”

But Varsha Ayyar, an assistant professor in the School of Management and Labor Studies at the Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS), notes that even migrant groups have a sense of community. There is also a tendency to join the same profession when they come into a city. Working with others from the same village gives migrants a sense of security when they first arrive. They help to get them a job; a construction worker would be most cognizant of vacancies in his field, for example. And they act as informal mentors, particularly when the newcomer is a relative. In Mumbai, there is a large area known as Sonar Bangla in which illegal Bangladeshis have settled. They number several hundred thousand and tend to stick together.

Migration doesn’t explain everything, continues Ayyar. “The difference is that dabbawalas have more of a sense of autonomy and accountability. The system itself demands that,” she says. “Taxi drivers [in Mumbai] are often not owners of the taxis; there is no sense of ownership and they have to make a minimum amount of money each day, even if it means tampering with the meter.” According to Quadros, taxi drivers are vulnerable. If a driver parks illegally, or merely in the wrong spot, to drop off or pick up a passenger, he often has to bribe the police if caught. Regular extortion for real or imagined transgressions means that drivers must earn more than what is registered on the meter. Fights with passengers, who often know what the exact fare should be, are inevitable. And this adds to the atmosphere of acrimony.

Sense of Social Coherence
But Bino Paul GD, an associate professor at the TISS School of Management and Labor Studies, attributes part of the culture of the dabbawalas to their tremendous sense of social coherence with the city -- they live with their families, eat home-cooked meals and lead respectable lives. “Those factors are more important than community. Taxi drivers have none of these advantages. That seriously affects their morale,” says Paul. Taxi drivers often live in slums with 10 or 15 people to a room. Working conditions are tough -- as mentioned earlier, among the toughest in the world. They don’t have parking space or restrooms. “A lot of them belong to religious minorities,” notes Paul. “They lead anonymous, invisible lives compared to the dabbawalas.”

Then why become a taxi driver at all? That’s a question that could be asked in any large city. “Reservation wage,” says Paul, using a theory from labor economics. “That is the market wage below which people won’t enter the labor force. The reservation wage of Maharashtrians is much higher than that of taxi drivers. Also, there are push and pull factors that facilitate migration. Poverty is a major push factor.”

It’s a tough life. Taxi drivers work 12 to 16 hours a day, seven days a week. They make around US$60 to US$100 a month. Dabbawalas work nine hours a day, six days a week and make US$160 to $US180 a month. They supplement that income by US$80 to US$100 per month doing other jobs, such as delivering newspapers or milk. Some are also part-time taxi drivers. “For [dabbawalas], work is worship,” Agrawal says, citing the group’s credo, “We believe that by serving food, we are serving God. We don’t work for money.”

For the taxi driver, money is a key frustration. “[If a driver doesn’t get enough fares], he gets angry,” Quadros notes, adding that the formula for calculating taxi fares has not been revised by the government since 1996.The taxi drivers’ job, by its very nature, means moving from place to place. Toward the end of a shift, the driver has to maneuver to get back where he started from. In Mumbai, taxis are on the roads 24 hours a day, with one driver replacing the other when his duty is over. The dabbawala on the other hand has a fixed route; his schedule is as regular as a newspaper carrier's. He can tell you where he will be at any given time. The regularity makes for discipline, experts say.

But what about the sheer numbers of taxi drivers as compared with the dabbawalas? Does this have anything to do with their group behavior? Paul of TISS does not think so. “That there are so many more taxi drivers than dabbawalas is not relevant to how well they are able to enforce discipline. When it comes to property rights in terms of ownership or control over vehicles, power lies in a few hands. There are a few [people] that regulate the whole activity, a collective of some interest.”

According to Paul, whether it is taxi drivers or dabbawalas, power structures exist within both organizations. The only difference, he points out, is that dabbawalas have a more formal power structure that is known to everybody. In the case of taxi drivers, there are multi-stakeholder informal power structures.

Is there anything that the taxi drivers can learn from the dabbawalas? Harvard's Thomke views the groups' divergent behavior as a nature vs. nurture battle. “I believe that nature is one input, among many inputs, but it is the nurture -- or the system -- that explains excellent service performance." While he is unfamiliar with the Mumbai taxi trade, Thomke suggests a thought experiment: if the dabbawalas were to run the taxi system, what would they change?

Agrawal says that the taxi drivers' basic organizational structure should be reconsidered. The dabbawalas have several hundred group leaders that are the core of the organization. Each heads groups of 10 to 25 members and is responsible for all their activities. “How can one leader control and be responsible for thousands of drivers?” asks Agrawal. “They should make groups of 20 to 30 drivers reporting to a leader who can properly manage them and inculcate values of honesty and efficiency.”

But Quadros doesn’t think that approach will work. “It is difficult to imbibe the best practices of the dabbawalas,” he says. “Even if I hold a meeting, very few people will show up.”

'Too Many Spooks Spoil The Case'

Liaquat Shah’s case is a symptom of the colossal anti-terror mess. Dozens of agencies, turf wars, power centres, crossed wires. Is the NCTC the answer?

On22 March New Delhi woke up and counted its blessings. Officers of the Delhi Police Special Cell claimed they had averted a major terror strike by arresting Hizbul Mujahideen commander Liaquat Shah on the Indo-Nepal border near Gorakhpur in Uttar Pradesh. A cache of arms and ammunition, including AK rifles and grenades, too had allegedly been recovered from a guesthouse in old Delhi. As 24×7 news channels showed a haggard-looking man, shouting his innocence, in the grip of gun-toting Special Cell men, the National Capital Region and perhaps the whole country heaved a sigh of relief. Memories of the twin blasts that rocked Hyderabad on 21 February were still fresh in their minds.

The police claimed that Liaquat, a resident of Kupwara in Jammu & Kashmir, had slipped into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir in 1997 and received arms training. They said Liaquat had returned to oversee a terror attack to avenge the hanging of 2001 Parliament attack convict Afzal Guru.

The terror story ruled the airwaves for a few hours before it exploded in Delhi Police’s face. As soon as news of Liaquat’s arrest went public, his family and the J&K Police debunked Delhi Police’s claims. According to the J&K Police, Liaquat was a reformed militant coming home to start a new life. His relatives claimed they had notified the cops on 5 February 2011 about Liaquat’s planned surrender. The route that he had taken, entering India through Nepal, is the most preferred one for reformed militants and many who availed of the state’s surrender policy had used it.

J&K Police also claimed that two policemen had gone to Gorakhpur to pick up 9-10 people, including Liaquat, and had kept the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Delhi Police in the loop. When the handover happened, the J&K Police allege that the Delhi Police didn’t allow them to take Liaquat into custody. Two days later, he was paraded as a terror mastermind.

However, a Delhi Police officer begged to differ and made some counter-claims.

• If the J&K Police had received the surrender application in February 2011, then why did they file an FIR against Liaquat in March for waging war against the nation?
• Why is the J&K Police refusing to reveal the identity of the two personnel who had gone to pick up the contingent?

The Delhi cop also wondered whether his colleagues were foolish enough to jeopardise an operation in which both the IB and the J&K Police were kept in the loop.

The Kashmir Valley, which was already reeling under curfews imposed after Guru’s hanging, erupted in protest. Chief Minister Omar Abdullah was quick to remind the Centre that Liaquat’s arrest might deal a big blow to its flagship programme aimed at bringing back reformed militants who had crossed over to POK. PDP leader Mehbooba Mufti added that Kashmiris are nabbed without evidence and treated as fodder for rewards and medals.

Two days after Omar made the demand, the Union home ministry announced that the National Investigation Agency (NIA) will probe the curious case of Liaquat.

This is not the first time such claims and counter-claims have exposed the lack of coordination between various intelligence agencies. And it won’t be the last.

As a home ministry official puts it, “Intelligence agencies have a ruthless desire to put one’s interest before everything and make sure they get all the credit. The nation’s interest can go to hell for all they care.”

So, how does one explain Liaquat’s arrest? Was it due to a bad intelligence input or an insatiable greed on the part of the security agencies to have a terror arrest against their names so that their annual confidential report looks good? There are close to 23 security agencies, 35 state anti-terror cells and special units operating in India on hundreds of cases in which people have been branded as terrorists, only to be found innocent after a trial extending from five years to eternity. By that time, the officer concerned has moved on in his life, with a gallantry medal pinned on his chest for exemplary courage. INN has relentlessly chronicled the plight of such innocents, who were falsely implicated. INN has also tracked the alarming chaos and difficulties faced by India’s anti-terror establishment. 

When P Chidambaram took over as home minister after the 26/11 attacks, it was seen as a welcome relief. He touted the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) as a magic wand that will rid Indian intelligence agencies of their turf wars. Four years later, the NCTC has turned out to be the biggest bone of contention between the Centre and the states. The fate of Chidambaram’s pet project will be known at the internal security meeting of the chief ministers to be held in Delhi on 15 April. So, with the NCTC’s dilution, are we once again taking one step forward and two steps back in the fight against terror?

“If everybody in the intelligence community had shared inputs, 70 percent of the terror attacks would not have taken place,” says an intelligence officer. “But then, given the stakes involved, it is also asking for the impossible.” This sums up the attitude of the intelligence agencies, who are busy fighting a turf war rather than the war against terror.

When two blasts rocked Dilsukhnagar, a crowded locality in Hyderabad, on 23 February, terror made its first visit to India in 2013. The twin blasts killed 17 people and injured more than 100. What followed was something that has played out again and again after every terror attack.

Within no time, the Union home ministry issued a statement that it had shared intelligence inputs with the Andhra Pradesh government, which they “failed” to assess and act upon. Not wanting to be left out of the action, Delhi Police Special Cell officers told friendly journalists that two Indian Mujahideen (IM) operatives had confessed in late 2012 that Dilsukhnagar was one of the areas where they had done a recce. The officers claimed they had passed on the information. But the AP Police rubbished those claims, saying the intel inputs were not that specific.

Forty-eight hours later, the NIA took over the probe. A crucial piece of information emerged when CCTV footage revealed a man visiting the spot on a bicycle. He was seen leaving a bag and fleeing just minutes before the blasts. Going by the modus operandi, the NIA suspect that IM operatives Tabrez and Waqas, who were part of the 13/7 Mumbai attack, had a hand in this operation as well.

However, 12 days before the blasts, something interesting had happened in Mumbai. On 11 February, the Mumbai Anti- Terror Squad (ATS) had announced a reward of 10 lakh each for information on four IM operatives alleged to be behind various terror strikes across India in the past couple of years, including the 2012 Pune blasts. They were Yasin Bhatkal, the founder-leader of IM and one of India’s most-wanted terrorists, Asadullah Akhtar alias Tabrez, Waqas alias Ahmed and Tahseen alias Raju bhai. For a long time it was believed that Tabrez and Waqas were Pakistanis, but the Mumbai ATS claimed that they were, in fact, Indians.

But the Mumbai ATS failed to disclose that had it not been for a major goof-up, involving the Delhi Police, IB and Mumbai ATS, three out of the four IM operatives would have been behind bars and maybe the lives of the 16 people in Hyderabad could have been saved.

Chronicles of a Terror Foretold
Five cases where lack of coordination among the security agencies cost the country dear 

1. Hyderabad 2013 The 21 February blasts in Hyderabad could have been averted if the Mumbai Police had not arrested Naqi Ahmed Wasi in January 2012. Wasi, a Delhi Police informer, was on the verge of leading the police to Indian Mujahideen operatives Waqas and Tabrez, when he was nabbed for his alleged role in the 2011 serial blasts that rocked Mumbai. Security agencies suspect that Waqas and Tabrez were instrumental in the Hyderabad blasts

2. Kolkata 2009 Indian Mujahideen founder-leader Yasin Bhatkal was arrested by the Kolkata Police in 2009 on charges of carrying fake currency. But he was set free after only a month in jail as he could convince the police that his arrest was a case of mistaken identity. Unfortunately, the police had no way of cross-checking with a national database

3. Mumbai 2008 Despite having concrete intelligence, the investigators could not join the dots, leading to audacious terror attacks on 26/11. The Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) knew of the training and sea movements of Lashkare- Toiba terrorists and the IB had a list of 35 cell phone numbers, but those leads were not pursued. The role of the Mumbai ATS also came under the scanner for its inability to access the information

4. Kargil 1999 The IB had 45 specific intelligence inputs. The most concrete input received in June 1998 said that Pakistan was building bunkers, but it was not shared with everybody. The then RAW chief Girish Saxena was livid enough to put his displeasure on record, saying that the turf war had cost the country dear

5. Purulia 1995 In the Purulia arms drop case, where automatic weapons and ammunition were dropped from an aircraft in West Bengal to be used by a militant group, RAW had the information at least a week prior to the incident. “We gave the information to the home ministry 4-5 days in advance. The ministry sent it by registered post to Calcutta,” says a former RAW official

On 20 November 2011, the Delhi Police Special Cell announced that they had busted a homegrown terror module and arrested six people. They were Mohd Qateel Siddiqi, Mohd Irshad Khan, Gauhar Aziz Khomani, Gayur Ahmed Jamali and Abdul Rahman (all from Bihar) and Mohd Adil (from Karachi). This module was allegedly behind the terror attacks at German Bakery in Pune, Chinnaswamy Stadium in Bengaluru and the Jama Masjid in Delhi.

It was a joint operation by the Delhi Police Special Cell and the IB, but what was not revealed in the press conference was the identity of the seventh person, Naqi Ahmed Wasi Shaikh, who was also arrested. Naqi was a resident of Darbhanga district in Bihar and owned a leather-processing unit in Byculla, Mumbai.

Naqi told the Special Cell that he knew about the hideout of Bhatkal and two other IM operatives in Mumbai and could lead the police to it. Though Bhatkal and his accomplice had vacated the place, they were yet to collect their advance of 1 lakh. The Special Cell had put the phone line of Rubina, the landlady, on surveillance. On 1 January, they got a lucky breakthrough when one of the “Pakistanis” made a call to Rubina, who asked him to call back in an hour. The suspect called after three hours but Rubina told him that she needed more time to return the money. The call was traced to a phone booth in Dadar. The sleuths were confident that they were on the verge of effecting a big breakthrough.

On 23 January, the Mumbai ATS announced to the world that they have arrested two people from Bihar in connection with the 13/7 Mumbai blasts. One of them was Naqi. A stunned Special Cell then leaked the news that Naqi was their informer, triggering a war of words between the Special Cell and Mumbai ATS. The moment Naqi’s arrest was made public, all the clues simply disappeared.

This is touted as a classic case of how lack of coordination, inflated egos and the constant game of one-upmanship are compromising the fight against terror.

However, this was not the only embarrassing story that emerged out of that breakthrough. During the course of interrogation, the revelations made by Mohd Irshad stunned and embarrassed the Delhi Police. Irshad told them that Bhatkal had lived in New Delhi for 8-9 months in 2011.

Bhatkal was married to Irshad’s daughter and was living in the industrial belt of Meer Vihar, in west Delhi’s Nangloi area. When the police raided the area, they found a small ordnance and weapon factory. The locals told police that Irshad and Bhatkal mostly kept to themselves and didn’t interact much with others. The police believe that Bhatkal was in the city even after the 2011 Delhi High Court blast.

But if you thought that the intelligence agencies’ tryst with embarrassment and Bhatkal ended here, think again.

In late 2008, on an alert given by the IB, the Kolkata Special Task Force busted a fake currency racket and arrested Bhatkal. He claimed that he was Mohammad Ashraf from Darbhanga in Bihar and showed a voter’s ID card as proof. The address and other information checked out to be true. After a month in jail, he was let off.

However, when the footage of the German Bakery blast was released by the IB, the Kolkata Police was shocked to find that the person they thought was a petty thief was India’s most-wanted terrorist.

Intelligence officers and security experts agree that in cases like these, if even a little cooperation is extended, big results can be achieved. Bhatkal is not the only case where lack of coordination botched up the case, it’s just the latest.

“The 2006 Mumbai train blast is yet another example of how the lack of coordination led to this situation,” says a senior IB officer. “RAW was aware of the movement of the LeT module, which came to do the recce, and even the IB knew this. However, none of them shared the information with the higher-ups and therefore a golden chance was lost to prevent that attack.”

Months before the 1999 Kargil War, the IB had 45 specific intelligence inputs. In June 1998, the IB had intelligence that Pakistan was building bunkers but they did not share the information with anyone. The result was there for everyone to see.

The disconnect is also illustrated by Riyazuddin Nasir’s arrest. In 2008, a sub-inspector in Bengaluru saw Nasir carrying several car number plates and enquired about it. Unable to get a satisfactory reply, he booked him under a vehicle theft case. In a chance encounter, the SP crosschecked Nasir’s details with the IB, and found that they had arrested one of the country’s most-dreaded terrorists.
Even the 26/11 attacks, one of the most audacious that the country has ever seen, is not without its share of goof-ups.

“We had a lot of information about 26/11 and that too well in advance,” says SD Pradhan, former chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee and former deputy National Security Adviser (NSA). “In 2006, RAW knew that 150 LeT men were undergoing training in water tactics. In June 2008, we got inputs that the Taj Mahal hotel and Leopold Café were going to be attacked. But the biggest problem was that these inputs were with different agencies — RAW or IB or DIA. In mid-November, another input was given to the Coast Guard, Indian Navy and the Mumbai Police that 10-12 people were coming towards Mumbai from Karachi. They scanned the coast but didn’t find anything. Another alert was sounded on 19 November, but they thought they had already checked. There was plenty of intelligence to be acted upon. If only somebody had connected the dots.” Even these inputs were not shared with the NSA.

Incredibly, highly-placed sources have told INN that the cell phone numbers used by the 10 LeT terrorists were available with the IB at least five days before the attacks. The sources shared the contents of a ‘secret’ note that mentioned 35 cell phone numbers. Of the 35 SIM cards, 32 had been bought from Kolkata and three from New Delhi by LeT’s “overground workers”, and sent to POK by mid-November. The precise contents of the ‘secret’ note could not have been more direct. “The numbers given below have been acquired from Kolkata by overground workers and have been sent through Pakistan-trained militants based in Kashmir to POK,” the note said. “These numbers are likely to emerge in other parts of the country… and need to be monitored and the information taken from these numbers regarding the contents of the conversation and call detail records are required for further developing the information. The monitoring is possible at Kolkata.”

Sources reveal that this crucial piece of information was received by the IB on 21 November, at least five days before Ajmal Kasab and his nine accomplices got off the inflatable dinghies on the evening of 26/11. Both the prime minister and the home minister were aware that the numbers were available, but they were not being monitored. The lapse is all the more critical because at least three of the 32 numbers contained in the secret note were the exact same cell numbers that the terrorists used to keep in touch with their handlers in Pakistan. It is possible that the terrorists only activated their cell phone numbers after reaching Mumbai but why were the numbers not put under surveillance despite the knowledge that they had been sent to terrorists in POK?

Former Uttar Pradesh DGP Prakash Singh agrees that had a national commission like the one formed by the US after 9/11 been appointed by India after 26/11, several heads would have rolled.

After 26/11, the then home minister Shivraj Patil resigned and Chidambaram took charge and advocated the NCTC’s formation. However, the plan ran into rough weather. It was scuttled by at least seven non-Congress CMs. The biggest stumbling block proved to be the NCTC’s power structure. That it would be reporting to the IB director and have the power to arrest people without informing the local police made non-Congress CMs see red. After stiff objection, the Centre decided to place the NCTC under the home ministry and clarified that whenever any arrest is made, it will inform the local police. Besides, the DGPs of respective states will be on the NCTC board, so that any action will have their consent or be in their knowledge.

When Sushil Kumar Shinde took over, he sounded out a conciliatory message that until all the CMs’ concerns are addressed, the NCTC won’t become a reality.

Experts like Pradhan feel that since the Indian model of NCTC has been borrowed lock, stock and barrel from the US, there was no need for Chidambaram to change it. The US NCTC makes it abundantly clear that the agency will have no power to arrest or assume operational responsibilities. “The NCTC is a very powerful body. The states are legitimately worried. Only the KGB had the power to arrest and needless to add, it was grossly misused,” he says.

VK Singh, former Joint Secretary (technical wing), RAW, narrates how multiple agencies work at cross-purposes. “After I took over, I had a chat with the army. We knew what equipment the Pakistan and Chinese forces were using and I offered to exchange information. When I told my superiors, they didn’t buy the idea.

“The aim of the NTRO (National Technical Research Organisation) was to bring all technical resources under one umbrella. Everyone is doing the same job, monitoring radio or microwave link. Besides duplication, it’s resulting in a wastage of effort. The aim almost became a reality during APJ Abdul Kalam’s time but RAW refused to play ball. The IB and army also did the same and we were back to square one.”

But former RAW chief Vikram Sood questions the very need for NCTC. “Whenever we are in a crisis, we create a new agency,” he says. “After 1962, we had the ARC and SSF. After the Mizo mess in 1965- 66, we created RAW. In 1971, we won the Bangladesh war, so nothing was created.

In 1999, after Kargil, we created the NTRO. After 26/11, the NCTC proposal came up, which has still not taken shape. Have you thought through the concept? It has to be a bottoms-up, not a top-down system.”

A serving senior IB officer agrees with the potential of misuse. “Even in the IB, there are various stories of misuse,” he says. “After 1977, the Shah Commission had documented the IB’s misuse during Emergency, and this is when the agency didn’t have any power to arrest. So you can understand the fear of these states when the powers of arrest and independent investigation are given to the IB.”

Security experts are also of the opinion that instead of creating more bureaucratic hurdles and agencies, the government should concentrate on beefing up the existing system. “How will the NCTC be helpful in preventing attacks?” asks noted security expert Ajai Sahni. “Show me anything the NCTC brings to the table that does not already exist in the IB or the Multi- Agency Centre (MAC). All they are doing is cannibalising existing institutions to create a new and weak institution. In a country with 1.2 billion people, how can you be successful when you have barely 300-400 people committed to anti-terror intelligence gathering in the IB?”

The crippling shortage of manpower in the IB is also manifest in the response of Minister of State, Home, RPN Singh in the Rajya Sabha on 12 February. Reflecting the apparent state of disarray, he said, “Despite a sanctioned strength of 26,867, the IB has only 18,795 personnel. Nearly 1,500 slots in the deputation quota could not be filled due to non-availability of suitable officers.”

The figures mean the IB is functioning with only 70 percent of the required manpower and the gap is increasing every year. The minister added that the “actual induction figures are much less because many selected candidates don’t turn up”.

But experts like Prakash Singh are in favour of setting up the NCTC as they feel that without it the individual agencies will keep indulging in turf wars. “If the states feel that the NCTC is encroaching on their territory, then why do they ask for Central forces after terror attacks?”

Intelligence experts also question the need for vesting investigative powers with the NCTC when the NIA already exists. The NIA was created in 2008 to ensure that all terror-related investigations are streamlined. Four years later, the NIA is still grappling with internal issues. The government’s seriousness about its creation can be gauged from the fact that the agency was initially operating out of a shopping mall in south Delhi. The agency also got a taste of the turf war during the probe into the 2011 Delhi High Court blast when the police was left fuming after the home ministry transferred the case to the NIA.

“A major flaw in the current proposal is that the sub-structures needed for the NCTC’s functioning have not been included,” says Pradhan. “It must be understood that the mere creation of the NCTC won’t suffice. Unless the sub-structures are created at the state and district levels, it won’t be able to function efficiently.

“There is a need to create district-level collation centres (under district police chiefs) for examining the collected inputs from thanas, which are needed for counter- terrorism. Such inputs should be sent to the subsidiary MACs for examination and integrating related information. These centres should be chaired by the state DGs to ensure that they are fully aware of the developments and place their resources for further action or developments of leads.”

Following the outrage over Liaquat’s arrest, the Centre has announced a new policy framework for the rehabilitation of surrendered militants, as the arrest is seen as a symbol of the lack of coordination among security agencies. In the coming months, the Centre is expected to consult with the states to firm up the policy.

Investigation: Marks On The Water

By M H Ahssan & Deepti Waghmare

The Pak connection is almost confirmed. Is it another LeT-D Company cocktail?

As commandos of the Indian navy flushed the Taj Mahal hotel of terrorists, they came upon a bag containing ammunition, magazines, wallets with photo-IDs, fake credit cards and a huge stock of almonds. Twenty-four hours had passed and the terrorists were still active, so investigators were barely up to sifting through evidence. But pressed for an early assessment, they dismissed the e-mail sent by a certain ‘Deccan Mujahideen’ claiming responsibility as a red herring. The name doing the rounds is the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), purportedly working in close coordination with a section of the Mumbai underworld and rogue elements of Pakistan’s isi. But neither Maharashtra dgp A.N. Roy nor Mumbai police commissioner Hasan Gaffoor would confirm the involvement of this deadly troika.

In fact, early intelligence assessments suggest that some of the terrorists who came in were young British Muslims of Pakistani origin. Sources say they had been in training for well over a year but the final decision to carry out the assault was given at the annual conference of the LeT held in Muridke, PoK, last week. The Mumbai operation, apparently, was funded by Saudi Arabia-based Abdul Bari. He’s part of a larger international terror network and has financed strikes in India earlier too.

In a major breakthrough, investigators had traced the ship in which the terrorists made their way from Pakistan to the Mumbai coast by Thursday evening. The fishing vessel, Kuber, was found off the coast of Mumbai and some satellite phones recovered from it. The boat is owned by a Porbander-based businessman, Vinoo Masani, who has been detained for questioning. Kuber left Gujarat 14 days ago with six crew members who are believed to have been killed by the terrorists who hijacked the boat. Investigators are looking into how this will bring out the Pakistan connection.

If the Kuber was indeed hijacked, then the modus operandi becomes clear. Proceed to Indian waters in a Gujarat-registered vessel (Regn No. 2302) so as not to attract attention and then move into the mainland on dinghies.

Meanwhile, analysis of the accents of the two (purported) terrorists in conversations they had with a private TV channel suggested they are either expat Pakistanis or from Punjab there. The use of "muthbhed" (encounter) instead of the term "muqabla" is a dead giveaway, says analysts. Like Pakistani Punjabis, they also signed off saying "Allah hafiz", instead of "khuda hafiz." Maj Gen R.K. Hooda, goc (Maharashtra and Goa area), says the intercepts during the operations revealed that they spoke to each other in Punjabi. Prior technical intercepts as well as other sources had suggested a major attack was to go down in Mumbai via the sea and that the Taj Mahal Hotel would be targeted. These inputs had been looked at but with few concrete leads, no preventive action was taken.

Intelligence sources told Outlook that Dawood’s men in Mumbai may have provided the logistics support. An official told us, "Dawood has this diesel smuggling network in Mumbai—diesel is downloaded from tankers in the high seas off the coast of Mumbai and then brought in using high-speed boats. Our inputs suggest that these guys provided safe passage to the terrorists. They provided the boats, the cars and reports on the patrolling schedules of the coastguard. The idea was to hit the international community as well as shake up the top businesses in the country."

Maharashtra CM Vilasrao Deshmukh said that 20-25 terrorists were involved in the attack this time but "it was too early to say anything concrete. We have leads, but we won’t talk until there is confirmation". Two of the terrorists, chased after they hijacked a police jeep, were gunned down near Chowpatty.

Reports say five others were gunned down inside the hotels. A lucky break for the cops was the arrest of Abu from Faridkot in Pakistan. He was held after the Skoda shootout incident where one terrorist was killed. Abu’s interrogation had not begun till late Thursday night. As we go to press, agencies reported that another three arrests were made at the Taj hotel. One of the arrested was Ajmal Amir Kamal, also from Faridkot.

Analysts who have gone through the ‘Deccan Mujahideen’ e-mail say many of the issues raised in it were copied from the last missive by the ‘Indian Mujahideen’ after the Gujarat blasts.

The latter had raised issues like Muslims being "targeted and harassed" in Mumbai and had warned that they would hurt the city and the state ats.

The scale of the operation itself points towards organised logistic help. "From the weapons, the fake visa credit cards, the amount of ammunition each terrorist was carrying, it is quite clear they have been trained and equipped by a foreign state. It’s also clear that the training came from naval experts, familiar with special operations," say sources.

Indian intelligence is closely examining the involvement of Tauqeer Subhan, an ex-simi member and suspected component of the Indian Mujahideen. He hails from Mumbai and would have been able to provide key details such as the presence of the Chabad Lubavitch, an ultra-orthodox Israeli Jewish organisation that provides support and services to Israelis visiting India.

Incidentally, Indian intelligence has reports that Subhan was in regular touch with the LeT and information gleaned from various interrogation reports of his colleagues suggest he had also helped route finance from the LeT to the Indian Mujahideen. The IB is also looking at the involvement of Riyaz Bhatkal, suspected to be a key force behind earlier bombing attacks carried out in various states this year.

The marine commandos, who were the first to be inducted into the counter-terror operations, had reported this to their superiors: the terrorists were professional, highly motivated and had come with enough ammunition, explosives and food to last several days. Said Vice-Admiral J.S. Bedi, flag officer commanding-in-chief of the Western Naval Command: "Our commandos recovered plastic explosives, several AK-56 magazines, hand grenades and dry fruits. My men also said the terrorists had done their homework well...knew exactly how to cause maximum damage."

What Are India's Options? "Bomb Islamabad!" That's what a representative of the Samajwadi Party suggested at one of the UPA meetings. But are there serious options that one could look at as a credible response to these terror attacks? Writing in a post for his blog on The New Yorker, Steve Coll, an old and much respected hand on security affairs in South Asia had something interesting to say about the terrorist attack in Mumbai and the likely reaction from Pakistan. His argument is that the options for India are limited. Simply because the Pakistanis know that they are blessed when it comes to its relevance in geo-politics:

"The Pakistan Army understands this international equation thoroughly and exploits the gaps—it is careful not to expose its direct fingerprints, and yet it is brazenly persistent in pursuit of its objective of military pressure against India in Kashmir and political-military pressure on India more broadly."

So what are the options that India can exercise in the aftermath of the Mumbai terror attack?

If the politicians are to be believed, there was a lot of sabre rattling at two meetings held by the government on Sunday, November 30 night. While the all-party meet called by the government was a more sedate affair, an earlier meeting organised exclusively for the UPA and its allies, held in Parliament was more telling. A representative of the Samajwadi Party is said to have suggested that this was a good time to "bomb Islamabad!"

Fine. Let's bomb Islamabad, assuming we have the capability to do so and that the frontline aircraft of the Indian Air force are all serviceable, the MiG-21s ready to escort the bombers, and we can launch a full-scale military attack by penetrating the secure skies over Islamabad and then bomb it back to the stone age.

But are we really ready for a war?

Are we ready for the fallout when two nuclear nations go to war? Are we ready for destroying everything that we have built in the last decade and a half? Are we prepared for rolling back our consistent 9 percent growth story and undertake hardships that several generations of Indians have never seen?

All this must be weighed before we take on the job of rattling our sabres. We did that once, post December 13, 2001 attack on Parliament. What did we really achieve from that 11-month old stand off with the Pakistanis? We stood on the border and they stood on the border, eyeball to eyeball, and we finally sent the forces back to the bunkers after that. But not before we had spent something to the tune of Rs 6000 crores (the official figures put it at a much lower figure pegging it a few hundred crores) and lost many precious lives of our soldiers, who stepped on mines not mapped, or tried to clear mines with bare hands while our bureaucrats held back critical mine clearing equipment.

Our air force, sanctioned 39.5 combat squadrons, is down to 30 off squadrons, our armoured corps doesn't have the tanks to roll in, our infantry is horribly tied up in counter-insurgency operations, our soldiers and officers are poorly paid and cheated in pay commission after pay commission, while we talk about "bombing Islamabad."

But there are options that one could look at as a credible response to these terror attacks.

More than us, more than the Americans or the British, it is the average Pakistani who knows that they are living in a failed state. They know that their economy is in shambles, their young men are becoming ready fodder for the terror factory and governance is being remote controlled by a military-industrial complex that is also making billions as we speak.

The international outrage that has emerged after the terrorist attack is an opportunity that rarely presents itself in a nation's history. This is the time to forge partnerships with all those willing to work with us.

Intelligence cooperation has already been ramped up (the first warning for the current attack came from the Americans) and there are other diplomatic measures that are already underway. But, this is also the time to build partnerships with those elements in Pakistan who recognise the fact that the idea of Pakistan is in greater danger than from these terrorists than its declared enemies.

This is the time to look for partnerships in intelligence gathering -- not just the non-functional anti terror mechanism that was set up earlier, but a mechanism that produces hard, actionable intelligence that can be put to good use. This is the time to look at joint covert operations against terrorists and their infrastructure simply because this is a job that the Pakistanis cannot do on their own. The Americans, the British and the NATO forces are already in the region and this is as good a time as any to build partnerships with them.

Perhaps a partnerships sounds too utopian and unrealistic, a diplomatic impossibility in times of rhetoric. But look at the facts. There is no terror attack that can bend a nation as resilient as India. It has an innate strength that will ensure that the good news story, that India was, will continue to hold true.

A lot will have to be done to weed out the systemic failures in our security apparatus. It is not about "intelligence failure" and as this case has shown, our intelligence actually produced good stuff. By calling it "intelligence failure" we are trivialising the discussion to a level that is insulting to our counter-terror mechanism as well as security apparatus. Instead, we have to realise that systemic faults have to be addressed systematically. The overhaul, if the political leadership is willing, will have to happen over months, and perhaps years. But if politics goes back to the usual set of empty promises, the usual rhetoric and the usual coteries, that will be an attack on the very idea of India itself. And the time to act, is now.

An Action Plan: Post the terror attacks in Mumbai, leaving aside what to do vis-à-vis Pakistan, there is a whole lot more that needs to be addressed in the way we approach our security and intelligence set-up.

1: Set up a National Commission of professionals with no political agenda, in consultation with the Leader of the Opposition, to enquire into all the major terrorist strikes that have taken place in the Indian territory outside Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) since November,2007, and task it to submit its report within four months, with no extensions given. Its charter will be not the investigation of the criminal cases arising from these terrorist strikes, but the investigation of the deficiencies and sins of commission and omission in our counter-terrorism agencies at the Centre and in the States, which made these strikes possible.

2: Induct proved experts in terrorism and counter-terrorism from the Intelligence Bureau (IB), the State Police and the Army into the R&AW at senior levels. Presently, the R&AW does not have any such expertise at senior levels. Of the four officers at the top of the pyramid, two are generalists, one is an expert in Pakistan (Political) and the other in China (Political).

3: A similar induction from the State Police and the Army would be necessary in the case of the IB too. Since I have no personal knowledge of the officers at the top of its pyramid, I am not in a position to be specific.

4: Make the IB the nodal point for all liaison with foreign intelligence and security agencies in respect of terrorism, instead of the R&AW.Give the IB direct access to all foreign internal intelligence and security agencies, instead of having to go through the R&AW.

5: Have a common data base on terrorism shared by the IB and the R&AW directly accessible by authorized officers of the two organizations through a secure password.

6: Make the Multi-Disciplinary Centre of the IB function as it was meant to function when it was created-- as a centre for the continuous identification of gaps and deficiencies in the available intelligence and for removing them and for effective follow-up action.

7: Revive the covert action capability of the R&AW and strengthen it. Its charter should make it clear that it will operate only in foreign territory and not in Indian territory. Give it specific, time-bound tasks. All covert actions should be cleared and co-ordinated by the R&AW. Other agencies should not be allowed to indulge in covert actions.

8: The National Security Guards (NSG) was created as a special intervention force to deal with terrorist situations such as hijacking and hostage-taking. Stop using it for VIP security purposes. Station one battalion each of the NSG in Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai and Bangalore. Ensure that its regional deployment does not affect its in-service training. Review the rapid response capability of the NSG in the light of the Mumbai experience and remove loopholes. In handling the Kandahar hijacking of 1999 and the Mumbai terrorist strikes, the delay in the response of the NSG would appear to have been due to a delay in getting an aircraft for moving the NSG personnel to Mumbai from Delhi.

9: Give the police in Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai and Bangalore a special intervention capability to supplement that of the NSG.

10: After the series of hijackings by the Khalistani terrorists in the early 1980s, Indira Gandhi had approved a proposal for the training of Indian experts in dealing with hostage situations and hostage negotiation techniques by foreign intelligence agencies, which have acknowledged expertise in these fields.

The training slots offered by the foreign agencies have been largely monopolized by the IB and the R&AW. The utilization of these training slots and the selection of officers for the training should be decided by the NSA-- with one-third of the slots going to Central agencies, one-third to the NSG and one-third to the State Police. It is important to build up a core of terrorism and counter-terrorism expertise in all metro towns.

11: The IB’s Multi-Disciplinary Centre should have a constantly updated database of all serving and retired officers at the Centre and in the States, who had undergone overseas training, and also of all serving and retired officers and non-governmental figures who have expertise in terrorism and counter-terrorism so that their expertise could be tapped, when needed.

12: Strengthen the role of the police stations in counter-terrorism in all major cities. Make it clear to all Station House Officers that their record in preventing acts of terrorism, in contributing to the investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related cases and in consequence management after a terrorist strike will be an important factor in assessing their suitability for further promotion. Revive and strengthen the beat system, revive and intensify the local enquiries for suspicious activities in all railway stations, bus termini, airports, hotels, inns and other places and improve police-community relations. An important observation of the UK’s Security and Intelligence Committee of the Prime Minister, which enquired into the London blasts of July,2005, was that no counter-terrorism strategy will succeed unless it is based on the co-operation of the community from which the terrorists have arisen. The UK now has what they call a community-based counter-terrorism strategy. The willingness of different communities to co-operate will largely depend on the relations of the police officers at different levels with the leaders and prominent members of the communities.

13: Adopt the British practice of having Counter-terrorism Security Advisers in Police Stations. Post them in all urban police stations. Their job will be to constantly train the PS staff in the performance of their counter-terrorism duties, to improve relations with the communities and to closely interact with owners of public places such as hotels, restaurants, shopping malls etc and voluntarily advise them on the security precautions to be taken to prevent terrorist strikes on soft targets and to mitigate the consequences if strikes do take place despite the best efforts of the police to prevent them.

14: Stop using the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) as a dumping ground for retired officers, who are favoured by the Government. The NSCS cannot be effective in its role of national security management if it is not looked upon with respect by the serving officers. The serving officers look upon the retired officers of the NSCS as living in the past and in a make-believe world of their own totally cut off from the ground realities of today in national security management. The NSCS should be manned only by serving officers of acknowledged capability for thinking and action.

15: Strengthen the role of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) as a Government-sponsored think tank of non-governmental experts in security matters to assist the NSCA and the NSA. Give it specific terms of reference instead of letting it free lance as it often does. It should be discouraged from undertaking esoteric studies.

16: Set up a separate Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) to deal with internal security. Assessment of intelligence having a bearing on internal security requires different expertise and different analytical tools than assessment of intelligence having a bearing on external security.

In 1983, Indira Gandhi, then Prime Minister, bifurcated the JIC and created a separate JIC for internal security. Rajiv Gandhi reversed her decision. Her decision was wise and needs to be revived.

17: Set up a National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) under the National Security Adviser (NSA) to ensure joint operational action in all terrorism-related matters. It can be patterned after a similar institution set up in the US under Director, National Intelligence after 9/11. The National Commission set up by the US Congress to enquire into the 9/11 terrorist strikes had expressed the view that better co-ordination among the various agencies will not be enough and that what was required was a joint action command similar to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Armed Forces. Its tasks should be to monitor intelligence collection by various agencies, avoid duplication of efforts and resources, integrate the intelligence flowing from different agencies and foreign agencies, analyse and assess the integrated intelligence and monitor follow-up action by the Police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other concerned agencies. Every agency is equally and jointly involved and responsible for the entire counter-terrorism process starting from collection to action on the intelligence collected. If such a system had existed, post-Mumbai complaints such as those of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) that the advisories issued by them on the possibility of a sea-borne attack by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) on Mumbai were not acted upon by the Mumbai Police would not have arisen because the IB and the R&AW would have been as responsible for follow-up action as the Mumbai Police.

18: The practice of the privileged direct access to the Prime Minister by the chiefs of the IB and the R&AW, which came into force under Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, should be vigorously enforced. This privileged direct access is utilised by the intelligence chiefs to bring their concerns over national security and over inaction by the agencies responsible for follow-up on their reports to the personal notice of the Prime Minister and seek his intervention. If the intelligence chiefs had brought to the notice of the Prime Minister the alleged inaction of the Mumbai Police on their reports, he might have intervened and issued the required political directive to the Chief Minister of Maharashtra.

19: Either create a separate Ministry of Internal Security or strengthen the role of the existing Department of Internal Security in the Union Ministry of Home Affairs and make it responsible for dealing with internal security operationally under the over-all supervision of the Minister for Home Affairs.

20: Either create a separate federal terrorism investigation agency or empower the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to investigate all cases involving terrorism of a pan-Indian dimension. It need not take up cases where terrorism is confined to a single state or a small region such as terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir or the Al Umma in Tamil Nadu. It should be able to take up the cases for investigation without the need for prior permission from the Governments of the States affected. It should not have any responsibility for investigating crimes other than terrorism. If its charter is expanded to cover other crimes too, there will be political opposition. There is a lot of confusion about this concept of a federal terrorism investigation agency. Many critics ask when the IB is there, what is the need for another central agency. The IB is an intelligence collection agency and not an investigation agency. The IB has no locus standi in the Indian criminal laws.

It collects intelligence and not evidence usable in a court of law. It cannot arrest and interrogate a suspect or search premises or perform other tasks of a similar nature, which can be performed only by police officers of the rank of Station House Officers. The IB officers are not recognized as equivalent to SHOs.

21: Set up a task force consisting of three senior and distinguished Directors-General of Police (DGPs) and ask it to come up with a list of recommendations for strengthening the powers of the police in respect of prevention, investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related offences and the capabilities of the Police in counter-terrorism and implement its recommendations. This is the only way of getting round the present political deadlock over the revival of the Prevention of Terrorism ACT (POTA).

22: Expedite the erection of the border fence on the border with Bangladesh without worrying about opposition from Bangladesh.

23: Start a crash programme for the identification of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh and for deporting them. Ban the employment of immigrants from Bangladesh anywhere in Indian territory.

24: Strict immigration control is an important part of counter-terrorism The post-9/11 safety of the US is partly due to the tightening up of immigration procedures and their strict enforcement. Among the best practices adopted by the US and emulated by others are: Photographing and finger-printing of all foreigners on arrival, closer questioning of Pakistanis and persons of Pakistani origin etc. We have not yet adopted any of these practices. Hotels and other places of residence should be banned from giving rooms to persons without a departure card and without a valid immigration stamp in their passports. They should be required to take Xerox copies of the first page and the page containing the immigration stamp of the passports of all foreigners and also the departure card stapled to the passport and send them to their local Police Station every morning. All immigration relaxations introduced in the case of Pakistani and Bangladesdhi nationals and persons of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin should be cancelled with immediate effect. The requirement of police reporting by them should be rigorously enforced. It should be made obligatory for all persons hosting Pakistanis and Bangladeshis to report to the local police about their guests. A vigorous drive should be undertaken for tracing all Pakistanis and Bangladeshis overstaying in India after the expiry of their visas and for expelling them.

25: The MEA’s capability for terrorism-related diplomacy should be strengthened by creating a separate Division for this purpose. It should continuously brief all foreign governments about the role of Pakistan and Bangladesh in supporting terrorism in Indian territory and press for action against them.

26: The Mumbai strikes have revealed serious gaps in our maritime security on our Western coast. This is partly the result of our over-focus on the Look East policy and the neglect of the Look West dimension. This was corrected earlier this year. Despite this, there are apparently major gaps and an alleged failure by the Naval and Coast Guard authorities to act on the reports of the IB and the R&AW about likely sea-borne threats from the LET. The identification and removal of the gaps need immediate attention. The Mumbai off-shore oil installations and the nuclear and space establishments on the Western coast are also vulnerable to sea-borne terrorist strikes.

INDIA is under attack

By M H Ahssan

This nation is under attack. The scale, intensity and level of orchestration of terror attacks in Mumbai put one thing beyond doubt: India is effectively at war and it has deadly enemies in its midst. Ten places in south Mumbai were struck in quick succession.

As in the case of the demolition of New York's World Trade Center in 2001, Mumbai's iconic monuments such as the Taj Mahal Hotel, the Oberoi Trident and Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus have come under attack. The number of people killed in multiple attacks is 101 and counting, which includes foreigners and senior policemen. At least 300 have been injured.

The terrorists who carried out the attacks are well supplied, armed to the teeth and extremely well motivated. The question now is whether the nation can show any serious degree of resolve and coordination in confronting terror. This war can be won, but it will require something from the political class, from security forces and from ordinary people. It's time now to move beyond pointing fingers at one another or resorting to cliches such as 'resilient Mumbai'. It's also time to end the habit of basing one's stand on terrorism on the particular religious affiliation of terrorists, criticising or exonerating them using their religion a point of reference. Terrorists have no religion. Political bickering on this issue is divisive; what India needs now is unity.

While Mumbai also witnessed multiple attacks which brought the city to a halt in 1993, this one is different in two respects. One, it is unfolding in slow motion with the world media as witness, which makes for maximum psychological impact. Two, foreigners have specifically been targeted. Sites frequented by them have been chosen for attack and Britons, Americans and Israelis appear to have been singled out.

This kind of attack on India's financial capital is intended to send the message that India isn't a safe place to do business. The Indian economy and its links with the world are under attack. On the plus side, there have been unprecedented outpourings of sympathy and offers of cooperation from world governments. All the more reason to make the attacks on Mumbai a transformative moment. There has been talk of beefing up India's poor infrastructure. Security must now be seen as an essential element of infrastructure, as vital as power, water or transport.

Both L K Advani and Rajnath Singh have said it's time to rise above politics, which is welcome. An announced joint visit to Mumbai by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and leader of the opposition Advani would send a signal of political unity. Beyond that the PM, in consultation with senior opposition leaders, must draw up a consensus plan about how to deal with contingency situations as well as upgrade India's security culture.

A host of institutions have been built since the 1980s when India first encountered terrorism. New agencies, special cells and commando units have come up since then. But how well do we run them, how well resourced are they and is there proper coordination among them to maximise and collate information? According to the home ministry, terrorists sneaked in from the Arabian Sea. They may have sailed past the naval headquarters to blast their way into the city. However, it took a while before the National Security Guards and naval commandos in the city were pressed into action. What explains such delay? Was it a multiplicity of commands or plain bureaucratic lethargy? The point is even in circumstances when personnel and infrastructure are available, planning and execution are shockingly poor.

Constitutional experts must put their hands together to see whether under existing laws any special, but temporary, powers can be given to the security agencies. All major political parties should be taken into confidence to see what urgent steps can be taken to prevent the nation from sinking deeper into chaos. There is a pressing need to restructure India's security architecture. A federal agency to deal with terrorism has been suggested by this newspaper and now by the PM. A coordinated effort to process information gleaned by state and central agencies should help to transform randomly collected information into actionable intelligence.

The government should immediately work on an internal security doctrine that demarcates the role of various security wings and a clear command structure to deal with terrorism. This should include contingency plans for various scenarios which lay out in advance how to respond to them. Tougher laws, in consultation with the opposition, may also be needed to control terror.

It's incumbent on all chief ministers to remain on alert and maintain calm in their states. Unnecessary repercussions from the Mumbai incidents need to be avoided at all costs. Election campaigning needs to be kept at a minimum to avoid stretching security too thin. The political class must ensure that communalism of all varieties is kept out of politics.

Besides terrorists coming in from the Arabian Sea, their looking for Americans, Britons and Israelis give the signal that the attack on Mumbai is a spillover from the larger war on terror. Al-Qaeda is, for the first time, feeling the pressure in its Pakistani sanctuaries as it is under Pakistani and American attack. But South Asian borders are notoriously porous. Al-Qaeda affiliated organisations such as Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) have struck deep roots in Bangladesh.

To tackle terror in India it is urgently necessary to stabilise Pakistan and Bangladesh. And, India should seek international help now to upgrade its own security apparatus, but also to stabilise the entire region stretching from Afghanistan to Bangladesh. There is no time to waste.

Alert: 'Mumbai' Asked To 'Stay At Home', Heavy Rains Ahead

By Suchitra Bolkarwar / Mumbai

There is no respite in sight for Mumbaikars who are already wading to work and suffering long traffic jams and delayed trains. The Meteorological Department on Tuesday warned that heavy to very heavy rains will hit Mumbai and coastal Konkan over the next 72 hours. And to add to it,  the high tide is expected to touch 5 metres on Saturday which could lead to flooding.

All agencies concerned with disaster management, relief and rescue operations have been put on high alert and people have been warned against venturing outdoors unless absolutely necessary.

Opinion: ‘Terrorists want to destroy Pakistan, too’

By Asif Ali Zardari

The recent death and destruction in Mumbai, India, brought to my mind the death and destruction in Karachi on October 18, 2007, when terrorists attacked a festive homecoming rally for my wife, Benazir Bhutto. Nearly 150 Pakistanis were killed and more than 450 were injured. The terrorist attacks in Mumbai may be a news story for most of the world. For me it is a painful reality of shared experience. Having seen my wife escape death by a hairbreadth on that day in Karachi, I lost her in a second, unfortunately successful, attempt two months later.

The Mumbai attacks were directed not only at India but also at Pakistan’s new democratic government and the peace process with India that we have initiated. Supporters of authoritarianism in Pakistan and non-state actors with a vested interest in perpetuating conflict do not want change in Pakistan to take root. To foil the designs of the terrorists, the two great nations of Pakistan and India, born together from the same revolution and mandate in 1947, must continue to move forward with the peace process. Pakistan is shocked at the terrorist attacks in Mumbai. We can identify with India’s pain. I am especially empathetic. I feel this pain every time I look into the eyes of my children.

Pakistan is committed to the pursuit, arrest, trial and punishment of anyone involved in these heinous attacks. But we caution against hasty judgments and inflammatory statements. As was demonstrated in Sunday’s raids, which resulted in the arrest of militants, Pakistan will take action against the non-state actors found within our territory, treating them as criminals, terrorists and murderers. Not only are the terrorists not linked to the government of Pakistan in any way, we are their targets and we continue to be their victims. India is a mature nation and a stable democracy. Pakistanis appreciate India’s democratic contributions. But as rage fueled by the Mumbai attacks catches on, Indians must pause and take a breath. India and Pakistan and the rest of the world must work together to track down the terrorists who caused mayhem in Mumbai, attacked New York, London and Madrid in the past, and destroyed the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad in September. The terrorists who killed my wife are connected by ideology to these enemies of civilization. These militants didn’t arise from whole cloth. Pakistan was an ally of the West throughout the Cold War. The world worked to exploit religion against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan by empowering the most fanatic extremists as an instrument of destruction of a superpower. Strategy worked, but its legacy was the creation of an extremist militia with its own dynamic.

Pakistan continues to pay the price: the legacy of dictatorship, the fatigue of fanaticism, the dismemberment of civil society and the destruction of our democratic infrastructure. The resulting poverty continues to fuel the extremists and has created a culture of grievance and victimhood.

The challenge of confronting terrorists who have a vast support network is huge; Pakistan’s fledgling democracy needs help from the rest of the world. We are on the frontlines of the war on terrorism. We have 150,000 soldiers fighting al-Qaida, the Taliban and their extremist allies along the border with Afghanistan far more troops than Nato has in Afghanistan.

Nearly 2,000 Pakistanis have lost their lives to terrorism in this year alone, including 1,400 civilians and 600 security personnel ranging in rank from ordinary soldier to threestar general. There have been more than 600 terrorism-related incidents in Pakistan this year. The terrorists have been set back by our aggressive war against them in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the Pashtun-majority areas bordering Afghanistan. Six hundred militants have been killed in recent attacks, hundreds by Pakistani F-16 jet strikes in the last two months. Terrorism is a regional as well as a global threat, and it needs to be battled collectively. We understand the domestic political considerations in India in the aftermath of Mumbai. Nevertheless, accusations of complicity on Pakistan’s part only complicate the already complex situation. For India, Pakistan and the US, the best response to the Mumbai carnage is to coordinate in counteracting the scourge of terrorism.

Benazir Bhutto once said that democracy is the best revenge against the abuses of dictatorship. In the current environment, reconciliation and rapprochement is the best revenge against the dark forces that are trying to provoke a confrontation between Pakistan and India, and ultimately a clash of civilizations.

Mumbai terror attacks: Nation salutes martyrs

By M H Ahssan & Alex D'souza

The body of Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) chief Hemant Karkare, who was killed while leading from the front in the battle against terrorists attack in Mumbai was on Saturday brought to his home at Shivaji Park in central Mumbai ahead of the funeral.

The cremation was delayed so that his two daughters who live abroad could return in time for the last rites. While his elder daughter Jui is married and lives in the US, the younger Sayali is studying in London. His son Akash is based in Mumbai.

As terrorists Wednesday night targeted 10 Mumbai landmarks, Karkare donned his helmet and bullet-proof jacket and set out to take them on. The protection, however, proved inadequate and Karkare fell to the terrorists' bullets. In all, 148 people were killed in the attacks and 327 were injured.

The 58-year-old Karkare, a 1982 batch Indian Police Service (IPS) officer, was in the spotlight for leading investigation into the Sep 29 blasts in Maharashtra's Malegaon town. Ten people, including Sadhvi Pragnya Thakur and Lt Col Prasad Purohit, were arrested as a result of the probe.

Karkare had taken over the ATS in January after a seven-year stint with India's external intelligence agency Research Analysis Wing (RAW).

Major Sandeep Unnikrishnan
Major Sandeep Unnikrishnan, 31, was martyred while engaging terrorists on Friday at the Taj hotel. He was with the 51 Special Action Group of the force and was with the NSG on deputation. He has been with the Black Cat commando force for the last two years.

An officer of the Bihar Regiment, he was commissioned in the Indian Army in 1999. The officer had joined the NSG on deputation in January 2007 after having served two tenures with his battalion in counter insurgency and counter terrorism roles. The officer hails from Bangalore where his father works for the Indian Space Research Organisation.

The funeral of the NSG Commando officer Major Sandeep Unnikrishnan, who laid down his life battling the terrorists in the Mumbai attacks, will be held with military honours.

Major Unnikrishnan body was brought to his house at ISRO layout in the outskirts of the Bangalore, where arrangements had been made for family, friends and well wishers to have a last glimpse of the Mumbai anti-terror hero.

NSG hawaldar: Gajendra Singh
The body of NSG hawaldar Gajendra Singh, who died fighting terrorists in Mumbai's Nariman House, was today brought to Delhi before being taken to his native place Dehradun for the last rites.

All ranks and file of the elite force gathered at NSG headquarters in Palam to pay their tributes to the slain hawaldar.

The body of Singh, who was a member of NSG's 51 Special Action Group, will be later taken to Dehradun, an NSG spokesperson said.

For Airlines & Passengers, Flying From Mumbai to Get Costlier

Despite the fire sale of airfares for travel between February and April in order to spruce up volumes, flying from Mumbai is going to get costlier from next month as the Airports Economic Regulatory Authority (Aera) has approved a 154 percent  hike in landing and parking charges at Mumbai’s airport and,  introduced a steep user development fee (UDF) on passengers  departing from the city.

The move will make the GVK Infrastructure-led Mumbai International Airport  as expensive as  Delhi International Airport and is likely to be opposed by carriers as well as passengers.

Domestic travellers will have to shell out Rs 346 as UDF  for February and March, while international passengers will have to pay Rs 692 for the same. Thereafter, for one year, till March 2014, it will be Rs 274 for domestic and Rs 548 for international passengers, respectively. The new UDF  is in addition to the Rs 100 and Rs 600 Airport Development Fee MIAL charges its domestic and international passengers.

Charges on landing, parking, housing, aerobridges, fuel handling and unauthorised overstay by airlines have also been raised, which are bound to be passed on to passengers by way of higher fares. Mint estimates that domestic flights will now pay 40 percent more to land while international airlines will pay 120 percent more.

A report in Business Standard adds ”these measures would lead to an average increase of five-seven percent on domestic fares of Rs 5,000-7,000 from Mumbai.

The cost of modernising Mumbai airport was pegged at Rs 5,826 crore when the project was awarded in 2006. The estimated cost was later increased to Rs 9,800 crore. Time and cost overruns have reportedly increased the project cost further, to Rs 12,300 crore.

High costs in the airports have  led to some airlines pulling out of India. In 2012  more than five foreign airlines withdrew  flights from the Mumbai and Delhi routes, citing high operating costs, including high airport and fuel charges. These include AirAsia, Air AsiaX, Thai AirAsia, FinnAi and Virgin Atlantic and American Airlines.

Other leading global airlines like British Airways, Air France-KLM and Lufthansa were also rethinking their India plans given the high airport charges.

While aeronautical charges helps the airport operators in recouping development cost of the airport, the  global trade body of airlines, International Air Transport Association, had written to the DGCA last  month criticising the Mumbai International Airport Ltd’s (MIAL) decision to demand steep landing fees and other charges. DNA says MIAL blames the government delayed decision-making as the cause for increase in investment costs. 

The Business Standard report quotes Cathay Pacific India general manager Tom Wright as saying: “Indian airports are becoming some of the most expensive in the world; we are concerned. How is this going to help India make its airports global hubs?”