Cowardice is Not the Way to Secure Peace with Pakistan

It serves nobody’s purpose – not India’s, not Pakistan’s, nor the rest of the world’s – to allow the recent negative vibes over horrific incidents on the Line of Control (LoC) to degenerate into open hostilities or war. But it serves even less purpose to pretend that peace with Pakistan can be achieved by one-sided concessions, or what passes for policy on the Indian side.

The real choice before India in the wake of Pakistan’s continuing bad faith is not war or peace, as our weak-willed peaceniks and phony intelligentsia presume. Our only realistic option is a tense form of peace that can be held together by our own internal preparedness for any eventuality. We cannot count on Pakistan to do its bit to engender trust in us about their intentions, and history provides ample proof of this.

This calls for India to put a long-term strategic plan in place – the main elements of which include a strong defence capability, a strong counter-intelligence capability, the ability to destabilise Pakistan for our own purposes, and the ability to make precision strikes at terror targets inside Pakistan that would also include plausible deniability on India’s part.

Without these elements, no peace policy can work, for they will be seen by Pakistan as being the result of our weakness – and they would not be wrong on that score. Failure to secure ourselves is cowardice of the highest order masquerading as peace-seeking.

The peaceniks argue that pushing trade and easier people-to-people relationships will improve the constituency for peace inside Pakistan, and there is some truth in that. We should encourage trade and more people-to-people contacts.

But even this policy will fail if we do not understand what Pakistan will use these concessions for. The Pakistani army and the jehadis will use these open conduits to push hostility covertly. For example, once huge trade volumes result, what is to stop Pakistan from using a corrupt border bureaucracy to push guns or dangerous material into India directly through the trade route instead of clandestime means? For that matter, what is to stop Pakistan from pushing jehadis through the freer visa regime? Do we have the capability to monitor who comes and goes, when we have a track record of letting thousands of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis to overstay here without any machinery to check this influx? Decades after the Assam agitation, we have not pushed even a handful of illegal Bangladeshis out. Pakistanis will melt away just as easily in India with freer visas.

The reason is simple: Pakistan knows what it wants from India and is willing to stake everything it has to get it. We don’t know what we want from Pakistan, beyond a vague hope that they will leave us alone. That they won’t allow.

As MJ Akbar wrote the other day in The Times of India, Pakistan has a clear India policy (and this policy is decided by the army), but India’s has none towards Pakistan. A mushy approach to peace does not amount to a hard-headed strategic policy of engaging Pakistan that will really promote peace in the neighbourhood.

Let us acknowledge that there is real mistrust between Pakistan and India, but we are more willing to forget it than them. This is why we are repeatedly surprised by their perfidies. After each Pakistani outrage, we blustered for a while and then gave up.

As Akbar notes: “There were 57 cross-border violations by Pakistan in 2010, 60 in 2011 and 117 in 2012. Delhi’s response has been a private, and sometimes public, campaign to reduce our forces on the border. If it takes two sides to go to war, it also takes a partnership for peace. Manmohan Singh has the look of a lonely man abandoned by the partner of his dreams.”

For real peace to break out, several things have to change internally in Pakistan, but there is nothing we can do about it beyond preparing ourselves for the next act of perfidy from Pakistan and plan for some form of retribution and resilience.

To be sure, this writer is dead against the kind of jingoism being bandied about in some prime-time TV channels. These channels, in fact, play right into Pakistan’s hands by strengthening jehadi forces like Hafiz Saeed and his cohorts.

However, consider what Mihir Sharma considers a strategy for peace in Business Standard:  “India must push the agenda of increased openness and interdependence for its own reasons and in its own interests. This will, tiresomely often, require of us the high road. It will involve ignoring frequent provocation from one or another of the many interests in Pakistan who see rapprochement with India as dangerous — whether the bearded prophets of India’s dismemberment or the Scotch-swilling empire-builders in the cantonments. It will involve making concessions when returns seem non-existent or delayed — Pakistan still hasn’t granted India most favoured nation status, as it promised to do by the end of 2012. But that is what bigger partners do; and that’s the price of securing our neighbourhood.” 

Sharma even thinks that Manmohan Singh‘s big achievement is the Sharm el Sheikh agreement with Pakistan, which was widely seen as a sellout. He believes that the Congress party humiliated Singh for allowing the Pakistanis to insert a line indicating that we may be fomenting trouble in Balochistan.

Now consider Akbar’s riposte to this: “Islamabad took the measure of Delhi in 2009 at Sharm el Sheikh, when, despite the international outrage over Mumbai (i.e. 26/11) and evidence of Pakistan’s involvement, it was Singh who made extraordinary concessions to put together a joint statement. The text was not shown to India’s National Security Adviser, MK Narayanan, who went ashen when he read the contents a little before it was released to media. Narayanan’s silence was purchased with a ghostly residence in Kolkata, also known as the Raj Bhavan. Pakistan’s Army concluded that if it could get away with Mumbai, it could get away with anything. It has.”

So the route to peace is to keep giving in to Pakistan’s belligerence?

Sharma’s logic for continuing with turn-the-other–cheek policies is this: “First, no other policy has worked. Outright belligerence? Failed. Using the United States to nudge the Pakistan establishment towards peacemaking? Failed. Turning our back on that border completely? Failed.”

What is missing in the above paragraph is one more line: “One-sided concessions and repeated peace overtures to Pakistan: Failed, too.”

To those who truly believe in peace, I offer this simple logic to understand why we can only achieve a tense form of peace guaranteed by our own toughmindedness.

We have to ask ourselves: What does Pakistan want from us, and are we really willing to give it?

Pakistan wants two things: validating its core ideology of founding a state based on Islam; and Kashmir, by hook or by crook.  The least of Pakistan’s demands in this area would be either the prising of the whole of Kashmir from us, or at least the Kashmir Valley. For this it is willing to be our permanent enemy, even if it means impoverishing its own masses. So if it cannot win a war, it will want to keep bleeding us by sending us jehadis, feeding arms and ammunition to other violent forces in India (the Maoists), by sending in counterfeit Indian currency, and by ganging up with China or whoever it considers as sufficiently inimical to India.

Is India willing to give up Kashmir for peace? Is it willing to sacrifice the logic of secularism for peace? If it is, we might as well accept the Sangh logic and declare India a Hindu state, since the only reasoning on which a Muslim-majority state like Jammu & Kashmir can be given to Pakistan is through the acceptance of this sectarian idea.

And it won’t end there: after Kashmir, we will have parts of Assam – where there is a significant Bengali influx – seeking similar remedies. Or even Nagaland or Mizoram or even Kerala.

An Indian loss on Kashmir will stoke the very forces that work against our secularism. They will become unstoppable if Pakistan gets it way on Kashmir, even partially. Remember how Pakistan turned jehadi after the loss of Bangladesh? A similar fate awaits us if we use spurious logic to acquiesce in Pakistan’s blackmail.

The only way out is for India to prepare for 100 years of Pakistani belligerence and perfidy. It won’t be peace, or war, but something in-between till something fundamental changes inside Pakistan. A bottom-up push towards secularism of a people tired of war and jehadi forces.

We can’t change them. They have to do the job themselves. We can help them best by being implacable in pursuing peace by being internally strong – economically, politically and militarily and in many other ways.

The paradox of life is: only the strong get peace. The weak will always invite war. Our peaceniks are inadvertently inviting the worst form of Pakistani behaviour by serving up cowardice as the road to peace.

Two-nation Theory has Bred Practice of Hatred

By M J Akbar

Why has Pakistan become synonymous with terrorism? The vast majority of Pakistanis surely find terrorism, which is the purest form of hatred, as repellent as Indians do. Why then does Pakistan breed an endless flow of suicide missionaries?

Practice has been shaped by theory. A theory of separation created Pakistan in 1947; over time, this has been converted into a culture of hatred by some self-appointed ideologues.

Pakistan emerged out of the notion that Hindus and Muslims could not live together. The threat perception was raised into the claim that Islam itself would be obliterated in a Hindu-majority India, during the seminal general elections of 1936-37. The Muslim League’s slogan was: “Islam in Danger!”

Neither history nor theology could have sustained such a slogan, but Muslim elites in British India, particularly landlords and capitalists, manipulated the incipient ideology of the Muslim League, and fuelled it with incendiary sentiment in order to create a state where they could protect their vested interests. They were not really afraid of “Hindu Raj”; they were terrified of land reform and socialism — however pale a version it might be — that the Congress would enforce. It is no accident that till today there has been no serious land reform in Pakistan. Gandhi’s honest faith in Hinduism was maliciously exploited to spread the perfidy that India would never offer an equal place to Muslims.

The idea of Islam being in danger was particularly attractive to a section of the ulema — but not to all of them; the Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Hind (now led by Maulana Mahmood Madni), unlike the Jamaat-e-Islami, was very clear-headed about the potential pitfalls and opposed the creation of Pakistan. The propartition ulema, however, discovered a unique opportunity for power. If Islam was going be the raison d’etre of the new nation, then who else could be its true guardians? The elites took control of the economy and politics; the upper middle classes dominated the administration; and the two shared authority in the armed forces. The clergy gradually took control of educational and legal space.

The one thing that united these elements, who had separate agendas and could be culturally antagonistic, was Kashmir. The first important decision taken after Pakistan’s birth was to convert the two-nation theory into a cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy.

It is often forgotten that Pakistan created the Kashmir problem when it decided to seize the Valley by armed force in the last week of October 1947. If this incursion had not taken place, there would have been a peaceful resolution to both Kashmir and Hyderabad, perhaps by the spring of 1948, with Britain as referee through the person of Lord Mountbatten. Perhaps this was one reason, apart from his sense of selfimportance, why Mountbatten wanted to be named Governor General of both India and Pakistan, but Jinnah told him to stick to Delhi.

India, Pakistan and Britain were in full agreement that no princely state should be permitted independence. The two holdouts, Kashmir and Hyderabad, could never have survived in their frozen condition. Mountbatten has left on record a note from Nehru in which he suggested that the resolution of Kashmir could be left to spring 1948, when the snows had melted.

Instead, Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan and Pakistan’s freshly emboldened leaders were convinced they could pray at the main mosque in Srinagar on the Friday following the invasion. They failed. The failure sponsored a lie, that the invasion was a “popular uprising”. Shuja Nawaz has exposed this falsehood effectively in his history of the Pakistan army, Crossed Swords [Oxford University Press]. The October 1947 invasion was armed and supported by the Pakistani administration.

Six decades of Fridays later, the rulers of Islamabad are still waiting. If they want to enter Srinagar on tanks they are welcome to wait another six decades and hand over the effort to their great grandchildren. If they want to come to Srinagar in peace, they can come and pray tomorrow. But it will be difficult for them to come in peace to Srinagar as long as they believe that Hindus and Muslims cannot live together. The twonation theory might have been abandoned in 1971, when Pakistan itself was partitioned. But it remains the official doctrine of the Pakistan state, sold to generations in millions of school textbooks.

Pakistan’s support for Sikh secessionism in the 1980s was clear evidence that it did not need only a “Muslim” cause to become pro-active. If it could destroy India’s integrity through another religious module, it was equally happy to do so. If General Zia ul Haq had spent as much energy on the construction of Pakistan as he did on the destruction of India, Pakistan might have had a rising economic story to tell by now.

Kashmir became the implicit sanction for the emergence, under Zia’s beneficial watch, of terrorist groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba, or the Army of the Pure. Zia’s successors, starting with Benazir Bhutto, did little to contain these terrorists. When India protested, Pakistani diplomats were polite across the table, and probably had a good laugh behind Delhi’s back. Since Zia’s time Pakistan has been asking for “evidence” or proof, and encouraging skepticism or conspiracy theories (dutifully lapped up by sections of the Indian media). Well, this time there is a canary singing in custody, and a satellite phone abandoned by terrorists with five logged calls to members of the Lashkar. Just in case you did not know, it is the declared intention of the Pure Army to fly the Pakistani flag on top of the Red Fort. Its plans are not secret. They are on its website. Its leader, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, certainly gets a wink if not a nod from the Pak establishment.

Pervez Musharraf was the only Pakistani leader to ban the Lashkar, under international pressure after Vajpayee mobilized along the border in the wake of the December 13 attack on Parliament. Passions cooled, and it simply reappeared under another name, back in business. Hafiz Saeed does not live in hiding. He gives interviews to Indian publications.

Asif Zardari’s latest alibi is: these are non-state actors. They certainly preen around on the Pakistani stage. If the Pakistani state cannot stop this bloodthirsty drama, the world will have to.

Two-nation Theory has Bred Practice of Hatred

By M J Akbar

Why has Pakistan become synonymous with terrorism? The vast majority of Pakistanis surely find terrorism, which is the purest form of hatred, as repellent as Indians do. Why then does Pakistan breed an endless flow of suicide missionaries?

Practice has been shaped by theory. A theory of separation created Pakistan in 1947; over time, this has been converted into a culture of hatred by some self-appointed ideologues.

Pakistan emerged out of the notion that Hindus and Muslims could not live together. The threat perception was raised into the claim that Islam itself would be obliterated in a Hindu-majority India, during the seminal general elections of 1936-37. The Muslim League’s slogan was: “Islam in Danger!”

Neither history nor theology could have sustained such a slogan, but Muslim elites in British India, particularly landlords and capitalists, manipulated the incipient ideology of the Muslim League, and fuelled it with incendiary sentiment in order to create a state where they could protect their vested interests. They were not really afraid of “Hindu Raj”; they were terrified of land reform and socialism — however pale a version it might be — that the Congress would enforce. It is no accident that till today there has been no serious land reform in Pakistan. Gandhi’s honest faith in Hinduism was maliciously exploited to spread the perfidy that India would never offer an equal place to Muslims.

The idea of Islam being in danger was particularly attractive to a section of the ulema — but not to all of them; the Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Hind (now led by Maulana Mahmood Madni), unlike the Jamaat-e-Islami, was very clear-headed about the potential pitfalls and opposed the creation of Pakistan. The propartition ulema, however, discovered a unique opportunity for power. If Islam was going be the raison d’etre of the new nation, then who else could be its true guardians? The elites took control of the economy and politics; the upper middle classes dominated the administration; and the two shared authority in the armed forces. The clergy gradually took control of educational and legal space.

The one thing that united these elements, who had separate agendas and could be culturally antagonistic, was Kashmir. The first important decision taken after Pakistan’s birth was to convert the two-nation theory into a cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy.

It is often forgotten that Pakistan created the Kashmir problem when it decided to seize the Valley by armed force in the last week of October 1947. If this incursion had not taken place, there would have been a peaceful resolution to both Kashmir and Hyderabad, perhaps by the spring of 1948, with Britain as referee through the person of Lord Mountbatten. Perhaps this was one reason, apart from his sense of selfimportance, why Mountbatten wanted to be named Governor General of both India and Pakistan, but Jinnah told him to stick to Delhi.

India, Pakistan and Britain were in full agreement that no princely state should be permitted independence. The two holdouts, Kashmir and Hyderabad, could never have survived in their frozen condition. Mountbatten has left on record a note from Nehru in which he suggested that the resolution of Kashmir could be left to spring 1948, when the snows had melted.

Instead, Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan and Pakistan’s freshly emboldened leaders were convinced they could pray at the main mosque in Srinagar on the Friday following the invasion. They failed. The failure sponsored a lie, that the invasion was a “popular uprising”. Shuja Nawaz has exposed this falsehood effectively in his history of the Pakistan army, Crossed Swords [Oxford University Press]. The October 1947 invasion was armed and supported by the Pakistani administration.

Six decades of Fridays later, the rulers of Islamabad are still waiting. If they want to enter Srinagar on tanks they are welcome to wait another six decades and hand over the effort to their great grandchildren. If they want to come to Srinagar in peace, they can come and pray tomorrow. But it will be difficult for them to come in peace to Srinagar as long as they believe that Hindus and Muslims cannot live together. The twonation theory might have been abandoned in 1971, when Pakistan itself was partitioned. But it remains the official doctrine of the Pakistan state, sold to generations in millions of school textbooks.

Pakistan’s support for Sikh secessionism in the 1980s was clear evidence that it did not need only a “Muslim” cause to become pro-active. If it could destroy India’s integrity through another religious module, it was equally happy to do so. If General Zia ul Haq had spent as much energy on the construction of Pakistan as he did on the destruction of India, Pakistan might have had a rising economic story to tell by now.

Kashmir became the implicit sanction for the emergence, under Zia’s beneficial watch, of terrorist groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba, or the Army of the Pure. Zia’s successors, starting with Benazir Bhutto, did little to contain these terrorists. When India protested, Pakistani diplomats were polite across the table, and probably had a good laugh behind Delhi’s back. Since Zia’s time Pakistan has been asking for “evidence” or proof, and encouraging skepticism or conspiracy theories (dutifully lapped up by sections of the Indian media). Well, this time there is a canary singing in custody, and a satellite phone abandoned by terrorists with five logged calls to members of the Lashkar. Just in case you did not know, it is the declared intention of the Pure Army to fly the Pakistani flag on top of the Red Fort. Its plans are not secret. They are on its website. Its leader, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, certainly gets a wink if not a nod from the Pak establishment.

Pervez Musharraf was the only Pakistani leader to ban the Lashkar, under international pressure after Vajpayee mobilized along the border in the wake of the December 13 attack on Parliament. Passions cooled, and it simply reappeared under another name, back in business. Hafiz Saeed does not live in hiding. He gives interviews to Indian publications.

Asif Zardari’s latest alibi is: these are non-state actors. They certainly preen around on the Pakistani stage. If the Pakistani state cannot stop this bloodthirsty drama, the world will have to.

Burning Issue: How Exactly Does The Indian Media Define A Terrorist?

By M H AHSSAN | INNLIVE

The English-language media's use of the term seems to be dictated by muscular nationalism and an anti-Kashmir bias rather than any objective parameters.

On July 10, India woke up to startling pictures of massive crowds at the funeral of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani in Tral, Kashmir.

CONCERN ON THE ENTANGLEMENT OVER THE BAGLIHAR HYDROPOWER PROJECT

By Priya Venkatesh

Entanglement over the Baglihar hydropower project in Kashmir continues as the careens of the nations involved stand differentiated. The situation over the so- called controversial design of the dam has become topsy-turvy and has brought in such ramifications of having a neutral civil Swiss engineer, Raymond Lafitte to sort out the issue!

Despite World Bank negotiations over the disputes that prevailed between India and Pakistan on the utilization of water from the existing facilities way back in 1960 via the Indus Water treaty, its hapless that both nations have again run into a dead lock.

PROVISIONS OF THE INDUS WATER TREATY, 1960
Way back at the time of independence, the boundary line between India and Pakistan was laid right at the Indus River basin. The contraventions that arose over the utilization of water for irrigation from the existing facilities at the Indus river by both the countries climaxed in the signing of the Indus Water Treaty at Karchi on 19th September 1960 by the then President of Pakistan Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan and the then Prime Minister of India Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru in the presence of Mr.W.A.B.Ill of the World Bank.

The treaty was put into effect from 01 April, 1960.Usage of water from the eastern rivers of the Indus (The Sutlej, The Beas, The Ravi) were apportioned to India and of the western rivers of the Indus (The Chenab, The Jhelum and the Indus) were apportioned on a larger scale to Pakistan allowing a restricted usage of water by India in the latter.

BAGLIHAR HYDROPOWER PROJECT – DESCRIPTION AND PURPOSE
In continuation to this, India started off with a double-phase 900MW hydropower project (phase 1 providing a potential of 450MW) in the Chenab River in Kashmir at the southern Doda district in Chandrakot in 1999-2000. The vantages of hydropower are inexplicable. It not only serves as a renewable resource free from pollution but also sustains minimal running costs in the long run.

This project was enquired by the Central Water Commission and a report was prepared by the latter on the same in the year 1984.It also states that the geological investigations were done in 1962-1978 by the geological survey of India and in 1987, The project was reported to have been transferred to NHPC. After almost a decade of dormancy, the construction of the mega hydropower project started in 2000.

Being the only power project of the state, it promises to provide unrestrained electricity to the region which has been incessantly suffering from daylong power cuts.

This project on successful completion anticipates bringing about harmonious developmental strategies with respect to the supply of electricity to the whole of Kashmir and redeems a prosperous socio-economic environment in the otherwise impoverished city of Doda.

LOCATION AND FEATURES OF THE HYDROPOWER PROJECT
As per the data presented by the two small rivers, The Chandra and The Bhaga rising from the South-East and North-West of Baralacha pass at a height of 4,891 meters merge together at a place called Tandi at a height of 2,286 meters and becomes the ChaderBagha river.

This in turn passes through the Chamba district (as the Pangi valley) in HP and enters the Podar valley of Kashmir.

In Kashmir, the Chenab River drops another approx.2000 meters and flows into Pakistan near Akhnur.

India sees this drop in elevation of the Chenab River in Kashmir as a tremendous potential for Hydropower generation. This urged India and led to the idea of the implementation of the gigantic Baglihar Hydropower project.

FRI Reservoir level: 840m
MDDDI Reservoir level: 838m
Average reservoir level: 839m
Submergence area at the full reservoir level: 12994.17 Kanals
Power generation: 450MW

Plans for the Rehabilitation and resettlement of those affected by the construction of this project are in the pipeline.

WORK-FORCE INVOVLVED IN THE PROJECT
As per the reports of the “Daily Times”,

· the project is said to involve 7000 workers including skilled labor and engineers.
· The talks between the Project chief Engineer Ghulam Hassan Rather and Mufti Muhammed Syed during his visit to the site in early may 2005, communicates that the civil works were being executed by contractors Jaiprakash Associates of the Jay Pee group while electric works were being implemented by a German Consortium Voith Siemens & VA Tech. Another German company, Lahmeyer International is supervising the work on behalf of the Kashmir government

PROJECT DESIGN –THE HEART OF CONTROVERSY
The controversy over this started at the design of the Baglihar dam in the Chenab River. The president General Pervez Musharaff approved a plan to coerce India to redesign the project on November 21, 2004 stating that it was a clear violation of the dictates of the Indus Water Treaty, 1960. He made it clear that the intervention of the International court of justice would be sorted to if in case the controversy heightens in spite of political and diplomatic efforts undertaken by both the governments concerned.

Pakistan raised its opposition to the construction of the gate-like structures present in the design stating that it would divert water to India, which otherwise is destined for Pakistan. It also emphasizes the fact that the successful implementation of this project would deprive Pakistan of 6000-7000 cusecs of water per day. It also emphasized in reducing the planned height of the dam(470 feet) for which the Indian authorities allege that the 450MW capacity would come down to a mere 50MW.

India upholds to state that the construction would in no way disrupt the water flow of the river or the canals of Pakistan. India alleges that the problem of augmentation of sludge is overcome only by abnormal flushing which in turn is unfeasible but for the presence of gated spillways.

With reference to this, talks were held between India and Pakistan in July, August and October 2003.But the repercussion was just a stalemate. Formal notices were issued by Pakistan to resolve the issue with the intervention of neutral experts twice in July and October 2003.The deadlines for India’s response were set up at December 31, 2003.

As per the postulation of the Indian government, a 3-day talk between the Indian and Pakistani authorities was convened at the Permanent Commission of Indus Water (PCIW) in January 2004.

The political and diplomatic efforts to resolve the issue broke down even when the stakes to do so at the bi-lateral government level were quiet high. Talks continued again in January 2005 but ended up in vain. The issue still remained a blind alley.

Arbitration by the World Bank was sought for by the Pakistani authorities in early 2005.As a consequence, The World Bank appointed Raymond Lafitte, a Swiss national civil Engineer cum Professor to sort out the longstanding issue on May 10,2005.Professor Raymond Lafitte is with the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Lausanne. He was a former expert on dam safety with the Swiss government.

Lafitte held confluences with the delegates from India and Pakistan on the assorted issues over the disputed project in Paris, in the wake of June 2005.

A NOTE ON THE TIMEFRAME AND VALUE OF THE PROJECT
The highly controversial Baglihar hydropower project is expected to race towards its completion by June 2006. The Union minister after his recent visit to the site in mid-June 2005 is reported to have said that the project would be completed and dedicated to the nation by June next year.

As per the versions of many leading dailies, out of the estimated overall cost of erection of about 4000-crore, a sum of 2700-crores has already been used up and almost 71% of civil works and 81% of electro-mechanical work of Phase-1 has been completed till date.

WHAT’S ON THE RUN AND WORK AHEAD
As the backwash of the World Bank arbitration towards reaching a consensus in this issue, Priya Ranjan Dasmunshi, the then Union minister for Water resources confabulated the site of construction on June 17, 2005 to produce a detailed report on the same.

Inspection by the Pakistani delegates and by Lafitte is in the pipeline in the next few months.

It is believed that by resorting to World Bank arbitration, a Pandora’s box has been opened up. Will there be a resolution to this controversy in the nearest future? Much awaited is an accord in this issue between the nations concerned in the nearest future!

Will the World Bank take the quickest measure to resolve the issue? Will a consensus be reached between the two nations still remains an unanswered question!

POSSIBLE ENTAILMENTS OF ARBITRATION
Arbitration on its march ahead may end up with the renegotiation or revocation of the Treaty with the consent of both the nations concerned. Sequel of the treaty and operation within the scope of the Indus Water treaty is a must for the increasingly agriculture dependent Pakistani side. With the declining water storage at the Terbela and Mangla of Pakistan, revocation of the treaty would emphatically not auspicate the Pakistani side positively.

Further delay in sorting out the issue will have bad reflection on the Indians for two reasons. The first being the finance involved in this project that have taken up huge tolls of money and second being the unrestrained supply of electricity that would be available to Kashmir on successful implementation. Arbitration if prolonged will also strain both the nations financially.

Considering the nook and corner of this complex dispute, the candid facts with respect to the issue has to be pondered upon

· Abrogation of the treaty would never have a positive reflection to the Pakistanis and continuance of the arbitration will have negative contemplations on the Indians

· Political tension and administrative friction at the government level has to be swept aside. The functional side of the issue has to be brought under discussion. Negotiations should be concluded within the shortest stint of time and an accord has to become a reality on operational basis.

· Cognitive upbeat decisions must be taken at the functional level scraping out the political differences thus paving way to renegotiations of the Indus Water Treaty.

Whatever be the resolution to this indefinitely unsolved issue, let us hope that it should surface within the shortest possible stint of time and it should be to the fullest benefit of both the countries involved.

CONCERN ON THE ENTANGLEMENT OVER THE BAGLIHAR HYDROPOWER PROJECT

By Priya Venkatesh

Entanglement over the Baglihar hydropower project in Kashmir continues as the careens of the nations involved stand differentiated. The situation over the so- called controversial design of the dam has become topsy-turvy and has brought in such ramifications of having a neutral civil Swiss engineer, Raymond Lafitte to sort out the issue!

Despite World Bank negotiations over the disputes that prevailed between India and Pakistan on the utilization of water from the existing facilities way back in 1960 via the Indus Water treaty, its hapless that both nations have again run into a dead lock.

PROVISIONS OF THE INDUS WATER TREATY, 1960
Way back at the time of independence, the boundary line between India and Pakistan was laid right at the Indus River basin. The contraventions that arose over the utilization of water for irrigation from the existing facilities at the Indus river by both the countries climaxed in the signing of the Indus Water Treaty at Karchi on 19th September 1960 by the then President of Pakistan Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan and the then Prime Minister of India Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru in the presence of Mr.W.A.B.Ill of the World Bank.

The treaty was put into effect from 01 April, 1960.Usage of water from the eastern rivers of the Indus (The Sutlej, The Beas, The Ravi) were apportioned to India and of the western rivers of the Indus (The Chenab, The Jhelum and the Indus) were apportioned on a larger scale to Pakistan allowing a restricted usage of water by India in the latter.

BAGLIHAR HYDROPOWER PROJECT – DESCRIPTION AND PURPOSE
In continuation to this, India started off with a double-phase 900MW hydropower project (phase 1 providing a potential of 450MW) in the Chenab River in Kashmir at the southern Doda district in Chandrakot in 1999-2000. The vantages of hydropower are inexplicable. It not only serves as a renewable resource free from pollution but also sustains minimal running costs in the long run.

This project was enquired by the Central Water Commission and a report was prepared by the latter on the same in the year 1984.It also states that the geological investigations were done in 1962-1978 by the geological survey of India and in 1987, The project was reported to have been transferred to NHPC. After almost a decade of dormancy, the construction of the mega hydropower project started in 2000.

Being the only power project of the state, it promises to provide unrestrained electricity to the region which has been incessantly suffering from daylong power cuts.

This project on successful completion anticipates bringing about harmonious developmental strategies with respect to the supply of electricity to the whole of Kashmir and redeems a prosperous socio-economic environment in the otherwise impoverished city of Doda.

LOCATION AND FEATURES OF THE HYDROPOWER PROJECT
As per the data presented by the two small rivers, The Chandra and The Bhaga rising from the South-East and North-West of Baralacha pass at a height of 4,891 meters merge together at a place called Tandi at a height of 2,286 meters and becomes the ChaderBagha river.

This in turn passes through the Chamba district (as the Pangi valley) in HP and enters the Podar valley of Kashmir.

In Kashmir, the Chenab River drops another approx.2000 meters and flows into Pakistan near Akhnur.

India sees this drop in elevation of the Chenab River in Kashmir as a tremendous potential for Hydropower generation. This urged India and led to the idea of the implementation of the gigantic Baglihar Hydropower project.

FRI Reservoir level: 840m
MDDDI Reservoir level: 838m
Average reservoir level: 839m
Submergence area at the full reservoir level: 12994.17 Kanals
Power generation: 450MW

Plans for the Rehabilitation and resettlement of those affected by the construction of this project are in the pipeline.

WORK-FORCE INVOVLVED IN THE PROJECT
As per the reports of the “Daily Times”,

· the project is said to involve 7000 workers including skilled labor and engineers.
· The talks between the Project chief Engineer Ghulam Hassan Rather and Mufti Muhammed Syed during his visit to the site in early may 2005, communicates that the civil works were being executed by contractors Jaiprakash Associates of the Jay Pee group while electric works were being implemented by a German Consortium Voith Siemens & VA Tech. Another German company, Lahmeyer International is supervising the work on behalf of the Kashmir government

PROJECT DESIGN –THE HEART OF CONTROVERSY
The controversy over this started at the design of the Baglihar dam in the Chenab River. The president General Pervez Musharaff approved a plan to coerce India to redesign the project on November 21, 2004 stating that it was a clear violation of the dictates of the Indus Water Treaty, 1960. He made it clear that the intervention of the International court of justice would be sorted to if in case the controversy heightens in spite of political and diplomatic efforts undertaken by both the governments concerned.

Pakistan raised its opposition to the construction of the gate-like structures present in the design stating that it would divert water to India, which otherwise is destined for Pakistan. It also emphasizes the fact that the successful implementation of this project would deprive Pakistan of 6000-7000 cusecs of water per day. It also emphasized in reducing the planned height of the dam(470 feet) for which the Indian authorities allege that the 450MW capacity would come down to a mere 50MW.

India upholds to state that the construction would in no way disrupt the water flow of the river or the canals of Pakistan. India alleges that the problem of augmentation of sludge is overcome only by abnormal flushing which in turn is unfeasible but for the presence of gated spillways.

With reference to this, talks were held between India and Pakistan in July, August and October 2003.But the repercussion was just a stalemate. Formal notices were issued by Pakistan to resolve the issue with the intervention of neutral experts twice in July and October 2003.The deadlines for India’s response were set up at December 31, 2003.

As per the postulation of the Indian government, a 3-day talk between the Indian and Pakistani authorities was convened at the Permanent Commission of Indus Water (PCIW) in January 2004.

The political and diplomatic efforts to resolve the issue broke down even when the stakes to do so at the bi-lateral government level were quiet high. Talks continued again in January 2005 but ended up in vain. The issue still remained a blind alley.

Arbitration by the World Bank was sought for by the Pakistani authorities in early 2005.As a consequence, The World Bank appointed Raymond Lafitte, a Swiss national civil Engineer cum Professor to sort out the longstanding issue on May 10,2005.Professor Raymond Lafitte is with the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Lausanne. He was a former expert on dam safety with the Swiss government.

Lafitte held confluences with the delegates from India and Pakistan on the assorted issues over the disputed project in Paris, in the wake of June 2005.

A NOTE ON THE TIMEFRAME AND VALUE OF THE PROJECT
The highly controversial Baglihar hydropower project is expected to race towards its completion by June 2006. The Union minister after his recent visit to the site in mid-June 2005 is reported to have said that the project would be completed and dedicated to the nation by June next year.

As per the versions of many leading dailies, out of the estimated overall cost of erection of about 4000-crore, a sum of 2700-crores has already been used up and almost 71% of civil works and 81% of electro-mechanical work of Phase-1 has been completed till date.

WHAT’S ON THE RUN AND WORK AHEAD
As the backwash of the World Bank arbitration towards reaching a consensus in this issue, Priya Ranjan Dasmunshi, the then Union minister for Water resources confabulated the site of construction on June 17, 2005 to produce a detailed report on the same.

Inspection by the Pakistani delegates and by Lafitte is in the pipeline in the next few months.

It is believed that by resorting to World Bank arbitration, a Pandora’s box has been opened up. Will there be a resolution to this controversy in the nearest future? Much awaited is an accord in this issue between the nations concerned in the nearest future!

Will the World Bank take the quickest measure to resolve the issue? Will a consensus be reached between the two nations still remains an unanswered question!

POSSIBLE ENTAILMENTS OF ARBITRATION
Arbitration on its march ahead may end up with the renegotiation or revocation of the Treaty with the consent of both the nations concerned. Sequel of the treaty and operation within the scope of the Indus Water treaty is a must for the increasingly agriculture dependent Pakistani side. With the declining water storage at the Terbela and Mangla of Pakistan, revocation of the treaty would emphatically not auspicate the Pakistani side positively.

Further delay in sorting out the issue will have bad reflection on the Indians for two reasons. The first being the finance involved in this project that have taken up huge tolls of money and second being the unrestrained supply of electricity that would be available to Kashmir on successful implementation. Arbitration if prolonged will also strain both the nations financially.

Considering the nook and corner of this complex dispute, the candid facts with respect to the issue has to be pondered upon

· Abrogation of the treaty would never have a positive reflection to the Pakistanis and continuance of the arbitration will have negative contemplations on the Indians

· Political tension and administrative friction at the government level has to be swept aside. The functional side of the issue has to be brought under discussion. Negotiations should be concluded within the shortest stint of time and an accord has to become a reality on operational basis.

· Cognitive upbeat decisions must be taken at the functional level scraping out the political differences thus paving way to renegotiations of the Indus Water Treaty.

Whatever be the resolution to this indefinitely unsolved issue, let us hope that it should surface within the shortest possible stint of time and it should be to the fullest benefit of both the countries involved.

CONCERN ON THE ENTANGLEMENT OVER THE BAGLIHAR HYDROPOWER PROJECT

By Priya Venkatesh

Entanglement over the Baglihar hydropower project in Kashmir continues as the careens of the nations involved stand differentiated. The situation over the so- called controversial design of the dam has become topsy-turvy and has brought in such ramifications of having a neutral civil Swiss engineer, Raymond Lafitte to sort out the issue!

Despite World Bank negotiations over the disputes that prevailed between India and Pakistan on the utilization of water from the existing facilities way back in 1960 via the Indus Water treaty, its hapless that both nations have again run into a dead lock.

PROVISIONS OF THE INDUS WATER TREATY, 1960
Way back at the time of independence, the boundary line between India and Pakistan was laid right at the Indus River basin. The contraventions that arose over the utilization of water for irrigation from the existing facilities at the Indus river by both the countries climaxed in the signing of the Indus Water Treaty at Karchi on 19th September 1960 by the then President of Pakistan Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan and the then Prime Minister of India Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru in the presence of Mr.W.A.B.Ill of the World Bank.

The treaty was put into effect from 01 April, 1960.Usage of water from the eastern rivers of the Indus (The Sutlej, The Beas, The Ravi) were apportioned to India and of the western rivers of the Indus (The Chenab, The Jhelum and the Indus) were apportioned on a larger scale to Pakistan allowing a restricted usage of water by India in the latter.

BAGLIHAR HYDROPOWER PROJECT – DESCRIPTION AND PURPOSE
In continuation to this, India started off with a double-phase 900MW hydropower project (phase 1 providing a potential of 450MW) in the Chenab River in Kashmir at the southern Doda district in Chandrakot in 1999-2000. The vantages of hydropower are inexplicable. It not only serves as a renewable resource free from pollution but also sustains minimal running costs in the long run.

This project was enquired by the Central Water Commission and a report was prepared by the latter on the same in the year 1984.It also states that the geological investigations were done in 1962-1978 by the geological survey of India and in 1987, The project was reported to have been transferred to NHPC. After almost a decade of dormancy, the construction of the mega hydropower project started in 2000.

Being the only power project of the state, it promises to provide unrestrained electricity to the region which has been incessantly suffering from daylong power cuts.

This project on successful completion anticipates bringing about harmonious developmental strategies with respect to the supply of electricity to the whole of Kashmir and redeems a prosperous socio-economic environment in the otherwise impoverished city of Doda.

LOCATION AND FEATURES OF THE HYDROPOWER PROJECT
As per the data presented by the two small rivers, The Chandra and The Bhaga rising from the South-East and North-West of Baralacha pass at a height of 4,891 meters merge together at a place called Tandi at a height of 2,286 meters and becomes the ChaderBagha river.

This in turn passes through the Chamba district (as the Pangi valley) in HP and enters the Podar valley of Kashmir.

In Kashmir, the Chenab River drops another approx.2000 meters and flows into Pakistan near Akhnur.

India sees this drop in elevation of the Chenab River in Kashmir as a tremendous potential for Hydropower generation. This urged India and led to the idea of the implementation of the gigantic Baglihar Hydropower project.

FRI Reservoir level: 840m
MDDDI Reservoir level: 838m
Average reservoir level: 839m
Submergence area at the full reservoir level: 12994.17 Kanals
Power generation: 450MW

Plans for the Rehabilitation and resettlement of those affected by the construction of this project are in the pipeline.

WORK-FORCE INVOVLVED IN THE PROJECT
As per the reports of the “Daily Times”,

· the project is said to involve 7000 workers including skilled labor and engineers.
· The talks between the Project chief Engineer Ghulam Hassan Rather and Mufti Muhammed Syed during his visit to the site in early may 2005, communicates that the civil works were being executed by contractors Jaiprakash Associates of the Jay Pee group while electric works were being implemented by a German Consortium Voith Siemens & VA Tech. Another German company, Lahmeyer International is supervising the work on behalf of the Kashmir government

PROJECT DESIGN –THE HEART OF CONTROVERSY
The controversy over this started at the design of the Baglihar dam in the Chenab River. The president General Pervez Musharaff approved a plan to coerce India to redesign the project on November 21, 2004 stating that it was a clear violation of the dictates of the Indus Water Treaty, 1960. He made it clear that the intervention of the International court of justice would be sorted to if in case the controversy heightens in spite of political and diplomatic efforts undertaken by both the governments concerned.

Pakistan raised its opposition to the construction of the gate-like structures present in the design stating that it would divert water to India, which otherwise is destined for Pakistan. It also emphasizes the fact that the successful implementation of this project would deprive Pakistan of 6000-7000 cusecs of water per day. It also emphasized in reducing the planned height of the dam(470 feet) for which the Indian authorities allege that the 450MW capacity would come down to a mere 50MW.

India upholds to state that the construction would in no way disrupt the water flow of the river or the canals of Pakistan. India alleges that the problem of augmentation of sludge is overcome only by abnormal flushing which in turn is unfeasible but for the presence of gated spillways.

With reference to this, talks were held between India and Pakistan in July, August and October 2003.But the repercussion was just a stalemate. Formal notices were issued by Pakistan to resolve the issue with the intervention of neutral experts twice in July and October 2003.The deadlines for India’s response were set up at December 31, 2003.

As per the postulation of the Indian government, a 3-day talk between the Indian and Pakistani authorities was convened at the Permanent Commission of Indus Water (PCIW) in January 2004.

The political and diplomatic efforts to resolve the issue broke down even when the stakes to do so at the bi-lateral government level were quiet high. Talks continued again in January 2005 but ended up in vain. The issue still remained a blind alley.

Arbitration by the World Bank was sought for by the Pakistani authorities in early 2005.As a consequence, The World Bank appointed Raymond Lafitte, a Swiss national civil Engineer cum Professor to sort out the longstanding issue on May 10,2005.Professor Raymond Lafitte is with the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Lausanne. He was a former expert on dam safety with the Swiss government.

Lafitte held confluences with the delegates from India and Pakistan on the assorted issues over the disputed project in Paris, in the wake of June 2005.

A NOTE ON THE TIMEFRAME AND VALUE OF THE PROJECT
The highly controversial Baglihar hydropower project is expected to race towards its completion by June 2006. The Union minister after his recent visit to the site in mid-June 2005 is reported to have said that the project would be completed and dedicated to the nation by June next year.

As per the versions of many leading dailies, out of the estimated overall cost of erection of about 4000-crore, a sum of 2700-crores has already been used up and almost 71% of civil works and 81% of electro-mechanical work of Phase-1 has been completed till date.

WHAT’S ON THE RUN AND WORK AHEAD
As the backwash of the World Bank arbitration towards reaching a consensus in this issue, Priya Ranjan Dasmunshi, the then Union minister for Water resources confabulated the site of construction on June 17, 2005 to produce a detailed report on the same.

Inspection by the Pakistani delegates and by Lafitte is in the pipeline in the next few months.

It is believed that by resorting to World Bank arbitration, a Pandora’s box has been opened up. Will there be a resolution to this controversy in the nearest future? Much awaited is an accord in this issue between the nations concerned in the nearest future!

Will the World Bank take the quickest measure to resolve the issue? Will a consensus be reached between the two nations still remains an unanswered question!

POSSIBLE ENTAILMENTS OF ARBITRATION
Arbitration on its march ahead may end up with the renegotiation or revocation of the Treaty with the consent of both the nations concerned. Sequel of the treaty and operation within the scope of the Indus Water treaty is a must for the increasingly agriculture dependent Pakistani side. With the declining water storage at the Terbela and Mangla of Pakistan, revocation of the treaty would emphatically not auspicate the Pakistani side positively.

Further delay in sorting out the issue will have bad reflection on the Indians for two reasons. The first being the finance involved in this project that have taken up huge tolls of money and second being the unrestrained supply of electricity that would be available to Kashmir on successful implementation. Arbitration if prolonged will also strain both the nations financially.

Considering the nook and corner of this complex dispute, the candid facts with respect to the issue has to be pondered upon

· Abrogation of the treaty would never have a positive reflection to the Pakistanis and continuance of the arbitration will have negative contemplations on the Indians

· Political tension and administrative friction at the government level has to be swept aside. The functional side of the issue has to be brought under discussion. Negotiations should be concluded within the shortest stint of time and an accord has to become a reality on operational basis.

· Cognitive upbeat decisions must be taken at the functional level scraping out the political differences thus paving way to renegotiations of the Indus Water Treaty.

Whatever be the resolution to this indefinitely unsolved issue, let us hope that it should surface within the shortest possible stint of time and it should be to the fullest benefit of both the countries involved.

TERROR EXPLOSIVES SHATTER LIVES IN KASHMIR VALLEY

By Athar Pervaiz / Srinagar

Maimed victims of landmines in Kashmir are struggling to pay for medical treatment and prosthetic limbs with the menial government compensation on offer. With many farming families forced to sell land and beg as a result, the impact of such accidents lasts long after the detonation.

Aadil Khan and his two siblings had been playing as usual behind their house in the village of Diver, 110 kilometers north of Kashmir's capital, Srinagar, when they came across what they thought was a "plaything" laying on the ground. But no sooner had they picked the object up than it literally shattered their innocent lives into pieces. 

'PASHMINA GOATS' BECOMING EXTINCT IN KASHMIR

By Abu Yousuf / Srinagar

In Kashmir valley, world famous Pashmina goats are becoming extinct due to various reasons. Since January, 13 percent of the Changra goats has been wiped out, threatening the lucrative Pashmina industry in the Kashmir Valley.

This summer, Pashmina shawl weavers like Ashiq Ahmed have a tough choice to make. They can either buy raw wool at inflated rates or abandon the 600-year-old weaving craft.

LETHAL INJURIES FROM 'NON-LETHAL' WEAPONS

By Mirza Shoeb Khan / Srinagar

Despite the call by human rights organizations to stop the use of weapons such as pellet guns and chilli grenades in tackling riots or mob fury, security forces in the Kashmir Valley continue to deploy the same with impunity. This has led to debilitating injuries and even death.

India grapples with the Obama era

By M H Ahssan

What prompted the spokesman of India's ruling party, Congress, to recommend that the Bharat Ratna - the "Jewel of India" - be bestowed on George W Bush, we might never know. India has conferred its highest civilian honor on only two foreigners, one of whom was Nelson Mandela.

The Congress politician apparently got carried away on a balmy winter day with nostalgia hanging heavily in the air, as he faced a select audience of Delhi's elite, who formed the gravy train of India-US "strategic partnership" in the Bush era.

Ironically, even as he spoke last Friday, a delegation was setting out from the United States for India to pay homage to Mahatma Gandhi, the great apostle of non-violence, who inspired Martin Luther King, who in turn remains a constant source of inspiration for US President Barack Obama.

The bizarre coincidence was driven home when at a special ceremony at the US State Department marking the visit, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, "India is a reminder that the struggle for civil rights and justice has always been and continues to be a global mission; it knows no borders."

The two unconnected events underscored the dilemma facing India's policymakers as the Obama era gets under way. Indeed, it is an extraordinary statement that the first American delegation to visit India after Obama took office should be a "Gandhian" delegation. Is Obama "demilitarizing" India-US strategic cooperation? "Mil-to-mil" cooperation was at the core of US-India relationship during the past eight-year period. In recent years, India conducted more than 50 military exercises with the US.

All dressed up, nowhere to go
Yet a pall of gloom has descended on New Delhi's elite. There is a pervasive nostalgia for George W Bush. The Bush administration officials claimed that the US regarded India as the preponderant power in South Asia and as a key Asian player that would shape up to be a viable counterweight to China militarily. The expectation was that the US would extricate India from the morass of its South Asian neighborhood by arm-twisting Pakistan.

Under constant encouragement from the Bush administration, the Indian elite placed faith in the country's emergence as a global player. They began working "shoulder to shoulder" with the US, just as Bush's officials urged. Now, Indian strategists find themselves awkwardly placed - all dressed-up but there's nowhere right now for them to go.

Three factors have shaken up the Indian complacency. First, Indian strategists seriously underestimated the military stalemate that was developing in the war in Afghanistan and the consequent acute dependence of the US on Pakistan's cooperation. This may sound surprising, but the knowledge of Afghan affairs remains shockingly poor among Indian strategists.

Two, Indian strategists underestimated the gravity of the global financial crisis that erupted last year. They couldn't comprehend that the crisis would fundamentally change the world order. Even hard-nosed Indian strategists placed a touching faith in the "New American Century" project.

Three, the Indian establishment failed to grasp what Obama meant when he spoke of "change". The Indian skepticism about Obama's capacity to change US policies remained fairly widespread. The Indian establishment concluded that Obama would ultimately have to work within the box, hemmed in by America's political, foreign policy and security establishment. It failed to see that the US's capacity to sustain its global dominance was itself weakening and that necessitated radical changes in Obama's policies.

From this perspective, the past week offered a reality check. The visit by the newly appointed US Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, to the region underscored that Islamabad's support for the US war strategy in Afghanistan has become critical. The war is at a crucial stage and salvaging it appears increasingly difficult.

More to the point, given the overall fragility of the political situation in Pakistan, a stage is reached beyond which the US cannot "pressure" Pakistan. Therefore, in a change of approach, the US will have no choice but to work with Pakistan. In the coming period, as Holbrooke gradually opens the political track leading to an Afghan settlement, need of Pakistan's cooperation increases further.

Meanwhile, the revelation that the US Predator drones operate out of Pakistani bases underlines how closely Washington and Islamabad have been working. The US's acquiescence in the release of AQ Khan revealed the great latitude towards Pakistan's concerns. The Indian strategists who fancied that New Delhi was Washington's preferred partner in South Asia are stunned. Clearly, India is nowhere near as valuable an ally as Pakistan for the US for the present.

Looking ahead, Obama's decision on Wednesday approving a troop buildup in Afghanistan constitutes a defining moment. He has put his presidency on the firing line. From this week onward, Obama's war has begun. The war can well consume his presidency. Either he succeeds, or he gets mired in the war. Yet, the new US strategy is still in the making. Delhi takes note that it is at such a crucial juncture that the Pakistani army chief, General Parvez Kayani, has been invited to go across to Washington for consultations.

The message is clear: Washington will be in no mood to antagonize its Pakistani partner and Delhi is expected to keep tensions under check in its relations with Islamabad.

Dollar courting yuan
But there is another aspect in Obama's new foreign policy that worries India even more. Obama's China policy renders obsolete the Indian strategic calculus built around the US containment strategy. Hardly two to three years ago, the Bush administration encouraged India to put faith in a quadrilateral alliance of Asian democracies - the US, Japan, Australia and India - that would strive to set the rules for China's behavior in the region.

According to reports, State Department officials had originally proposed that India be included in the itinerary of Clinton's current first official tour abroad, but she struck it out. As things stand, Clinton meant every word of what she wrote last year in her Foreign Affairs article that "our [US] relationship with China will be the most important bilateral relationship in the world in this century".

In a major speech at the Asia Society in New York last Friday before embarking on her tour of Asia, Clinton said, "We believe that the United States and China can benefit from and contribute to each other's successes. It is in our interests to work harder to build on areas of common concern and shared opportunities". She argued for a "comprehensive dialogue" and a "broader agenda" with China.

The Washington Post cited State Department officials as saying, "It is symbolically important that Clinton is the first secretary of state in nearly 50 years to intensely focus his or her maiden voyage on Asia". The story is easily comprehensible. The US needs to have new opportunities to export more to China; it should persuade Beijing to accept a realistic dollar-yuan exchange rate; and, it should convince China to keep investing its money in America. But what is unfolding is also a phenomenal story insofar as a new chapter in their mutually dependent relationship is commencing where the two countries become equal partners in crisis. This was simply unthinkable.

Dennis Blair, the newly appointed director of national intelligence, in his testimony before the US senate intelligence committee on January 22, struck a fine balance when he said, while the United States must understand China's military buildup - its extent, its technological sophistication and its vulnerabilities - in order to offset it, the intelligence community also needs to support policymakers who are looking for opportunities to work with Chinese leaders who believe that Asia is big enough for both of us and can be an Asia in which both countries can benefit as well as contribute to the common good.

However, this is precisely where a serious problem arises for India. In the Indian perception, South Asia and the Indian Ocean just aren't "big enough" for India and China.

Dragon encircles peacock
This was rubbed home when Chinese President Hu Jintao arrived in Port Louis, Mauritius, on Tuesday on the final lap of his latest odyssey to Africa. Hu nonchalantly handed out a generous US$1 billion aid package for Mauritius, which India traditionally regarded as its "sphere of influence" in the Indian Ocean. No doubt, it was an audacious gesture by Beijing to a country the majority of whose 1.3 million population are people of Indian origin - at a time when China too faces an economic crisis and analysts say anywhere up to 40 million migrant workers may lose their jobs this year.

Arguably, Beijing regards Mauritius as a value-added platform between China and Africa from where its entrepreneurs could optimally perform. But Hu has convinced the Indian strategic community about China's "encirclement" policy towards India. A leading Indian right-wing daily commented that Hu's visit was "anything but ordinary ... It underscores Beijing's relentless thrust to secure a permanent naval foothold in the western Indian Ocean ... That, of course, would only come at the expense of the Indian navy, which has been the principal external security partner of Mauritius all these decades".

It is precisely such hubris that gets punctured by the shift in the Obama administration's new priorities in the Far East and southwest Asia. A difficult period of adjustment lies ahead for Indian policymakers. India needs good relations with the US. At any rate, the India-US relationship is on an irreversible trajectory of growth. There is a "bipartisan" consensus in both countries that the relationship is in each other's vital interests. But the US's current strategic priorities in the region and India's expectations are diverging. Given the criticality of Pakistan in the US geo-strategy, Obama administration will be constrained to correct the Bush administration's "tilt" towards India.

Kashmir beckons
New Delhi pulled out all the stops when rumors surfaced that Holbrooke's mandate might include the Kashmir problem. Obama paid heed to Indian sensitivities. But at a price. It compels India to curtail its own excessive instincts in recent years to seek US intervention in keeping India-Pakistan tensions in check.

In short, New Delhi will have to pay much greater attention to its bilateral track with Pakistan. And, of course, Pakistan will expect India to be far more flexible. Rightly or wrongly, Pakistan harbors a feeling that India took unilateral advantage from the relative four-year calm in their relationship without conceding anything in return.

In a sensational interview with India's top television personality, Karan Thapar, on Thursday night, Pakistan's former foreign minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri confirmed what many in New Delhi suspected, namely, that through back channel diplomacy, Islamabad and New Delhi had reached a broad understanding on contentious issues such as Sir Creek, Siachen and Kashmir as far back as two years ago.

The Indian prime minister was expected to visit Pakistan to conclude some of the agreements but the Indian side apparently began developing cold feet and it is "sheer bad luck", as Kasuri put it, that the momentum dissipated.

To quote Kasuri, "If the Prime Minister of India had come when we [Pakistan] thought he would, we would have actually signed it, and that would have created the right atmosphere for resolution of other disputes, particularly the issue of J&K [Jammu and Kashmir]. We needed the right atmosphere."

In other words, there is always a lurking danger that at some point, Holbrooke may barge into the Kashmir problem by way of addressing the core issues of regional security. The Bush administration had been kept constantly briefed by New Delhi on its back-channel discussions with Islamabad regarding Kashmir. Retracting from any commitments given to Pakistan becomes problematic at this stage.

At the same time, the Indian government has done nothing so far to sensitize domestic public opinion that such highly delicate discussions involving joint India-Pakistan governance of the Kashmir region have reached an advanced stage.

Thus, in a manner of speaking, with Holbrooke's arrival in the region this past week, the clock began ticking on the Kashmir issue. Pakistan will incrementally mount pressure that Obama must insist on India moving forward on a settlement of the Kashmir problem in the overall interests of peace and regional stability.

And New Delhi will remain watchful. Holbrooke's visit to New Delhi on Monday was kept low-key. The Indian media fawned on any mid-level official calling from the Bush administration, but Holbrooke was tucked away as if under quarantine. And no wonder; there could be many among New Delhi's elite who feel nostalgic for the tranquility and predictability of the Bush era.

India grapples with the Obama era

By M H Ahssan

What prompted the spokesman of India's ruling party, Congress, to recommend that the Bharat Ratna - the "Jewel of India" - be bestowed on George W Bush, we might never know. India has conferred its highest civilian honor on only two foreigners, one of whom was Nelson Mandela.

The Congress politician apparently got carried away on a balmy winter day with nostalgia hanging heavily in the air, as he faced a select audience of Delhi's elite, who formed the gravy train of India-US "strategic partnership" in the Bush era.

Ironically, even as he spoke last Friday, a delegation was setting out from the United States for India to pay homage to Mahatma Gandhi, the great apostle of non-violence, who inspired Martin Luther King, who in turn remains a constant source of inspiration for US President Barack Obama.

The bizarre coincidence was driven home when at a special ceremony at the US State Department marking the visit, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, "India is a reminder that the struggle for civil rights and justice has always been and continues to be a global mission; it knows no borders."

The two unconnected events underscored the dilemma facing India's policymakers as the Obama era gets under way. Indeed, it is an extraordinary statement that the first American delegation to visit India after Obama took office should be a "Gandhian" delegation. Is Obama "demilitarizing" India-US strategic cooperation? "Mil-to-mil" cooperation was at the core of US-India relationship during the past eight-year period. In recent years, India conducted more than 50 military exercises with the US.

All dressed up, nowhere to go
Yet a pall of gloom has descended on New Delhi's elite. There is a pervasive nostalgia for George W Bush. The Bush administration officials claimed that the US regarded India as the preponderant power in South Asia and as a key Asian player that would shape up to be a viable counterweight to China militarily. The expectation was that the US would extricate India from the morass of its South Asian neighborhood by arm-twisting Pakistan.

Under constant encouragement from the Bush administration, the Indian elite placed faith in the country's emergence as a global player. They began working "shoulder to shoulder" with the US, just as Bush's officials urged. Now, Indian strategists find themselves awkwardly placed - all dressed-up but there's nowhere right now for them to go.

Three factors have shaken up the Indian complacency. First, Indian strategists seriously underestimated the military stalemate that was developing in the war in Afghanistan and the consequent acute dependence of the US on Pakistan's cooperation. This may sound surprising, but the knowledge of Afghan affairs remains shockingly poor among Indian strategists.

Two, Indian strategists underestimated the gravity of the global financial crisis that erupted last year. They couldn't comprehend that the crisis would fundamentally change the world order. Even hard-nosed Indian strategists placed a touching faith in the "New American Century" project.

Three, the Indian establishment failed to grasp what Obama meant when he spoke of "change". The Indian skepticism about Obama's capacity to change US policies remained fairly widespread. The Indian establishment concluded that Obama would ultimately have to work within the box, hemmed in by America's political, foreign policy and security establishment. It failed to see that the US's capacity to sustain its global dominance was itself weakening and that necessitated radical changes in Obama's policies.

From this perspective, the past week offered a reality check. The visit by the newly appointed US Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, to the region underscored that Islamabad's support for the US war strategy in Afghanistan has become critical. The war is at a crucial stage and salvaging it appears increasingly difficult.

More to the point, given the overall fragility of the political situation in Pakistan, a stage is reached beyond which the US cannot "pressure" Pakistan. Therefore, in a change of approach, the US will have no choice but to work with Pakistan. In the coming period, as Holbrooke gradually opens the political track leading to an Afghan settlement, need of Pakistan's cooperation increases further.

Meanwhile, the revelation that the US Predator drones operate out of Pakistani bases underlines how closely Washington and Islamabad have been working. The US's acquiescence in the release of AQ Khan revealed the great latitude towards Pakistan's concerns. The Indian strategists who fancied that New Delhi was Washington's preferred partner in South Asia are stunned. Clearly, India is nowhere near as valuable an ally as Pakistan for the US for the present.

Looking ahead, Obama's decision on Wednesday approving a troop buildup in Afghanistan constitutes a defining moment. He has put his presidency on the firing line. From this week onward, Obama's war has begun. The war can well consume his presidency. Either he succeeds, or he gets mired in the war. Yet, the new US strategy is still in the making. Delhi takes note that it is at such a crucial juncture that the Pakistani army chief, General Parvez Kayani, has been invited to go across to Washington for consultations.

The message is clear: Washington will be in no mood to antagonize its Pakistani partner and Delhi is expected to keep tensions under check in its relations with Islamabad.

Dollar courting yuan
But there is another aspect in Obama's new foreign policy that worries India even more. Obama's China policy renders obsolete the Indian strategic calculus built around the US containment strategy. Hardly two to three years ago, the Bush administration encouraged India to put faith in a quadrilateral alliance of Asian democracies - the US, Japan, Australia and India - that would strive to set the rules for China's behavior in the region.

According to reports, State Department officials had originally proposed that India be included in the itinerary of Clinton's current first official tour abroad, but she struck it out. As things stand, Clinton meant every word of what she wrote last year in her Foreign Affairs article that "our [US] relationship with China will be the most important bilateral relationship in the world in this century".

In a major speech at the Asia Society in New York last Friday before embarking on her tour of Asia, Clinton said, "We believe that the United States and China can benefit from and contribute to each other's successes. It is in our interests to work harder to build on areas of common concern and shared opportunities". She argued for a "comprehensive dialogue" and a "broader agenda" with China.

The Washington Post cited State Department officials as saying, "It is symbolically important that Clinton is the first secretary of state in nearly 50 years to intensely focus his or her maiden voyage on Asia". The story is easily comprehensible. The US needs to have new opportunities to export more to China; it should persuade Beijing to accept a realistic dollar-yuan exchange rate; and, it should convince China to keep investing its money in America. But what is unfolding is also a phenomenal story insofar as a new chapter in their mutually dependent relationship is commencing where the two countries become equal partners in crisis. This was simply unthinkable.

Dennis Blair, the newly appointed director of national intelligence, in his testimony before the US senate intelligence committee on January 22, struck a fine balance when he said,

While the United States must understand China's military buildup - its extent, its technological sophistication and its vulnerabilities - in order to offset it, the intelligence community also needs to support policymakers who are looking for opportunities to work with Chinese leaders who believe that Asia is big enough for both of us and can be an Asia in which both countries can benefit as well as contribute to the common good.

However, this is precisely where a serious problem arises for India. In the Indian perception, South Asia and the Indian Ocean just aren't "big enough" for India and China.

Dragon encircles peacock
This was rubbed home when Chinese President Hu Jintao arrived in Port Louis, Mauritius, on Tuesday on the final lap of his latest odyssey to Africa. Hu nonchalantly handed out a generous US$1 billion aid package for Mauritius, which India traditionally regarded as its "sphere of influence" in the Indian Ocean. No doubt, it was an audacious gesture by Beijing to a country the majority of whose 1.3 million population are people of Indian origin - at a time when China too faces an economic crisis and analysts say anywhere up to 40 million migrant workers may lose their jobs this year.

Arguably, Beijing regards Mauritius as a value-added platform between China and Africa from where its entrepreneurs could optimally perform. But Hu has convinced the Indian strategic community about China's "encirclement" policy towards India. A leading Indian right-wing daily commented that Hu's visit was "anything but ordinary ... It underscores Beijing's relentless thrust to secure a permanent naval foothold in the western Indian Ocean ... That, of course, would only come at the expense of the Indian navy, which has been the principal external security partner of Mauritius all these decades".

It is precisely such hubris that gets punctured by the shift in the Obama administration's new priorities in the Far East and southwest Asia. A difficult period of adjustment lies ahead for Indian policymakers. India needs good relations with the US. At any rate, the India-US relationship is on an irreversible trajectory of growth. There is a "bipartisan" consensus in both countries that the relationship is in each other's vital interests. But the US's current strategic priorities in the region and India's expectations are diverging. Given the criticality of Pakistan in the US geo-strategy, Obama administration will be constrained to correct the Bush administration's "tilt" towards India.

Kashmir beckons
New Delhi pulled out all the stops when rumors surfaced that Holbrooke's mandate might include the Kashmir problem. Obama paid heed to Indian sensitivities. But at a price. It compels India to curtail its own excessive instincts in recent years to seek US intervention in keeping India-Pakistan tensions in check.

In short, New Delhi will have to pay much greater attention to its bilateral track with Pakistan. And, of course, Pakistan will expect India to be far more flexible. Rightly or wrongly, Pakistan harbors a feeling that India took unilateral advantage from the relative four-year calm in their relationship without conceding anything in return.

In a sensational interview with India's top television personality, Karan Thapar, on Thursday night, Pakistan's former foreign minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri confirmed what many in New Delhi suspected, namely, that through back channel diplomacy, Islamabad and New Delhi had reached a broad understanding on contentious issues such as Sir Creek, Siachen and Kashmir as far back as two years ago.

The Indian prime minister was expected to visit Pakistan to conclude some of the agreements but the Indian side apparently began developing cold feet and it is "sheer bad luck", as Kasuri put it, that the momentum dissipated.

To quote Kasuri, "If the Prime Minister of India had come when we [Pakistan] thought he would, we would have actually signed it, and that would have created the right atmosphere for resolution of other disputes, particularly the issue of J&K [Jammu and Kashmir]. We needed the right atmosphere."

In other words, there is always a lurking danger that at some point, Holbrooke may barge into the Kashmir problem by way of addressing the core issues of regional security. The Bush administration had been kept constantly briefed by New Delhi on its back-channel discussions with Islamabad regarding Kashmir. Retracting from any commitments given to Pakistan becomes problematic at this stage.

At the same time, the Indian government has done nothing so far to sensitize domestic public opinion that such highly delicate discussions involving joint India-Pakistan governance of the Kashmir region have reached an advanced stage.

Thus, in a manner of speaking, with Holbrooke's arrival in the region this past week, the clock began ticking on the Kashmir issue. Pakistan will incrementally mount pressure that Obama must insist on India moving forward on a settlement of the Kashmir problem in the overall interests of peace and regional stability.

And New Delhi will remain watchful. Holbrooke's visit to New Delhi on Monday was kept low-key. The Indian media fawned on any mid-level official calling from the Bush administration, but Holbrooke was tucked away as if under quarantine. And no wonder; there could be many among New Delhi's elite who feel nostalgic for the tranquility and predictability of the Bush era.

India grapples with the Obama era

By M H Ahssan

What prompted the spokesman of India's ruling party, Congress, to recommend that the Bharat Ratna - the "Jewel of India" - be bestowed on George W Bush, we might never know. India has conferred its highest civilian honor on only two foreigners, one of whom was Nelson Mandela.

The Congress politician apparently got carried away on a balmy winter day with nostalgia hanging heavily in the air, as he faced a select audience of Delhi's elite, who formed the gravy train of India-US "strategic partnership" in the Bush era.

Ironically, even as he spoke last Friday, a delegation was setting out from the United States for India to pay homage to Mahatma Gandhi, the great apostle of non-violence, who inspired Martin Luther King, who in turn remains a constant source of inspiration for US President Barack Obama.

The bizarre coincidence was driven home when at a special ceremony at the US State Department marking the visit, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, "India is a reminder that the struggle for civil rights and justice has always been and continues to be a global mission; it knows no borders."

The two unconnected events underscored the dilemma facing India's policymakers as the Obama era gets under way. Indeed, it is an extraordinary statement that the first American delegation to visit India after Obama took office should be a "Gandhian" delegation. Is Obama "demilitarizing" India-US strategic cooperation? "Mil-to-mil" cooperation was at the core of US-India relationship during the past eight-year period. In recent years, India conducted more than 50 military exercises with the US.

All dressed up, nowhere to go
Yet a pall of gloom has descended on New Delhi's elite. There is a pervasive nostalgia for George W Bush. The Bush administration officials claimed that the US regarded India as the preponderant power in South Asia and as a key Asian player that would shape up to be a viable counterweight to China militarily. The expectation was that the US would extricate India from the morass of its South Asian neighborhood by arm-twisting Pakistan.

Under constant encouragement from the Bush administration, the Indian elite placed faith in the country's emergence as a global player. They began working "shoulder to shoulder" with the US, just as Bush's officials urged. Now, Indian strategists find themselves awkwardly placed - all dressed-up but there's nowhere right now for them to go.

Three factors have shaken up the Indian complacency. First, Indian strategists seriously underestimated the military stalemate that was developing in the war in Afghanistan and the consequent acute dependence of the US on Pakistan's cooperation. This may sound surprising, but the knowledge of Afghan affairs remains shockingly poor among Indian strategists.

Two, Indian strategists underestimated the gravity of the global financial crisis that erupted last year. They couldn't comprehend that the crisis would fundamentally change the world order. Even hard-nosed Indian strategists placed a touching faith in the "New American Century" project.

Three, the Indian establishment failed to grasp what Obama meant when he spoke of "change". The Indian skepticism about Obama's capacity to change US policies remained fairly widespread. The Indian establishment concluded that Obama would ultimately have to work within the box, hemmed in by America's political, foreign policy and security establishment. It failed to see that the US's capacity to sustain its global dominance was itself weakening and that necessitated radical changes in Obama's policies.

From this perspective, the past week offered a reality check. The visit by the newly appointed US Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, to the region underscored that Islamabad's support for the US war strategy in Afghanistan has become critical. The war is at a crucial stage and salvaging it appears increasingly difficult.

More to the point, given the overall fragility of the political situation in Pakistan, a stage is reached beyond which the US cannot "pressure" Pakistan. Therefore, in a change of approach, the US will have no choice but to work with Pakistan. In the coming period, as Holbrooke gradually opens the political track leading to an Afghan settlement, need of Pakistan's cooperation increases further.

Meanwhile, the revelation that the US Predator drones operate out of Pakistani bases underlines how closely Washington and Islamabad have been working. The US's acquiescence in the release of AQ Khan revealed the great latitude towards Pakistan's concerns. The Indian strategists who fancied that New Delhi was Washington's preferred partner in South Asia are stunned. Clearly, India is nowhere near as valuable an ally as Pakistan for the US for the present.

Looking ahead, Obama's decision on Wednesday approving a troop buildup in Afghanistan constitutes a defining moment. He has put his presidency on the firing line. From this week onward, Obama's war has begun. The war can well consume his presidency. Either he succeeds, or he gets mired in the war. Yet, the new US strategy is still in the making. Delhi takes note that it is at such a crucial juncture that the Pakistani army chief, General Parvez Kayani, has been invited to go across to Washington for consultations.

The message is clear: Washington will be in no mood to antagonize its Pakistani partner and Delhi is expected to keep tensions under check in its relations with Islamabad.

Dollar courting yuan
But there is another aspect in Obama's new foreign policy that worries India even more. Obama's China policy renders obsolete the Indian strategic calculus built around the US containment strategy. Hardly two to three years ago, the Bush administration encouraged India to put faith in a quadrilateral alliance of Asian democracies - the US, Japan, Australia and India - that would strive to set the rules for China's behavior in the region.

According to reports, State Department officials had originally proposed that India be included in the itinerary of Clinton's current first official tour abroad, but she struck it out. As things stand, Clinton meant every word of what she wrote last year in her Foreign Affairs article that "our [US] relationship with China will be the most important bilateral relationship in the world in this century".

In a major speech at the Asia Society in New York last Friday before embarking on her tour of Asia, Clinton said, "We believe that the United States and China can benefit from and contribute to each other's successes. It is in our interests to work harder to build on areas of common concern and shared opportunities". She argued for a "comprehensive dialogue" and a "broader agenda" with China.

The Washington Post cited State Department officials as saying, "It is symbolically important that Clinton is the first secretary of state in nearly 50 years to intensely focus his or her maiden voyage on Asia". The story is easily comprehensible. The US needs to have new opportunities to export more to China; it should persuade Beijing to accept a realistic dollar-yuan exchange rate; and, it should convince China to keep investing its money in America. But what is unfolding is also a phenomenal story insofar as a new chapter in their mutually dependent relationship is commencing where the two countries become equal partners in crisis. This was simply unthinkable.

Dennis Blair, the newly appointed director of national intelligence, in his testimony before the US senate intelligence committee on January 22, struck a fine balance when he said,

While the United States must understand China's military buildup - its extent, its technological sophistication and its vulnerabilities - in order to offset it, the intelligence community also needs to support policymakers who are looking for opportunities to work with Chinese leaders who believe that Asia is big enough for both of us and can be an Asia in which both countries can benefit as well as contribute to the common good.

However, this is precisely where a serious problem arises for India. In the Indian perception, South Asia and the Indian Ocean just aren't "big enough" for India and China.

Dragon encircles peacock
This was rubbed home when Chinese President Hu Jintao arrived in Port Louis, Mauritius, on Tuesday on the final lap of his latest odyssey to Africa. Hu nonchalantly handed out a generous US$1 billion aid package for Mauritius, which India traditionally regarded as its "sphere of influence" in the Indian Ocean. No doubt, it was an audacious gesture by Beijing to a country the majority of whose 1.3 million population are people of Indian origin - at a time when China too faces an economic crisis and analysts say anywhere up to 40 million migrant workers may lose their jobs this year.

Arguably, Beijing regards Mauritius as a value-added platform between China and Africa from where its entrepreneurs could optimally perform. But Hu has convinced the Indian strategic community about China's "encirclement" policy towards India. A leading Indian right-wing daily commented that Hu's visit was "anything but ordinary ... It underscores Beijing's relentless thrust to secure a permanent naval foothold in the western Indian Ocean ... That, of course, would only come at the expense of the Indian navy, which has been the principal external security partner of Mauritius all these decades".

It is precisely such hubris that gets punctured by the shift in the Obama administration's new priorities in the Far East and southwest Asia. A difficult period of adjustment lies ahead for Indian policymakers. India needs good relations with the US. At any rate, the India-US relationship is on an irreversible trajectory of growth. There is a "bipartisan" consensus in both countries that the relationship is in each other's vital interests. But the US's current strategic priorities in the region and India's expectations are diverging. Given the criticality of Pakistan in the US geo-strategy, Obama administration will be constrained to correct the Bush administration's "tilt" towards India.

Kashmir beckons
New Delhi pulled out all the stops when rumors surfaced that Holbrooke's mandate might include the Kashmir problem. Obama paid heed to Indian sensitivities. But at a price. It compels India to curtail its own excessive instincts in recent years to seek US intervention in keeping India-Pakistan tensions in check.

In short, New Delhi will have to pay much greater attention to its bilateral track with Pakistan. And, of course, Pakistan will expect India to be far more flexible. Rightly or wrongly, Pakistan harbors a feeling that India took unilateral advantage from the relative four-year calm in their relationship without conceding anything in return.

In a sensational interview with India's top television personality, Karan Thapar, on Thursday night, Pakistan's former foreign minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri confirmed what many in New Delhi suspected, namely, that through back channel diplomacy, Islamabad and New Delhi had reached a broad understanding on contentious issues such as Sir Creek, Siachen and Kashmir as far back as two years ago.

The Indian prime minister was expected to visit Pakistan to conclude some of the agreements but the Indian side apparently began developing cold feet and it is "sheer bad luck", as Kasuri put it, that the momentum dissipated.

To quote Kasuri, "If the Prime Minister of India had come when we [Pakistan] thought he would, we would have actually signed it, and that would have created the right atmosphere for resolution of other disputes, particularly the issue of J&K [Jammu and Kashmir]. We needed the right atmosphere."

In other words, there is always a lurking danger that at some point, Holbrooke may barge into the Kashmir problem by way of addressing the core issues of regional security. The Bush administration had been kept constantly briefed by New Delhi on its back-channel discussions with Islamabad regarding Kashmir. Retracting from any commitments given to Pakistan becomes problematic at this stage.

At the same time, the Indian government has done nothing so far to sensitize domestic public opinion that such highly delicate discussions involving joint India-Pakistan governance of the Kashmir region have reached an advanced stage.

Thus, in a manner of speaking, with Holbrooke's arrival in the region this past week, the clock began ticking on the Kashmir issue. Pakistan will incrementally mount pressure that Obama must insist on India moving forward on a settlement of the Kashmir problem in the overall interests of peace and regional stability.

And New Delhi will remain watchful. Holbrooke's visit to New Delhi on Monday was kept low-key. The Indian media fawned on any mid-level official calling from the Bush administration, but Holbrooke was tucked away as if under quarantine. And no wonder; there could be many among New Delhi's elite who feel nostalgic for the tranquility and predictability of the Bush era.