Showing posts sorted by relevance for query editorial. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query editorial. Sort by date Show all posts

Monday, October 28, 2013

New York Times Edit And The Unfounded 'Modi' Paranoia

By Dhiraj Nayyar (Guest Writer)

The Editorial Board of the venerable New York Times does not want Narendra Modi to become India’s Prime Minister. The paper is, of course, entitled to its view. One only wishes its argument was more sophisticated, and the evidence more compelling. 

The simplistic argument is this: “India is a country with multiple religions, more than a dozen major languages and numerous ethnic groups and tribes. Mr. Modi cannot hope to lead it effectively if he inspires fear and antipathy among many of its people.” The New York Times has a one-dimensional view of Modi. 

Thursday, May 28, 2009

Why BJP is Failing?

By Rajinder Puri

After the BJP lost the general election in 2004 this first person account of interaction with the BJP was published in a magazine now defunct to explain why the BJP lost. It predicted that in its present shape the BJP will never return to power. The article is reproduced without any change.

After six years in office the BJP launched the costliest election campaign in India ’s history and was badly trounced. The Congress, which itself had dwindled into irrelevance, succeeded in becoming the single largest party. The fractured election result did not signify a revival of the Congress. It signified the irrelevance of all existing parties.

The BJP itself lacks ideology, procedure and principle. It has an attitude. It is anti-Muslim and anti-Christian. These prejudices are its driving force. My views are derived from personal interaction with the BJP and its erstwhile avatar, the Jan Sangh. I present, by your leave, a first person account of that interaction, for whatever it is worth.

I was working, in 1970, for The Statesman, and was among the country’s best-paid journalists. My cartoons had been very critical of the Congress and of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. In those days of one-party rule all opposition parties stood up for me. Indeed, during those days when Indira was splitting the Congress, opposition party leaders from all the leading parties held a function in Vithalbhai Patel House to air support for me. On behalf of all the leaders present, Atal Behari Vajpayee even garlanded me!

The Jan Sangh (the BJP of those days) decided to start a daily newspaper, Motherland. I was invited to be the editor. Having my own ideas of how to run a newspaper, and believing that in a city largely sympathetic to the Jan Sangh I could effectively challenge Delhi ’s premier newspaper, the Hindustan Times, I accepted the offer. I mire than halved my own salary and set the same salary ceiling for the top five members of the editorial team. I created a salary structure in which junior staff would have salaries equivalent to the highest paying competitors, the Times of India and The Statesman. The Sangh leaders watched me uneasily but said nothing.

The resident editor of the Indian Express, DR Mankekar, had just retired. I approached him to become Editor of News. Mankekar was very much my senior in years. He appeared to respond favorably. On this matter I consulted KR Malkani, editor of the Jan Sangh’s journal, Organiser. The next thing I knew, I was told by Madhav Rao Mule, number two in the RSS that Mankekar would be the managing editor. I was told that Hansraj Gupta had a hand in this decision.

Mule, Malkani and I held a meeting to discuss the issue. The only known managing editor till then had been Devdas Gandhi in HT. Devdas was the boss of the show. So I asked Mule, “What does a managing editor do?”

Mule looked uncomfortable. Malkani replied, “Rajinderji, here we function like a family, we work together.”

I bluntly told him: “I don’t think we can function like a family. If we want to become number one in the city we must function like an army. We must have a chain of command. If there is a difference of opinion, who prevails, Mankekar or I?”

Malkani mumbled, “Mankekar.”

“Have you discussed salary with him? How much will you pay him?”

“The same that he gets.” That was around Rs 3,500 per month. I had sacrificed a Rs 4,000 plus salary to voluntarily set for myself a salary of Rs 2,000 per month! I bid Motherland goodbye. I had a letter of appointment from the Motherland Board unambiguously appointing me as number one. “Don’t worry,” I told Malkani. “I won’t sue you for breach of trust.”

Later, Advani and Kedarnath Sahni approached me together and requested me to return. “I thought I was entering a mandir (temple),” I told them wryly. “But I found myself in a mandi (marketplace)!”

Sahni looked at me mournfully. “Puriji,” he said earnestly. “Believe me, we are not a marketplace!” That was the end of the Motherland chapter. The paper never took off. It was closed during the Emergency. After Emergency was lifted it did not revive. I think the Sangh leaders had learnt the hard way that they were out of their depth when it came to daily journalism.

After my brush with Motherland I had returned to The Statesman. Just before Emergency was imposed, I had stopped drawing cartoons for it because its editor, NJ Nanporia, didn’t publish my cartoons critical of Indira. Those days CR Irani had little say in editorial matters. Nevertheless, after Emergency was imposed, a warrant for my arrest was issued. I went underground. When arrest warrants against all journalists were withdrawn upon the advice of Chalapathi Rau, I surfaced to resume my unemployed existence.

After Emergency was lifted, having had close relations with all anti-Indira forces, I found myself in the Janata Party. I was the only non-party general secretary of the party. My appointment had to be approved by all the constituents of the original Janata Party, which did not include Jagjivan Ram at that stage. I was entrusted with looking after the campaign publicity.

After the Janata Party won the election despite initial private pessimism among most of its leaders, especially George Fernandes, aspirants from all factions got together and conspired to throw me out from my post. Explaining to reporters my removal from the post, Advani and Surendra Mohan, who, along with me, were original general secretaries, said that my appointment had been “temporary”. That was not true. The conspiracy had been so complete that I learnt of my removal only from the newspapers the next day! But that is another story.

I grew closer to Charan Singh and Raj Narain because of my previous personal rapport with Ram Manohar Lohia. I wrote columns for Blitz Weekly and the Illustrated Weekly of India. In Blitz I broke the story of the RSS having given a sworn affidavit to the authorities stating it was a political organization in order to evade a tax of Rs 1 crore. That laid the foundation of the dual membership controversy that provided the excuse for the party to split. Eventually, Raj Narain was unconstitutionally expelled from the national executive for what he allegedly said about Morarji Desai in Shimla. Years later, Shanta Kumar of Himachal Pradesh admitted in a book he wrote that he had falsely implicated Raj Narain at the behest of Nanaji Deshmukh. Anyway, Raj Narain and I formulated the strategy to topple the Desai government, which I had concluded was incorrigible. A fortnight before the Janata government fell, I wrote in my Blitz column precisely how and when it would fall.

In the 1979-80 election I contested against Vajpayee and CM Stephen from the New Delhi constituency. I was then, along with Madhu Limaye and Narendra Singh, general secretary of the Lok Dal. It was a foolhardy enterprise. Charan Singh had announced his intention to apply the Mandal formula in government service. All the central secretariat employees who were voters in my constituency were at my throat. Delhi ’s urban voters passionately hated the Chaudhry. Being general secretary of the party and residing in New Delhi, I thought it a matter of honor that I contest from my own turf instead of contesting from Meerut where, with the Chaudhry’s blessings, I might have easily won. Raj Narain allowed me to keep for use in my own election the Rs 50,000 that I had collected for the party. I didn’t receive a single extra rupee from the party. During most of the campaign I had to seek small donations from friends.

I won few votes but they were crucial. In the extremely close contest my votes cut into the Congress tally to allow a victory for Vajpayee. After its defeat, the Janata Party split again into Janata Party and Bharatiya Janata Party. Meanwhile, because Charan Singh and Raj Narain also parted company, I quit the Lok Dal, not joining any faction. It was then that Vajpayee and Advani personally approached me to join the BJP. Advani said: “Let us forget the past. Let there be no reservations on either side.” Okay, I said, and joined the BJP. I asked for no post or status but joined as an ordinary member. It was a foolish decision. As John F Kennedy once said: “If someone deceives you once, it is his fault. If he deceives you twice, it is your fault.” The BJP leaders had already deceived me twice.

In the BJP I quickly became Vajpayee’s presidential speechwriter and unofficial think-tank. At the same time I got together likeminded Delhi leaders, Arif Baig, Mewa Ram Arya and others, to start the Jan Ekta Manch to work among jhuggi settlements where the BJP was particularly weak. We made quick progress. By that time Indira had launched the bank loans scheme for the poor. The party decided to stop the scheme’s misuse in enabling only Congress sympathizers to get bank loans. The Jan Ekta Manch had become strong enough to overshadow the party in organizing demonstrations and getting hundreds, sometimes thousands, to court arrest. Vajpayee was delighted. The Delhi leaders were uneasy although the Jan Ekta Manch was located in the premises of the party office and no non-BJP member was made an office-bearer of the Manch.

While Delhi leaders became uneasy at one level, the national leaders became uneasy at another. To give substance to the BJP’s empty slogan of ushering in Gandhian Socialism, I tried giving it content by creating the Workers’ Sector concept. Inspired by Gandhi’s concept of trusteeship I prepared an approach paper outlining the Workers’ Sector concept in which workers would become owners, share in the profits and participate in the management of those companies where public financial institutions held a majority share. The body to propagate this concept was named Ekatrit Kamgar Tabdili Andolan, Ekta. I lobbied hard and created the Ekta committee with Vajpayee, Chandra Shekhar, George Fernandes, Karpoori Thakur, Madhu Dandavate, Devraj Urs, Advani and Bhai Mahavir as members while I was convener. For the formal approval of the approach paper and its release to the Press, I got all the leaders to Vajpayee’s house. The next day the Indian Express carried a banner headline with a photograph of all the leaders flanking Vajpayee. This created shock waves among the BJP leaders, minus Vajpayee.

It seemed that opposition unity was being recreated in a new guise. Advani quickly swung into action and derailed the specific significance of the move by summoning the same leaders for routine consideration of electoral reforms and other humdrum subjects. The Workers’ Sector concept died a quiet death.

After Indira’s assassination, when the nation stood on the threshold of a general election, I had realized that I didn’t fit in with the BJP. I told Vajpayee he was losing his own election because the RSS was backing Scindia in Gwalior and the Congress in the rest of the country. I wrote my resignation letter and requested him to release it only after the poll. Vajpayee read the letter and threw it aside. He said emotionally, “Rajinderji, if we quit we’ll quit together! Just wait till after the poll. Things will change!” He stuck out his hand for me to shake. We shook hands and my resignation was spiked. This is the unedited text of the letter I had written then:

December 10, 1984
Dear Atal Ji,

After our meeting last evening I have had an opportunity to reflect on my position and role in the party. I realize how busy you must be at this time while electioneering is in full swing. Therefore I shall start with the operative part of the letter which you may read now, followed by an explanation which you may read at leisure.

I hereby resign from the National Executive, the Delhi Pradesh Executive, and the primary membership of the Bharatiya Janata Party effective from today. However, I would not like my resignation to be made public till the election is over on December 27th, and shall be grateful if the party does likewise, in order that nothing is said or done which may aid the Congress (I) in the poll.

There are several reasons which had led me to resign. First, I disagree with the strategy of the party. Secondly, I deplore the party’s style of functioning. Thirdly, I question the basic integrity of some leaders of the party who put personal advantage above the party’s interest, and have come to acquire collectively the character and outlook of a caucus. And lastly, there is the personal factor which emerged in our conversation yesterday.

First, the strategy. For more than two years the debate has continued whether the party should go it alone, merge with other parties to create a national alternative, or seek cooperation through seat adjustments with other parties. My own views on this fundamental question have been clear and consistent throughout this period, and were expressed vigorously and repeatedly during discussions in the National Executive. I had always maintained that seat adjustments for any ambitious and growing party could never be made into a declared policy unless the party intended to merge with its partners ultimately. Therefore, as far as I was concerned, the third option never existed, and if persisted with, was sure to cause confusion and demoralization with the party ranks and stunt its organizational growth. The continued effort for seat adjustments was a pathetic half-measure which betrayed the party’s lack of confidence and commitment.

The final straw fell in the most recent meeting of the National Executive on November 14th, after Mrs. Gandhi’s death, and after the elections had been announced. You may recall that I again argued strongly that the death of Mrs. Gandhi had brought about a fundamental change in the situation, which made the earlier resolution in favor of seat adjustments outlined in the Pune session irrelevant. I advocated that after the party’s frustrating experience during the past two years, it was time now for the party to go it alone. I urged that the party should put up 400 candidates, come to terms with Telugu Desam and DMK, and boldly put forward its claim of being able to form the next government. To achieve this, I advocated a crash effort of roping in strong independents and assimilating entire groups where feasible. My rationale was simple. During Mrs. Gandhi’s time the party’s requirement was mainly to consolidate a negative Congress (I) vote through seat adjustments with other parties. But after Mrs. Gandhi’s death the overwhelming feeling in the country was one of vacuum with no credible Congress (I) leader at the helm. I pointed out that above all the people sought a credible Prime Minister, and every single opinion poll in the country during the past year had put your name as a desired Prime Minister second only to Mrs. Gandhi’s, much above every other name, including that of Rajiv Gandhi. That was our main asset.

The other asset was that the BJP enjoyed the reputation of a disciplined party unlikely to break up after the poll. Therefore we required at least 400 candidates to be able to put up the claim with some conviction that we would be in a position to make you Prime Minister. The voters are going to vote for a prospective government, not for pious platitudes, which are all that a party putting up 225 candidates can offer. Our chance lay in creating a wave, and we failed to seize a historic opportunity due to the total lack of confidence in the leadership, I ended my remarks in the National Executive with the words: “If we persist with the futile bid for seat adjustments even at this hour, we will invite political suicide.”

A vast majority of those who spoke in the National Executive agreed with my views. Despite that the contrary policy was adopted because it seemed that those who mattered had already made up their minds. What happens now in the elections is irrelevant. The entire atmosphere in the crucial fortnight preceding the nominations was muddied by the arid attempt for seat adjustments, which totally blurred the BJP’s identity and the image of its leader. Ultimately, we are contesting 225 seats, more than 30 short of a simple majority, still confused in most constituencies about whether we have adjusted with other parties or not. With what conviction can we ask the voter to vote out the government when we cannot even provide him with an alternative government? We will not be in a position to do that because in the last analysis we were neither large-hearted enough to assimilate other parties, nor bold-hearted enough to go it alone. Victims of half-measures and confusion, we fell between two stools. Which brings me to our style of functioning.

The party’s style of functioning suggests a caucus, not a collective democratic leadership. The two fundamental principles of a healthy organization are lacking: we neither believe in clear demarcation of responsibility, nor in accountability of performance. As a result, there is no meritocracy prevalent in the party, sapping initiative among the workers. I had repeatedly demanded in the meetings of then National Executive in Jaipur, Patna and elsewhere that we must have clear demarcation of responsibility among the office-bearers, as well as accountability, instead of behaving like a joint family in which some are favored regardless of performance and others are treated like poor relatives. We have fifteen office-bearers of the party’s central secretariat. it is a mystery what each of them is supposed to look after. One office-bearer alone was supposed to look after Punjab, Himachal, Jammu, and Delhi, collect funds for the party, as well as look after the secretariat of the National Democratic Alliance while it lasted. How could one person discharge all these duties effectively? How often could this office-bearer visit the areas under his care during the past one year? I prepared a note suggesting how the central secretariat could be streamlines to function effectively. I put the note up twice, to you and the General Secretary of the party, Mr. LK Advani, for circulation among members of the National Executive. It was never circulated. It seemed that the National Executive was a mere showpiece, with little relevance to real policy-making, which was decided elsewhere. Let me further illustrate this point.

In the Bhubaneswar session of the National Executive it was resolved that the party would favor a Workers’ Sector of industry in which workers would obtain participation in ownership, profits and management of industry. This became a resolution of the party. It was also resolved that the party would set up an Ekta Labor Cell which would cater to the needs of the weaker sections and unorganized labor on behalf of the party. You thought it fit to appoint me all-India convener of the Ekta Labor Cell.

However, in practice both resolutions were ignored. After the Bombay Textile workers’ strike when the Government took over certain sick mills, we did not press for handing over the mills to the control of the workers themselves in light of the party’s declared policy resolution. Instead we supported the Government’s decision to hand over the mills to the public sector Textile Corporation of India that was already mismanaging a hundred textile mills running at a loss. The Ekta Labor Cell was also not allowed to operate because the Delhi Pradesh leadership sabotaged the plan and the central leadership acquiesced. Of what value, then, are decisions taken by the National Executive of the party?

Which brings me to the third point. This regards the lack of integrity of the BJP leadership. When individuals are appointed to an office they are expected to discharge their duties for the benefit of the entire organization, not concern themselves with personal advantage alone. But in the BJP it so happens that the organization continues to suffer while individual office bearers responsible for poor performance continue to thrive. For instance, the very individuals who sabotaged the Ekta Labor Cell were the ones who did not hesitate to seek the help of the Jan Ekta Manch, a similar organization privately set up by me and like minded colleagues of the BJP with our own resources, for work in their own individual constituencies. If such an organization could do useful work in one constituency, why could it not do useful work everywhere in the country for the whole party?

Most surprisingly, those leaders who took a hard line against seat adjustments in the Delhi Metropolitan poll, promptly somersaulted and sacrificed two parliamentary seats in Delhi in order to better their own chances in the parliamentary seats they were contesting. Now the East Delhi District workers of the party are in a quandary, thoroughly demoralized. If the leaders of the party betray such a selfish attitude, how can workers have any morale? Is this the kind of leadership which can hope to create a national alternative that will usher in a new society in India/ Our assertions ring hollow when matched against our actions.

Finally, there is the personal factor which emerged during our conversation yesterday. You will now deny, I trust, that I never shirked any responsibility given to me during the past four years when I worked for the party. I never approached you for any office. I never approached you for a parliamentary ticket. You broached the subject of a parliamentary ticket with me yourself. I indicated the possible choices. Eventually you could not give me a ticket. I neither complained, nor referred to the subject with anyone in the party. You yourself obviously felt embarrassed yesterday during the meeting which you had sought, and urged me to work harder during the campaign. I do not know how you got the impression that I was not doing what I was asked to do to the best of my ability. When the subject of ticket distribution arose, I did remark that surrendering two seats in Delhi appeared irrational and against the party interest. It was at this stage that you remarked, as you had earlier done in different contexts, that some people in the party had “reservations” about me and therefore I could not be given a ticket. How could those reservations be dispelled, I asked. You advised that time alone could improve matters.

I regret to say that I find this position unacceptable. Honestly, I do not mind not being given a ticket, which I never asked for in the first place. But I cannot countenance being refused a ticket for the reasons that you stated, particularly since you did not seem to question that my merit as a candidate in certain constituencies was not in doubt. I have committed no indiscipline in the party, and helped the party in every way to the best of my ability. I cannot help it if certain people have “reservations” about me and you are compelled to act by their advice. When you, and other senior colleagues in the party ask me to help in party work, which is not infrequent you will admit, are you not then inhibited by “reservations”?

When I was invited to join the party by Mr. LK Advani four years ago, he expressed the hope that there would be no reservations on either side. Let him reflect on my performance during the past four years and judge whether there were any reservations on my side. Let him also indicate whether I ever set any preconditions for joining the party or working for it, or whether I made a single personal demand for office or position in the party. I did advocate the creation of a labor cell in the party catering to unorganized labor, but I never sought to be its convener. That decision was yours. Despite this I continue to hear from time to time that certain people have “reservations” about me. This is a matter about which I can do nothing. It is obvious that a section of the party (which has never been named till now, and which has obviously no connections with the RSS lest there be any misunderstanding, because I have never had problems with either RSS or BMS, rather cooperation and encouragement) finds itself incompatible with me.

Personally I have no rancor against any individual in the party and hope to continue enjoying the best of relations with all members of the party. However, you will appreciate that I am left with no choice but to resign from the party, in the light of growing dissatisfaction with the party’s functioning, as well as of the “reservations’ about me that are entertained by unnamed colleagues in the party.

With best wishes,
Yours sincerely
Rajinder Puri

The election results were as bad as they could be. True, the vote percentage declined by just about 2.5 per cent, but the BJP won only two Lok Sabha seats. As I had warned Vajpayee, Scindia, with solid RSS support, defeated him. Despite the crushing defeat, nothing changed in the party’s functioning.

Advani had described the Anandpur Sahib Resolution of the Akalis as a “charter of national disintegration”. Despite that, Rajiv Gandhi described the BJP as an “anti-national party” because it had not distanced itself sufficiently from Prakash Singh Badal. The national executive of the party resolved to have no talks on Punjab with the PM unless he apologized for that remark. A few days after the resolution, Rajiv invited Advani, then secretary-general of the party, for a discussion on Punjab and Advani met him.

I issued a press statement criticizing Advani for breaking party discipline by ignoring the national executive resolution. Vajpayee wrote to me saying I should not have gone to the press. I said I would not do that as long as Advani did not flout national executive resolutions.

A short while later Advani flouted another national executive resolution. Ram Jethmalani had argued all day persuading the party to have no truck with the Shiv Sena in Mumbai. But almost immediately after that the Mumbai unit of the BJP, blessed by Advani, teamed up with the Shiv Sena to contest the Mayor’s election.

I again went to the press and criticized the party for flouting discipline. Thereupon, Vajpayee wrote a letter asking me to resign from the national executive for breaching discipline. I replied by resigning from the primary membership of the party. Ironically, later Jethmalani had no compunction in seeking Shiv Sena support for becoming an MP! Vajpayee’s letter and my reply are reproduced without editing. The correspondence is self-explanatory:

Atal Behari Vajpayee
President
Bharatiya Janata Party
May 12, 1985

Dear Shri Puri Ji,

I am sorry to see in this morning’s Statesman a statement of yours criticizing the Bombay BJP.

During the last two months this is the third time you have chosen the forum of the press to voice criticism of the party. On March 31, you wrote to me a letter taking exception to the meeting on Punjab, which I, along with Advani Ji, had with the Prime Minister. You certainly had a right to hold that opinion, but as I pointed out to you immediately thereafter, it was improper on part of a member of the National Executive to release such a letter to the press. You had assured me in your letter dated April 2 that you will in the future “take extra care’ about your utterances.

I am sorry to note that you have failed to act up to your utterances. Two days back you have publicly criticized Shri Advani for his meeting with the Prime Minister, And today there is this statement accusing the Bombay BJP of indiscipline.

Obviously, you are unable to abide by the discipline imposed by membership of the National Executive. I feel constrained, therefore, to ask you to resign from the Executive.
With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,
Atal Behari Vajpayee

I sent my reply to Vajpayee the next day:

May 13, 1995

Dear Shri Vajpayee Ji,

Thank you for your letter of May 12th.

I must say that I was surprised by your request that I resign from the National Executive for my “inability to abide by the discipline imposed by its membership”. You deem me undisciplined for informing the press that the General Secretary of the party, Shri Lal Krishna Advani, and the Bombay unit of the party, were undisciplined for brazenly violating the resolutions of the National Executive. You consider me undisciplined for exposing the indiscipline of others, but have no word of reprimand for those who oppose your own formal policy statements as well as resolutions of the National Executive. Discipline, let me remind you, enjoins a code of conduct on all members of the party, including its President and General Secretary.

If I was impelled to take matters to the press it was due to my repeated failure in obtaining redressal for the acts of indiscipline by the General Secretary pointed out by me to you privately. After my letter of April 2nd, you conceded that the General Secretary was wrong in not briefing the press after his meeting with the Prime Minister in order to allay misunderstanding about the party’s attitude on the Punjab issue. In my letter of April 2nd I had urged you to ensure that the party secretariat does not bungle in future and thereby project a false and distorted image of the party’s stand to the public. Orally, you had assured me that such a mistake would not be repeated. Subsequently, you made a formal policy statement in your own name declaring that the BJP would not participate in parleys with either the Government or the Akalis for achieving a solution in Punjab. Yet, twice after that, Shri Advani, in contemptuous disregard of your statement, conferred with the Prime Minister along with other opposition leaders in defiance of your declared policy.

Later, the Bombay unit of the party supported the Shiv Sena candidate for Mayor in total defiance of the central party. Privately you may deplore this fact, but what good is private anguish? The party’s image and credibility are totally tarnished by the wide divergence between its precept and practice, and by your pathetic inability to impose your will.

Upon receiving your letter my instinct was to refuse to resign and demand a full discussion on the matter in the National Executive. But on reflection I have decided otherwise. As per the party constitution all the members of the National Executive are nominated by you. You alone, as President, are elected by the National Council. The National Executive therefore is the reflection of the President’s will. As you know, we do not vote in the National Executive. We decide by consensus. But when even resolutions arrived at after consensus are violated and ignored at will by a handful of senior members of the party, it is clear that it is not even consensus which rules the party. The party is being ruled by a caucus, and you have become its creature. This is not a new development. May I remind you that I had resigned on December 10th 1984, when you had advised me that I was not trusted by the section of the party to which I refer as the caucus? I had of course decided not to make public the resignation in order not to embarrass the party during elections, even though the election results were a foregone conclusion to me. I withdrew the resignation upon receiving your solemn assurance that after the elections the party’s style of functioning would change.

Five months have passed since then, and nothing of the sort has happened. Instead, matters have become worse, with members of the caucus brazenly flouting policy resolutions of the party while you remain a helpless spectator. I can understand a stray violation, but not the kind of arbitrary conduct, involving no accountability, which has become the party’s style of functioning. I enclose my letter of December 10th to refresh your memory. For reasons contained in that letter, and for the added reasons of policy mentioned above, I am left with no choice but to resign from the primary membership of the party.

I resign with regret, and in spite of the warm personal relationship I have with you, Shri Advani, and others in the party. However political association should not be based only on personal relationship but also on fundamental factors like policy and style of functioning. It is my humble submission that you should adopt a similar approach while charting the BJP’s future. Given the political instincts of your most influential colleagues in the party, would it not be better for the BJP to dissolve its identity and merge with the Congress(I)? It would clear much confusion in the country. This is, of course, just a suggestion for your serious consideration.
With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,
Rajinder Puri

Enclosure: Letter of December 10th

It may be seen from the correspondence that the BJP is neither democratic nor disciplined. It seeks blind obedience in the name of discipline. Upon reflection, I am inclined to think the BJP leaders were never really against the goals I had set for the party to achieve. They were deeply disturbed only because I did not, at each step, take permission from some appropriate leader. With their RSS culture, BJP leaders are unused to individual initiative. Individual initiative frightens them. Inevitably, in these circumstances, the question arises: Does the party have a future? I don’t think so ~ unless it changes miraculously. If I am wrong and the party in its present shape and form does have a future, I would then be forced to conclude that India doesn’t.

I sent the correspondence I have reproduced to all members of the national executive. After my resignation party functionaries approached me to rejoin the party. “We will welcome you back with honor,” one of them said. I declined. I continue to have good personal relations with all of them. They are in most cases nice people. It is just that they belong to a different planet.

Monday, March 18, 2013

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Wednesday, September 14, 2011

Facebook's Growth in the Arab World Is Surging with Demands for Political Change

The use of social media tools such as Facebook and Twitter to organize protests roiling the Arab world has been widely acknowledged. Researchers at the Dubai School of Government have now published research showing why social media played such a crucial role in helping catalyze popular anger that toppled two regimes in the Middle East and continues to rock others.

Launched just before demonstrations began in North Africa in December 2010, the inaugural Arab Social Media Report demonstrates the growth and reach of Facebook among Arab youth: some 75% of all Facebook users in the region are between the ages of 15 and 29 years. An even more telling fact: Facebook added more than 1 million new users in the region since protests began. During the weeks of growing unrest in Tunisia, researchers found that Facebook accounts in the country grew by nearly 10%.

In response to citizens taking to the streets, countries such as Egypt and now Libya have tried cutting off their countries' connections to the Internet. That still doesn't stop the flow of information via text messages sent over mobile networks, notes Simon Jones, director of the Abu Dhabi Men's College in the Higher Colleges of Technology, and a former senior research fellow at the MIT Media Lab. "Mobile phone penetration is higher than computer penetration," Jones says. "Everyone has a mobile [phone]. It's instantaneous to send large numbers of SMS messages to people. You can reach a wider range of people, more quickly. Emails are ignored; web pages might not be seen for weeks, but SMS gets eyeballs."

While it may be easy to block websites, or even block an Internet network, cutting off a mobile network leaves even the government without the capability to communicate, Jones says, a point the protestors exploited. "SMS catalyzed the action," he says. Jones compares the mass protests to flash mobs, noting the modern prank provided an example of how to organize through social media. "For young people, it's a natural way to organize, because they've done it before," he says. "Lots of governments haven't understood that." Regime fear of technology leading to action has a long history, Jones adds, citing the example of Communist Russia and its Samizdat policies that regulated the use of photocopiers. "People have always used the tools available to them," he says, "almost every young person is now connected to some network, whether over the phone or the Internet."

In addition to social media tools and mobile networks, satellite television played a role in providing alternative perspectives about the Arab world, says Lawrence Pintak, founding dean of the Edward R. Murrow College of Communication at Washington State University, and former Middle East correspondent for CBS News.

"Social media was invaluable in networking the activists, in allowing them to reach out to each other, to coordinate and to share images of unrest in disparate parts of Tunisia and later Egypt," he says. "But television was the game-changer. In Tunisia, Al Jazeera and later other Arab networks took the videos posted on YouTube and made them accessible to the masses; in Egypt, social media allowed the activists to organize the Day of Anger, but television brought the masses out into the streets."
Regional bloggers first demonstrated the power of the Internet as a tool of change, Pintak says, noting while some governments understood the potential and risk of social media, "certainly in Egypt the regime was living in the past and dismissed 'Facebook Girl' and the others as children.

"Governments have yet to learn to systematically use these new media outlets," Pintak notes. "A few years ago, a member of the Saudi royal family told me that they recognized that change was coming and that media was a key part of that change, and so they were trying to figure out how to harness the process. So far, they have not done very well. As the reporting of Egyptian television during the crisis showed, Arab governments still don't quite understand that they can no longer control the message nor kill the messenger."

In an interview with Arabic Knowledge, researchers at the Dubai School of Government -- Fadi Salem, fellow and program director of the school's Governance and Innovation program, and Racha Mourtada, research associate -- note that the way social media tools have been used in the past few weeks has forever changed social and political culture in the Arab world. Among the surprising facts the study uncovered, they add, is that Facebook penetration can be high even in countries that restrict use of the Internet.

An edited transcript of the conversation follows.
Arabic Knowledge: We've seen the toppling of two governments by protestors organizing through social media in the Arab world. Was this expected?
Fadi Salem: I think it was, if you look at the events taking place in the Middle East over the past year. If you look at our report, we highlight some of the countries where people used social media tools to mobilize and engage in civil movements, such as Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, or Tunisia. It was expected that social media would be part of any engagement that took place. But the extent has been surprising. The fact that there were problems existing, and people were discussing them online, made social media the platform of choice. The Arab world lacks channels for youth to communicate their problems. This was a medium people felt empowered in. Maybe if other channels existed, social media would have been less of a platform.

Arabic Knowledge: Given that these social media tools were developed in the West, how have the youth localized these platforms for their use?
Salem: Let's go back to the role of the media and the role of the channels that already exist in society. People for the last 50 years didn't see in the mass media a tool they could use to interact with the government. The media are mostly state-controlled, and people tended to overlook them because of their low credibility. In the Arab world, the average person's consumption of news, the decision-making process based on news, involves going through at least five different sources. You check BBC, CNN, Al Jazeera of course, and the local news. And then based on that, on a specific issue, you consume information from all these sources and you make a decision. So when social media became the platform of choice over the last five years, it was very natural for young people to choose this platform to influence their decision-making [as a tool for filtering numerous sources].

Arabic Knowledge: What were the main factors that led to a broader adoption of these social media platforms?
Salem: In our report we looked into factors such as age, gross domestic product, Internet freedom, and the country in question. For example, one of the surprises was that Internet freedom is not related to the degree of Facebook penetration. Even with countries with lower Internet freedom, they had high Facebook penetration, or large numbers of Facebook users.
Mourtada: We had the youth factor, where 75% of Facebook users are the Arab youth. There was the gender factor, which wasn't the same as the rest of the world. Globally, it is about 1:1 when it comes to males and females on Facebook, whereas in the Arab world, it is closer to a 2:1 ratio, with a lot more men than women on Facebook. We think that has to do probably with factors such as political participation, participation in the workforce, education, and access to health care. This part of the world doesn't have the highest figures when it comes to women's participation in these indicators. The top three countries with Internet penetration are Gulf countries, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Qatar. They don't have very high Internet freedom ratings, yet they boast some of the highest Facebook penetration ratings in the world.

Arabic Knowledge: What has made social media grow so fast in this region?
Mourtada: I don't think there's one defining factor. Obviously having Internet access and being tech savvy is important. Countries with higher incomes generally had higher Facebook penetration too. Just as a trend over the past year, it's been growing phenomenally; the number of Facebook users has grown by 78%.
Salem: One of the primary reasons is that the regional population is young. In most of the countries in the Arab world, the age group under 30 makes up 50% to 70% of the total population. This is the group that feels empowered by the [social media] platform . It didn't start that way -- it originally was a way to connect with others in countries where it is not that easy to connect with the other gender. But then, the usage trends shifted towards more politically active, more socially active ways of use. The trend is visible all over the Arab world. Just scan comments from Facebook profile updates or from Tweets. You will notice the shift from, 'This is what I am doing tomorrow,' to, 'I wish I was in Tahrir Square.' I'm not sure this will last, but we'll see.

Mourtada: We have seen a number of countries where the number of Facebook penetration is actually higher than Internet penetration, so they must be using mobile phones. That was the case in Djibouti and Iraq.
Salem: Also, families are large in most of the countries in the Arab world, so one Internet connection could have five people connected in the household.

Arabic Knowledge: Are there things that you learned that surprised you, either positively or negatively?
Mourtada: One positive thing is that in all Arab countries, the rate of growth of new users to Facebook is huge, for example in places such as Iraq. I believe it had 300% growth over the past year. Even countries with lower rates of Facebook penetration are all getting into the social media movement, much faster than any country in the West. That isn't surprising, since those countries may have reached a plateau, while Arab countries are just beginning to take off.
Salem: One thing I found surprising was the rate of Arab women using Facebook. I was expecting it would be more, not less. I was expecting, given that this is a society where it is not easy to connect with the other gender. But that wasn't the case. Only Lebanon has about an equal number of men and women. In Jordan and Bahrain the ratio of men and women who use social media tools is close.

Arabic Knowledge: Did social media spur these young people to action, or was this unrest simply looking for an outlet?
Mourtada: It's a combination, a perfect storm. All these social and political issues were bubbling under the surface. Then you also happen to have all these social media tools available. These tools were perhaps the catalyst for the unrest, but not necessarily the actual instigator. There already was this social revolution going on, and it just found its outlet. You can't ascribe too much power to these tools, as ultimately the people using these tools drove this revolution.

Arabic Knowledge: When did these tools go from a means of socializing among youth to tools for organizing protest and voicing dissent?
Salem: Take Tunisia, for example. There was a huge shift in the way people used Facebook there. Penetration of Facebook among Tunisians was high, but people used it to socialize, nobody talked about politics, because it was taboo. Suddenly, after the [self-immolation of a 26-year-old Tunisian, Mohamed Bouazizi, last December] the shift happened -- everyone changed their profile photo to the Tunisian flag, posted news articles critical of the government, and organized. The most important thing Facebook allowed the people to do was organize in a way they didn't think possible. Self-organizational movements are not part of the culture in many Arab countries. The state is the provider and the organizer. But even when the government disappeared in Tunisia and in Egypt, people started organizing themselves, not just for political movements but for cleaning the streets, for security to protect their neighborhoods. So when people felt the need, they managed to find these platforms and utilize them creatively.

Arabic Knowledge: In your study, did you determine whether people were using more Arabic or English while on social media?
Mourtada: The impact would have been less [if these social media tools didn't have the capability to display Arabic text]. There was a lot of Arabic use. It depends on the class you're talking about too. The middle class tends to use more English. In order to become popular uprisings, these protests have to draw in the lower classes too, and these people mainly Tweet or use Facebook in Arabic.
Salem: One of the main examples is Rast network, a Facebook group with tens of thousands of followers in Egypt. It basically is a news agency. Its name is the Arabic word for 'scanning' or 'compiling.' For the many of the youth in Egypt, this was the source for information. This group of young people, who are a part of the revolutionary youth, used Rast to collect all the information that the government and all the traditional news outlets were not providing, such as profiles on personalities in the government, and what people were Tweeting about. With the core of the movements being youth connected on Facebook, it was the easiest way to collect and share information. And it was all in Arabic.

It spread just by Tweets and Likes on Facebook. There is no editorial board and they don't publish their own articles. They collect information and repackage it, with links and YouTube videos. They were in the first few days, especially during the Internet blackout, the source of information on what was happening in Egypt. Somebody who managed to get an Internet connection would post a video on YouTube, and it would be linked there, and it was disseminated to the community of supporters outside. It was also followed closely by Arab media organizations.

Arabic Knowledge: How did the protestors translate plans made through social media to actual people showing up on the streets in large numbers?
Salem: In Tunisia, that was the real surprise. In Egypt's protests, there was a case that worked in Tunisia, and they followed that. Tunisia was surprising. There were definitely grievances, and an event, Bouazizi's death, which catalyzed opinion. People were spreading the videos through their mobile phones, through Bluetooth, so it wasn't even the Internet alone. So how did such large numbers of people show up? Look at the number of Facebook users in Egypt and Tunisia. When the report was launched in December the number of Facebook users was more than 4 million users, now it is 5.2 million. We don't have the numbers yet for Egypt on the percentage of growth, but for Tunisia in the first few weeks during the protests, it shot up 8%. That was a huge increase in two weeks. But consider, you have 5 million people on Facebook, probably a big percentage are receiving this information, and every single person will have a real-life network of about five or six people. So do the math: that's about 30 million people who know what's happening. If 1 million were to show up, or even 100,000 show up, it would be enough.

Arabic Knowledge: Still, how did social media propel these protests in a way that other media have not in the Arab world? For instance, Al Jazeera and opposition newspapers reported on protest movements that were ignored by state-controlled media. But you'd never see similar reactions among people.
Mourtada: With social media, there is that personal touch. The people themselves are putting that content out, communicating with each other, as opposed to some media outlet telling them what's going on. With these social networks, the only way you can get the word out to that many people, and get them to organize, is if there is that element of trust between them.
Salem: Consider the profile of the Facebook user in the Arab world. Some 75% are people between the age of 15 and 29. They are part of one generation, and feel they have the same social problems, the same issues with the government, and the same aspirations. So it is one specific group. That's 4 million users in Egypt. But we have two different cases here. Since Tunisia, we had several different calls for 'Days of Rage' in Arab countries. Not all have materialized, such as in Algeria, though it has a high number of Facebook users. In Syria, there was a call, but nobody showed up. But in Yemen and Syria, the number of Facebook users is very low, so that's also a factor.

Who is organizing this, that's as important as the message. In Egypt, people trusted the group organizing the protests. These organizers had been activists for a year, at least. Whereas in Syria, the group who called for protests were outside the country, and they had low credibility. Nobody knew who they were. There could be other reasons. Maybe the timing wasn't right. There are differences in every country.

Arabic Knowledge: Has Facebook created a social shift in the Arab world? Have cultural norms been disturbed, perhaps permanently?
Salem: Absolutely. Not just cultural, but political norms as well. I would say that in countries where penetration of the Internet and social media is high, the next president, the next government there, will be those who utilize these social media tools to interact with the public. If it's a democratically elected government, it could be similar to how Barack Obama managed to win his presidency. The people who can connect to the youth through these technologies will be the next people in power in these countries.

Arabic Knowledge: Considering the adoption of Facebook as a platform in the Arab world, did you record any concern that it was not homegrown? For example, in Japan, Facebook does not have high penetration because people there are using locally developed social media platforms.
Salem: Unfortunately, the Arab world hasn't produced enough technologies or media channels for people. I know that in some countries, the opinion is, 'Ok, this is from the U.S., we don't know who will be monitoring this.' But at some point, people will not care anymore. If they have a cause that is beyond this, they will not look into who developed the platform.

Arabic Knowledge: So you didn't come across that sentiment?
Mourtada: It didn't seem to be a factor, from the number of Tweets and Facebook messages. People got past that, and it became about communicating, regardless of where the platform was built.
Salem: In the case of Egypt, the previous government tried to convey this message, that Al Jazeera, Wikileaks, Facebook, these are external, it's a conspiracy from the outside. The public didn't buy it.
Mourtada: It's mainly the governments people rose up against that were wary of these tools. It's a testament to the power of these tools.

Arabic Knowledge: Have some of the barriers between classes in the region been eliminated, or reduced, as a result of this collective experience through social media?
Mourtada: It's brought all these people together. You could say social media tools have created a new public sphere, where people can come in and talk about their grievances and social issues. In that sense it has flattened the informational hierarchy and some of the social structures.
Salem: Definitely, the flow of information in these societies became horizontal. No bottlenecks can filter this information. An endless number of connections have been established between people today, and it is almost impossible to block, filter or even monitor all of them. Governments in the region and on a global level are realizing this. Everybody has seen from Egypt's example that you cannot disconnect the information flow, even if you cut off an entire country from the Internet.

Arabic Knowledge: You mention in your report that one of the countries you could not get credible information on was Iran.
Salem: There is an issue with some countries, and that's because of the rules in the U.S. In Iran, Syria, Sudan, Cuba and North Korea, indeed there are embargoes on these countries, technological embargoes. Even companies like Google and Facebook will not enable you to get information, by law, or provide services to people in these countries. Even if they can access Facebook in these countries, they might not be able to download many applications for Facebook, which would affect their number of users. That limits the information available to us also. At this point, now that there is a realization that censorship is useless. Take Syria, it unblocked Facebook, YouTube and Blogspot. The real censorship is now happening from the U.S. side. We're talking about 180 million people in these countries who cannot download a browser, or use an application.

Arabic Knowledge: How do you see regional governments reacting to social media now?
Salem: Governments are realizing this is an opportunity to communicate and connect with the majority in these countries, which is the youth. Some governments are working on this, creating guidelines and putting policies into place to use social networking tools. On the other hand, some countries realize that they cannot control or monitor people as easily as they thought they could. This is another positive thing. Governments will waste fewer resources on trying to control and block these platforms, and instead try to use them to engage with their populations, which will ultimately see their countries better off. That they are taking these measures suggest these governments have accepted the fact that these tools will be here from now on. This is like when the Internet was first introduced in Arab countries. The first response was to control and monitor. The same thing happened with satellite television. That's the normal process, denying, and then accepting…. The next step will be participation. Taking advantage of these tools to connect with the public, and get them engaged in policymaking and decision-making, if not democratic participation.

We'll see how Tunisia and Egypt change their perspectives on these platforms. But I have no doubt that every single country in the world will try to infiltrate these platforms. Some countries have policies in place on how to use, manipulate and change perspectives on using these platforms. Everybody will try to collect information at least on the usage of social media tools, from how people are interacting with those platforms to devising plans on how to change that usage.

Friday, June 12, 2009

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Tuesday, August 21, 2007

EDITORIAL: New clear deal

The big issue is India’s foreign policy


The Left is right. The Congress-Left battle is not simply over the nuclear deal. There are bigger issues involved. The big issue is India’s foreign policy. The Left wants and, to be fair to it, has been wanting for some time an ideological foreign policy.


No one else in India, at least no serious player at the national level, certainly not the Congress or the BJP, wants a foreign policy strait-jacketed by ideology in the sense of prioritising theories and dislikes over national interests. Therefore, and this is the crucial thing to understand as the Left and the Congress issue reactions to each other’s statements, at the fundamental level what the current crisis has brought to fore is what some observers, including this newspaper, had suspected about this ruling arrangement: the alliance was always artificial, both sides felt unnatural in it, and it could only run so long because the Left’s hard ball tactics were concentrated on economic policy.


This may sound strange because the PM, squarely in the Left’s target, is so much a part of India’s economic transformation. But economics as it has played out in politics recently offers room for manoeuvre that big foreign policy choices don’t. In part because of earlier reforms that released, to use the much-used Keynesian phrase, the animal spirits in India’s private sector, India’s growth could ramp up without radical additional reforms. Manmohan Singh and his handful of reformist ministers would have loved to initiate more reforms. Not being able to do so was frustrating. Listening to the Left’s jibes and threats wasn’t pleasant. But a lot can be tolerated when the economy grows above 9 per cent.


Barring Delhi and Mumbai airport ownership change and the SEZ bill, the UPA can claim no major reform. No one was expecting any more. What was widely expected was that any other reform proposal mooted would be shot down by the Left and the government would have carried on ruing economic policy paralysis but knowing political stability isn’t at great risk.Foreign policy now doesn’t offer these luxuries because redefining India’s role in the world requires action.


The nuclear deal was part of that action. The BJP, never mind what it says now, started it when a Democrat was in the White House and the Congress carried on with it with a Republican president. There’s bipartisan consensus in both countries on the broad and crucial aspects of India’s foreign policy programme. The Left doesn’t want any part of that programme.


Which is why talk about buying time and postponing this or that negotiation on the nuclear deal are ultimately red herrings. Tactical inaction can’t resolve the current dispute. The dynamics of the larger issue around the nuclear deal are very different from, say, those around the pension bill. The Congress has probably understood that.

Thursday, May 16, 2013

EDITORIAL: INDIAN CRICKET FACING 'CREDIBLITY CRISIS'

By M H Ahssan / Hyderabad

Ironically, the most shocking thing about the spot fixing scandal that has rocked the Indian Premier League is that it may not have come as a rude shock to too many in the game. For, the moral vacuousness of IPL’s agenda -- packaging dumbed-down entertainment as sport with the sole aim of making money -- had left plenty of room for shady dealings of this kind.

Hannah Arendt’s famous phrase, the banality of evil, may not be out of place in the context of the popular League and the mephitic cloud of corruption under which it has prospered.

Tuesday, January 20, 2009

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Saturday, December 06, 2008

Editorial: It's now Bijli, Sadak, Pani and Terror

By M H Ahssan

Driving through Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, just a few days before the terrorist attack in Mumbai, one got the distinct impression that bijli, sadak and pani (BSP) firmly remained the key issues impacting the assembly elections in both states.

More importantly, terrorism was not even remotely seen as an issue with the electorate, even though the BJP’s central leaders had tried their best to politicise the Malegaon terror episode. This may have changed after the Mumbai attacks. It is now emphatically bijli, sadak, pani and terrorism (BSPT), not necessarily in that order.

Congress party leaders admit privately that the terrorist strike could have instantly given the BJP the extra advantage in crucial states such as Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Delhi which voted just after the black Wednesday. Of course, the full debate on terrorism will play out at the general elections five months from now.

By then things may look a bit different as some distance from the event brings greater perspective. The Congress still has time to demonstrate its seriousness in tackling the growing threat of terror. Five months, after all, is a long time in politics.

The BJP will also try to appropriate, as much as possible, the issue of national security in the context of terrorism. It will be somewhat constrained by the unwieldy manner in which it sought to communalise the terror issue — though L K Advani is now correcting his course saying that he was merely on the issue of how the Maharashtra ATS had tortured the sadhvi allegedly involved in the Malegaon bomb blasts.

The BJP is already going through its own contortions to explain away its earlier stand on Maharashtra ATS chief Karkare, who fell to the terrorist’s bullet.

There will be a much more nuanced play of the terror issue in the months ahead. Meanwhile, the results of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Delhi will help in gauging how the Congress and BJP would evolve their campaign strategy for general elections.

Barely three days before the Mumbai terror attack, Madhya Pradesh chief minister Shivraj Chouhan candidly admitted to some journalists who met him at his Bhopal residence that there was a lot of anti-incumbency working at the constituency level. He also conceded that national level issues such as terrorism were not a factor at all at that time.

However, the chief minister felt confident that his positive image, linked with a larger vision for the state would beat the anti-incumbency at the level of MLAs. The biggest factor working against the BJP at the MLA level was the absence of bijli and pani, the very slogan which helped the party throw the Congress out of power five years ago. On an average, across Madhya Pradesh, villages are getting electricity just about five hours a day. Sans power, farmers are unable to pump up ground water.

Chouhan was honest enough to admit that part of the failure was caused by the dependence of the state on hydel power from Narmada river which did not have much water this year due to low rainfall. “What was supposed to generate 2,200MW is now only giving 800MW”, Chouhan said.

Despite the odds, Chouhan is seen as a winning horse because of what many see as his ability to connect with the poor in the state. Put simply, he is a 24x7 grassroots politician.

Does Congress have one in Madhya Pradesh? It is interesting to note that Chouhan tries to model himself as a strong regional leader like Narendra Modi, who is seen as having a finger on the pulse of the people. One also saw in Madhya Pradesh shades of Modi’s Gujarat strategy. For instance, Chouhan has fielded a large number of fresh faces to beat anti-incumbency at the local level.

Of course, the Congress’s major criticism against the chief minister is that he has promised a lot and done little. Even if that were true, it might be difficult for the Congress to cover the massive deficit in the total vote share it suffered in the last assembly elections.

In 2003, the BJP cornered 42% of the total votes polled in Madhya Pradesh, with the Congress bagging only 31%. Other things remaining the same, the Congress needs a 5% plus swing away from the BJP to cover the vote deficit, which seems like a tall order. The terrorist strike in Mumbai a day before the polling in the state may have made things even more difficult for the Congress.

The Congress, it would appear, has a much better chance of exploiting the anti-incumbency factor in Rajasthan where it lags behind the BJP in vote share by just 3%. It needs a 1.5% plus swing in its favour to challenge the BJP chief minister Vasundhara Raje Scindia, who seems to be banking largely on her personal charisma, with not much help from the rest of the BJP leadership either at the state or central level. The party apparatus does not seem to have backed her to the hilt.

The Congress is somewhat better organised in Rajasthan this time and Vasundhara’s distance from her party leadership could help swing the state away from the BJP. Again, it is not clear how the issue of terrorism will play out in Rajasthan whose capital has been a target of major terror strikes in recent times. The voter turnout in Rajasthan, though, was quite high.

In Delhi, it seemed very clear that the sudden surge in voting after the Mumbai attack clearly reflected some anxiety among the urban middle class over the issue of national security. So, terrorism will certainly impact the outcome of the assembly polls.

The real test for India’s major political parties will come during the 2009 general elections. In many ways the Mumbai terror attacks may have already changed the discourse of national politics. Until recently, the view espoused by many political observers seemed to be that both the Congress and the BJP were in disarray and that a reinvented third front could emerge with Mayawati playing a key role.

The third front becomes a strong possibility if the Congress and BJP together fall well below the half way mark in the 545-seat Lok Sabha. At present the two main parties are a little above the half-way mark of 273 seats.

However, as national security and terrorism gain centre stage, as they are most likely to do, in the Lok Sabha elections, the electorate might prefer a coalition that is led by a stronger national party. This is an opportunity for both the BJP and the Congress. The contest to appropriate the national security plank should be quite engaging.

Monday, March 25, 2013

Liyaqat Case, And A Flawed Idea Of Special Courts For Muslims

It didn’t need the drama over the arrest of Liaqat Shah, who is caught in a tug-of-war between the Delhi Police and the Jammu and Kashmir government authorities over whether he was returning from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to plot terror or start his life anew, to remind us of a problem in our security agencies’ response to terror attacks and conspiracies.

The problem is this: anecdotal evidence of innocent people being framed or falsely implicated in terror cases is abnormally high. In Liaqat Shah’s case, even if one acknowledges that the truth of his circumstances is yet to be established, the two versions that have been trotted out are so widely contradictory that it is evident that one of them is a pack of lies.

The Delhi Police stands by its claim that Liaqat Shah was returning from PoK via Nepal to India in order to unleash urban jihad in Delhi on the lines of the November 2008 attack on Mumbai.  But as INN has noted, the Delhi Police narrative is so full of holes that it is hard to take it seriously. Yet, their officials continue to trot out “incriminating evidence” that makes a mockery of their claim: the latest  they have is that Liaqat Shah had  known Hizh-ul-Mujahideen militants on speed dial on his mobile phone.

Jammu and Kashmir authorities on the other hand insist that Liaqat Shah was returning with his family under a ‘rehabilitation’ scheme for reformed ‘militants’. If that version bears out as true – and Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde has promised an investigation by the National Intelligence Agency to establish that – it’s fair to say Liaqat Shah is being framed under false pretences.

This is symptomatic of a larger problem of security agencies influencing investigations into terror cases with their own agenda – or, at any rate, of being less than professional. Far too often, the kneejerk response of police and investigating agencies is to round up the “usual suspects”. As INN has noted, this has led, in many cases, to innocent Muslims being falsely implicated on terror charges. As happened in the Mecca Masjid blast case of 2007, the entire evidence against those who were arrested and had served jail term was a house of cards that collapsed in court. And yet, right after the blasts in Hyderabad in February this year, investigators were looking to round up the “usual suspects” again.

The Union Home Ministry’s decision to set up special courts to conduct speedy trials in cases where innocent people are falsely implicated in terror cases is, therefore, not without intrinsic merit. Even given the challenges that security agencies face in investigating terror cases, falsely implicating  innocent people in terror cases is a perversion of the law. Even if, in the end, the courts acquit them and establish their innocence, nothing can take away from the injustice of being incarcerted in jail for years – and the taint of being branded for years as a suspected terrorist.

The Home Minister has noted that arresting innocent people and keeping them in custody – knowing that they were innocent – is a serious a crime.  He has also promised strong action against officers responsible for such false cases. So far so good.

But where the Union Home Ministry, or the Minority Affairs Ministry (which proposed the establishment of special courts), err is in limiting these proposed special courts to take on only the cases of innocent Muslims. Even if one acknowledges that the preponderance of such cases relate to innocent Muslims – and investigative reports in the media have established that beyond doubt – a proposal to establish special courts for Muslims alone certainly tests the limits of constitutional propriety and makes for bad political optics.

As this editorial points out, the intended special courts and the mechanisms that sustain them ought to be carefully thought through so that nothing transpires to boomerang on the good intent that underlies it. These courts “should be aimed primarily at clearing a backlog, not serve as a long-term prophylactic against future mis-steps by the law enforcement and investigating agencies.” And the intent of framing such a measure must be to catalyse administrative and police reform by ridding the system of social prejudice, and upgrading investigative procedures.

Far too often, political considerations have led parties to embrace potentially unconstitutional positions as a quick-fix to address what are genuine problems in society. That way only lies ruin, and the possibility that a flawed approach can undermine the larger objective.

Constitutional propriety demands that special courts that take up the cases of innocent people arrested on false charges in terror cases should be blind to the religious background of the falsely accused. By narrowing the focus in the way it proposes to, the government is guilty of the same social prejudic that investigators and law-enforcement agencies stand accused of.

Sunday, February 08, 2015

INNLive Media Group Is Looking For Local 'News Partners'!

INNLive Media is a social network for change, connecting people and organisations who want to make things happen in the community.

With thousands of members across India and beyond, INNLive Media people include individuals who volunteer and professionals that work in the not for profit and charity sectors along with organisations looking for help.

Tuesday, March 10, 2009

Editorial: Clear And Present Danger

By M H Ahssan

The BDR mutiny is over, the threat to Hasina remains

For Bangladesh prime minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed, the February 25 mutiny by Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) troops was a near-checkmate. It pitted the powerful army in direct confrontation with a smaller borderguard force. The mutiny spread to districts within a day, threatening to spin out of control. But Hasina managed to avert a fratricidal conflict with decisive political intervention. Her initial announcement of a general amnesty for the mutineers upset the army. Tempers rose further when mass graves of massacred army officers commanding the BDR were found. So much so that army chief General Moeen U Ahmed was heckled by his own troops and twice offered to resign.

Hasina herself took a great risk by going to the Dhaka cantonment two days after the revolt to placate the army. She could have fallen to a lone assassin or a small group of conspirators close to the Islamic radicals. Hasina has come back from the brink, her fortunes wavering over the last two years. The military-backed interim government’s advent followed her imprisonment on a host of trumpedup corruption charges. Her party was nearly split by the military intelligence agency, Directorate General of Forces Intelligence. Late last year, her fortunes improved. The corruption charges came unstuck. Her party remained united despite attempts by the ‘reformist lobby’ to oust her. She emerged a clear front runner once the Awami League started campaigning.

The nation had had enough of military intervention by remote control — General Moeen understood that. For over a year, he had tried to develop ties with the Indian Army to convert his own army into an Indian-style professional fighting machine rather than remain a Pakistan-style political army. The interim administration is credited for organising the fairest election ever. But it is also clear that, if polls are free and fair, the Awami League and its secular allies stay miles ahead of their fundamentalist Islamist rivals. The spirit of 1971 and of Bengali nationalism has lived on, despite militant Islam’s global surge, to ensure Bangladesh doesn’t turn into another Pakistan.

Hasina’s huge electoral victory gave her confidence to purge ‘reformist elements’ in her own party, especially senior leaders, heroes of the liberation generation. A relatively young cabinet, sans these tested leaders and with many women, gave her ministry a new look. Hasina also decided to press ahead with her electoral promise: the trial of 1971 war criminals. A unanimous resolution in parliament for the proposed trial — of mostly top Jamaat-e-Islami leaders and some from the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) as well — was followed by Hasina’s vocal support for a
South Asian anti-terror task force that upset Pakistan and its allies in Bangladesh. Her government arrested Chittagong’s leading arms dealer Hafizur Rehman and restarted the Chittagong arms seizure case in view of Rehman’s confessions that the huge arsenal seized in the port city in April 2004 was meant for India’s north-eastern rebel group, ULFA, and that several BNP and Jamaat leaders were involved.

Then came the mutiny. Hasina risked military intervention if the crisis was not tackled to the army’s satisfaction. Home minister Sahara Khatun and local government minister Jehangir Kabir Nanak helped disarm the BDR troops. Hasina also backed off from the general amnesty, promising exemplary punishment for those who had murdered officers and their families. Military pressure is on Hasina to hand over the BDR to the army command, to punish mutineers harshly and even to disband the borderguard force while sacking Khatun and Nanak for alleged proximity to the mutineers.

The BDR’s grievances — pay and perks, military domination since the entire BDR officer corps is from the army and denial of UN peace keeping duties — are old. The rank and file seethed at not being able to raise these issues with Hasina during her Pilkhana visit a day before the revolt. But investigations now reveal calculated planning behind the mutiny, with truckloads of weapons and scores of ‘outsiders’ entering Pilkhana in BDR uniform to carry out killings meant to sink Bangladesh into chaos.

The massacres were not sudden. BDR chief Major General Shakil Ahmed managed to speak twice to Hasina from the barracks after the mutiny started. District processions with slogans like “BDR-Janta Bhai Bhai” involved opposition supporters. Hasina alleges the latter even provided vehicles to fleeing mutineers. The Jamaat-e-Islami, which would suffer the most in any 1971 war crimes trial, is believed to be the main conspirator with the shadow of Pakistan, whose president has appealed to Hasina to defer the trials, lurking.

General Moeen has repeatedly asserted the army is “subservient to the government of the people”. He has only a few months left and is under pressure from his next rung commanders to extract the army’s pound of flesh from the mutiny-rattled government. Hasina has conceded some ground, withdrawing the general amnesty and arresting hundreds of mutineers now booked under serious criminal charges. But she is lucky to have survived a deep conspiracy, emerging stronger and more confident.

If Jamaat’s role in the massacre is conclusively established, Islamic radicals will risk the army’s wrath. That’s not bad for Hasina. Hopefully, the mutiny won’t make her back out on the war crimes trials and cases related to the Sheikh Mujib murder and Chittagong arms seizure. If she doesn’t go all out to decimate her Islamist rivals politically, she could be looking at another conspiracy.