Showing posts sorted by relevance for query Mumbai. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query Mumbai. Sort by date Show all posts

Saturday, November 29, 2008

Mumbai a target for terrorists

By Golden Reejsinghani

Terrorists are like black shadows that stealthily come in the night and do their work. Mumbai is known as a safe city and the people living in this city always thought Afghanistan, Kashmir and Pakistan were soft targets for terrorists. But now Mumbai is also under their fire. Terrorists ran amuck on the streets of Mumbai spraying bullets and lobbying grenades on innocent people without making the concession for the old , infirm , women , children and sick people their main aim was to destroy the very fabric of Mumbai and to kill the spirit of the cosmopolitan nature for which it is famous.

In 1993 the first bomb blast ripped the city apart. But the denizens of Mumbai rose up like a proverbial phoenix from the ashes and rebuilt the city and this continued till today but this did not go down well with the terrorist and therefore they tried many more times to bring Bombay and its people to their knees. Some of the terrorist attacks which followed the 1993 carnage are given below.

August 28 , 1997 – Bomb blasts took place near Jama Masjid injuring 3 people
January 24,1998- Malad 1 person got injured
February 27, 2008 – Virar – 9 people got injured.
December 2, 2002 – Blast in BEST Bus at Ghatkopar.
December 6, 2002 – Mumbai Central Railway station 25 people got injured.
January 27, 2003 – Vile Parle killing 1 and injuring at least 25.
March 13 , 2003 - Mulund Railway station killing 11 and injuring 80
August 25, 2003 – Two taxis were ripped apart in the morning in Mumbai.
July 11, 2006 – Serial Blasts took place at 7 places in the evening killing 225 and injuring 890 innocent citizens.
July 29, 2003 - Ghatkopar killing 3 and injuring 34 people.

This time around the terrorists wanted to really kill the spirit of the city and aim at destroying the pride of Mumbai when inconceivable terror and over whelming feeling of fear and anxiety returned to Mumbai’s Streets on Wednesday night killing more than 25 people and injuring at least 327 people including the ATS chief < anti terrorism squad chief > Mr. Hemant Karkare, additional commissioner Ashok Kamte and the encounter specialist Mr. Vijay Salaskr. All these top notch officials laid their life for the love of the country fighting bravely with the terrorists. .

The main aim of these terrorists was to bring a dead end to the country’s commercial center Mumbai .The terrorists who attacked Mumbai moved about in groups of two’s and three’s and attacked the innocent people on the roads all over the city, setting off inter connected numerous blasts and gunshot in many localities across the city including the CST train station and two posh five star hotels – Oberoi trident and the Taj Mahal Hotel. These two hotels are pride of Mumbai , especially the Taj Mhal hotel which is known as a heritage hotel and every tourist envy, the terrorist tried their best to d0 9/11 to the hotels like they did to twin towers in USA and most recently to Marriott hotel in Pakistan, but in spite of their best efforts the two hotels took all the beating right on their bellies and stood like two sentinels looking them squarely in the eye and challenging them to destroy them, today the terrorists are all smoked out of the hotels and their dead bodies removed to the morgue except for one Azam Amir Kassam a 21 year old who is from Faridkot which is in Pakistan, he is the only one who is captured alive and who is spilling the beans on his comrades.

The terrorists arrived in the city through the sea route with hand grenades, Automatic machine guns and a large amount of explosives. The terrorists did not even refrain from harming hospitals like the GT and the Cama hospital.

Eye witness Santosh singh said,‘Hand grenades, automatic machine guns and rifles were used by the terrorists to spread unimaginable terror and kill the innocent people. Unfortunately Non –resident Indians and the policemen were the major targets of these people”

Eye witnesses recounting Tales of Horror

TAJ: Many were the people who were trapped inside the two prestigious hotels, according to one eye witness Jaisingh Giakwad Patel, NCP MP from Beed said “he was staying in room 319 in Taj hotel and he saw that the terrorists were well equipped. Around 9.45 p.m. “I was watching TV when I heard gunfire I thought these must be fire crackers, but when this continued for sometime I called up the reception and I was told not to open the door because the hotel was under siege from terrorists. whole night the firing continued and the sound of grenades shattered the silence of the night, the terrorists forcibly opened the doors of foreign nationals and they were taken hostages the terrorists positioned themselves in strategic locations around the hotel and anyone who dared to peep out of their room was shot down in cold blood. All this time I had nothing to eat I survived on 3 fruits, a few bottles of cold drinks and water till I was rescued by NSG commandos 2.30”.

CHATRAPATI SHIVAJI TERMINUS TRAIN STATION: Ramakrishna Athyale who has a pan shop went to the CST station to catch a train at 9.10 p.m. when he had just boarded the train he heard the gun shots. In a second of minutes People were running all over the station.

VILE PARLE: Ram Prasad Singh was on the road in his car when the taxi near the fly over exploded “I was 500 meters away from the place where the taxi exploded and everything was surrounded in smoke and the vehicle that contained the bomb blew into bits and pieces.”

COLABA: “I and my friends were eating outside at a road side stall when we heard gunshots and all the people were running helter skelter this occurred around 9.55 p.m At that moment I and my friends could not think of anything but run”. – Ramprasad Sanghvi executive.

WADI BUNDER: Amina Sheikh was an eye witness to the blast that took place near the BPT Colony at wadi bunder near the sandhurst road , recounts that “ it was a very scary situation to face when I saw many dead and blown away to pieces when the bomb exploded in a taxi stationed outside the hutments colony”.

It is bewildering to see how innocent citizens are being wiped out by the terrorists. And disgusting to see these terrorists killing people at will There must be some solution to this nagging problem-to clear terrorists from the city it took 52 hours of hard work and back breaking labor along with this there were many who lost their lives, many who are permentaly maimed, many who have lost their jobs in these days of recessions. Who is going to give these people back their loved ones, their jobs and what about the trauma, people who have seen the carnage at close quarters will carry this trauma throughout their lives, there must be some solution to the problem and this can be solved only if all the governments of the world get together and start a fight against terrorists and countries harboring these terrorist the attacks are becoming very frequent every country in the world is being targeted by these dark forces because they feel invincible-somebody has to make them realize that they are not invincible and the start should be made by India because it has seen the worst attack of terrorism in this century. India needs to establish a national terrorist law and its approach in dealing with the terrorists should be even handed. There is an urgent need to damp down the temperature in the country and along the lines of L.O.C. India also needs a united policy direction at the national level to deal with terrorism.

Friday, May 24, 2013

FIXING: MEIYAPPAN, MUMBAI POLICE PLAY HIDE AND SEEK

By M H Ahssan / Hyderabad

When the Queen of England is not in residence at the Buckingham Palace, the Union Jack flutters over the iconic palace to signal the royal absence to her plebeian subjects – and to anyone else who may profit from that information. It is a curious courtly protocol that was introduced in 1997 after a controversy that arose following the death in a car crash in Paris of Princess Diana, whose relations with the British royal family had become severely strained.

Far away from London, another such royal ritual involving flags and a “Super King” was played out for Mumbai Police officials who turned up in Chennai to serve a summons notice on Gurunath Meiyappan, CEO of the Chennai Super King franchise and the jamai raja of BCCI president N Srinivasan.

Wednesday, July 20, 2016

Failure To Prove Zakir Naik's 'Terror Links' Has Left Police Looking Foolish

By SAHIL JOSHI | INNLIVE

The Islamic televangelist wanted to play a victim of media campaign against him as he knew that this would earn him more followers.

Islamic televangelist Zakir Naik has become a headache for the investigating agencies. Because the police simply don't know how to pin him down.

It has been a week and the Mumbai Police is yet to submit its report on the investigation ordered by Maharashtra chief minister Devendra Fadnavis after the media went all-out against Naik for his allegedly inspiring the terrorists who attacked a Dhaka cafe earlier this month.

Thursday, March 21, 2013

'SANJAY DUTT WILL GO TO JAIL AGAIN!'

The Supreme Court on Thursday ordered Bollywood actor Sanjay Dutt to serve a five year jail sentence in the 1993 Mumbai blasts. The apex court also dismissed the appeal of blast mastermind Yakub Memon and upheld his death sentence. Memon is prime accused Tiger Memon’s brother.

12:30 pm: Grateful to SC for reducing sentence: Dutt’s lawyer

Sanjay Dutt’s lawyer Satish Maneshinde said he was grateful to the Supreme Court for reducing Dutt’s sentence. “We respect the SC order, we will go by whatever the court directs us to go through.”

“Whatever be the judgement, we will go through it.”

When asked whether he would appeal against the order, Maneshinde said he could not comment until he got a copy of the order.

11: 47 am: SC sentences Sanjay Dutt to five years in jail

The Supreme Court on Thursday ordered Bollywood actor Sanjay Dutt to serve a five year jail sentence for his role in the 1993 Mumbai blasts.  Dutt had already served a jail sentence of a year-and-a-half.

The Supreme Court has given Dutt and the other accused who are on bail a period of one month to surrender. Dutt will spend a period of three years and six months in jail.

Earlier, a TADA court had sentenced Sanjay Dutt to six years in jail. The Supreme Court reduced the TADA court order and awarded him to serve a sentence of five years, the minimum sentence under the Arms Act.

Sanjay Dutt was found in possession of weapons at his residence.

Sanjay Dutt, however, can file a review petition before the Supreme Court.

Dutt’s sister Priya Dutt was in court while the sentence was pronounced.

11: 42 am: Life sentence of Rehman Azimulla reduced to 10 years

Life sentence of Ashrafur Rehman Azimulla has been reduced to 10 years while that of Imtiyaz Yunusmiya Ghavte to jail term already undergone.

SC upholds life sentence of 16 out of 18 convicts sentenced by TADA court.

11:38 am: Death sentence of blast mastermind Yakub Memon upheld

The Supreme Court on Thursday upheld the death sentence of blast mastermind Yakub Memon, prime accused Tiger Memon’s brother.

The apex court in its ruling reportedly said there is no doubt that Memon played a huge role in the 1993 serial blasts.

Police, customs and coastal guards are also to be blamed for 1993 blasts: SC.

The Supreme Court reduced the death sentence of 10 other accused to life imprisonment considering the fact that they have spent 20 years in jail. It also ruled that life term convicts will remain in jail till their death.

Condemning the role of Pakistan in the blasts, the SC reportedly said: It is clear that ISI training was given to the accused in Islamabad. Confessions of terrorists reveal ISI encouraged terrorism.

“They (accused) had a green channel entrance and exit in Pakistan. No immigration procedures were followed.”

Yakub Memon and all absconding accused (Dawood Ibrahim and others) were “archers” and rest of the accused were “arrows” in their hands.

11: 30 am: SC will pronounce order on ’93 Mumbai blasts

The Supreme Court will pronounce its order on the 1993 Mumbai blasts today. In the multiple blasts across Mumbai, 257 were killed and 713 were injured.

The apex court will pronounce its verdict on the 124 cross appeals by those convicted by a special court for the 1993 Bombay serial bomb blasts, including film star Sanjay Dutt, as well as by the Maharashtra government challenging some acquittals and seeking enhanced sentences for other guilty.

A bench of Justice P Sathasivam and Justice BS Chauhan had heard the spate of cross petitions by the convicts and the state of Maharashtra over ten months. The hearing that commenced on 1 November, 2011, concluded on 29 August, 2012.

The court dealing with the then Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act had convicted and sentenced 12 accused to death, 20 to life imprisonment, and 46 others, including Sanjay Dutt, were given varying terms of imprisonments.

The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) had faced flak for not challenging the TADA court verdict acquitting Sanjay Dutt of charges under the TADA but convicting him under the Arms Act and sentencing him to six years imprisonment. However, in the course of the hearing of his appeal, the CBI had opposed the actor’s plea challenging his conviction and sentencing.

A series of 13 car bomb blasts had ripped through Mumbai on March 12, 1993, resulting in the death of 257 people and injuries to 713. The locations that were targeted included fisherman’s colony in Mahim Causeway, Zaveri Bazaar, Plaza Cinema, Century Bazaar, Katha Bazaar, Hotel Sea Rock, Sahar Airport, Air India building, Hotel Juhu Centaur, the Bombay Stock Exchange Building and the Passport Office.

The TADA court trial court of Justice P.D. Kode had commenced the trial Nov 4, 1993, and pronounced its 4,230-page verdict on July 31, 2007.

On the other hand, Actor Sanjay Dutt’s conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court today. The actor had previously been sentenced to six years in jail. However, the apex court has reduced his sentence from six years to five. Sanjay has not been granted any probation and will have to spend three years and six months of his remaining jail time in prison, given that has already served 18 months of his sentence. Here is a timeline of Sanjay Dutt’s case.

Aug 29, 2012: After a marathon ten-month-long hearing, the Supreme Court reserved its verdict on a number of appeals and cross-appeals in the 1993 Mumbai serial terror bombing case in which 257 people were killed and 713 others were injured.

Sanjay Dutt was facing charges for illegal possession of weapons under the arms act.

Appearing for the actor, senior counsel Harish Salve told the apex court bench of Justice P Sathasivam and Justice BS Chauhan that Sanjay Dutt came to possess the weapons in question in September 1992 when his father Sunil Dutt and sisters were facing threats, as the senior Dutt’s help to Muslim victims during the Mumbai riots had angered powerful people.

He also told the Supreme Court that his offense of possessing a rifle and ammunition was not linked to the 1993 Mumbai bomb blasts.

27 November 2007: Sanjay Dutt was granted bail by the Supreme Court.

22 October 2007: Dutt was back in jail but again applied for bail.

23 August, 2007: Sanjay Dutt was released from jail.

20 August 2007: Supreme Court of India granted Dutt interim bail. He was released after the Yerwada Central Jail authorities received a copy of the court’s bail order. The bail was deemed to be valid until the special TADA court, which sentenced Dutt on 31 July, provided a copy of its judgment to him.

7 August 2007: Sanjay Dutt appealed against the sentence.

2 August 2007: Sanjay Dutt was moved from Arthur Road jail in Mumbai to the Yerwada Central Jail in Pune.

31 July 2007: Sanjay Dutt was sentenced to six years rigorous imprisonment for illegally possessing weapons. However, he was also “cleared of terrorism conspiracy charges in the blasts” related to the 1993 bombings. Sanjay Dutt was immediately taken into custody and lodged in the Arthur Road jail.

March 2006: When framing murder charges against extradited Abu Salem and co-accused Riyaz Siddiqui in the 1993 Mumbai bomb blasts case, the prosecution said that Salem delivered 9 AK-56 rifles and some hand grenades to Dutt at his Bandra house in the second week of January 1993.

2006: The case opened for sentencing for all the 189 accused.

April 1997: Sanjay was released once again on police bail terms.

December 1995: Sanjay Dutt was rearrested after being granted bail in October.

November 1993: A 90,000 page primary chargesheet was filed against the 189 accused in the 1993 Mumbai bomb blasts case which included Sanjay Dutt’s name as well.

19 April 1993: Due to terrorist interactions, and illegal weapons possession, Sanjay was arrested under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA). He spent 16 months in jail until he was granted bail in October 1995.

12 March, 1993: A series of 13 bomb explosions took place in Mumbai, Maharashtra, killing 250 people and injuring 700. The attacks were coordinated by Dawood Ibrahim and Tiger Memon.

Tuesday, September 10, 2013

Exclusive: Indian Mujahideen - The Terror And The Threat

By Newscop / INN Bureau 

The Indian Mujahideen are both a grave threat and a complex puzzle for this country. As recently as June-end, the Gujarat Police released the interrogation report of one of IM’s key operatives, Danish Riyaz, 29, a software engineer from Ranchi. The Crime Branch had arrested him on 22 June at Vadodara railway station aboard the Secunderabad-Rajkot Express after a tip-off. He was accused of sheltering Abdul Subhan Qureshi in Ranchi, allegedly a mastermind of the Delhi and Ahmedabad blasts of 2008. 

Monday, December 01, 2008

The hottest place in the world!

By M H Ahssan & John Wilson

During the recently concluded American elections, vice president-elect Joe Biden made the widely criticized point that president-elect Barack Obama would be tested very soon after ascending to the job. It appears from recent events that his particular prophesy has been fulfilled, and rather earlier than even he had imagined, namely, even before Obama takes on the job of president. It may be no exaggeration to point out that much like September 11, 2001, charted the course of the George W Bush administration, the Mumbai massacre on Thanksgiving 2008 could well chart the course of the Obama presidency.

Firm evidence with respect to the participation of Pakistani government agents in the latest terrorist outrage in Mumbai that left nearly 200 people dead is still unavailable as I write this article; however, the apparent presence of a naval vessel carrying the terrorists to the city's shore as well as the targeting of patently Western and Jewish people in Mumbai points outside the pattern of terrorism that Mumbai has witnessed thus far; namely that of killing locals in mass numbers through the use of explosive devices planted on taxis and trains. I return to the failures of the Indian government in the second half of this article, after first dealing with the immediate consequences for Pakistan should the involvement of its citizens be proven over the near term.

There is a second possibility that I discussed with my Asia Times Online colleague Spengler, namely that the attacks on Mumbai were a response to the anti-piracy actions of the Indian navy that resulted in the sinking of a Somali pirate mother ship last week. The mother ship was a Thai fishing trawler that the pirates had seized a short while before. It is not much of a secret that Somali pirates are well aligned with al-Qaeda for their training and weapons; it is also possible that an important al-Qaeda functionary was killed in the Indian attack.

Based on the complicated set of facts in front of us, it seems logical for now to conclude that the Mumbai operations were the product of meticulous planning and action taken almost exclusively by non-locals to prevent the risk of information leaking to Indian police if locals had been taken into confidence. The most logical source of such people would be the Islamic terrorist continuum operating under the auspices of al-Qaeda and loosely aligned with renegade elements of the Pakistani government itself, namely the Inter-Services Intelligence or ISI; the notorious state-within-state.

Much as everyone discusses the carnage in Mumbai, I cannot escape the feeling that execution was hurried along; the use of even a slightly larger force with more deadly weapons could well have created a multiplication of damage and casualties in Mumbai. That suggests that the operation was executed prematurely: precisely what one should expect if planners had somehow suspected being exposed and their carefully planned actions aborted entirely. It is for this reason that I suspect the Pakistani government’s actions against the ISI as the primary trigger for this terrorist attack.

From a longer-term perspective, it shocks me that more Western agencies including the US and UK governments do not take full cognizance of the size of the challenge in Pakistan. US neo-conservatives for example highlight Iran as the major threat to the planet, despite the fact that its 60 million people are relatively well-off, demographically in decline and most importantly a Shi'ite people surrounded by inimical Sunni groups.

In contrast, Pakistan is a country possessing nuclear weapons and hosting over 150 million people skewed towards the young. Its share of young, unemployed and restless people with a penchant for religious extremism since the early 1980s has steadily risen to the point where calling the country the leading breeding center for terrorism globally wouldn’t be too far-fetched. All of these factors have led to the undermining of civilian government, while the country's elite slide into accommodation with religious fanatics from al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

A few weeks back, I wrote an article (Triangulating an Asian conflict Asia Times Online, September 6, 2008 ) that discussed the potential for Pakistan slipping deeply into the Taliban sphere of operations, in turn imperiling its neighbors, including most urgently India and less probably China over the longer term. What looked like a thesis has now come fully into the realm of probability.

Thus, the indomitable force of Islamic fundamentalism that emerges from Pakistan will have to confront the immovable objects of Han and Hindu resurgence. It is well likely that the first course of action will be against the well known enemy of India rather than the scarier opponent in China, but that is a relatively minor detail in that it only applies over the relative near term.

Of course, the primary thrust of that article was not so much the existence of these threats, but the regional media's casual disregard for the security situation with column inches being devoted instead to the wardrobe choices of the Republican vice-presidential nominee, Sarah Palin. In that article, I juxtaposed the emerging Taliban threat to Pakistan in the context of its worsening economic fundamentals, even as the resurgence of Hindu nationalism made the idea of rapprochement unattainable.

One of the key changes ushered in by President Asif Ali Zardari was the broadening of ties with India, leaving out for now the thorny issue of Kashmir but focusing instead on improving trade and infrastructure while making a common cause against Islamic terrorists. This made sense not only because Zardari owed his ascent to the assassination of his wife, former premier Benazir Bhutto, but also because sidelining the army by achieving peace with India would help to secure his own future.

Proceeding in that vein, and acting finally on a key recommendation by the US government that had been made as early as 2006, earlier last week it emerged that the "political" wing of the ISI had been disbanded. Now of course, much of the ISI isn't supposed to exist in the first place, therefore one uses ground contacts to determine just how serious such changes actually are; in this case it appears that the government's action was seen as a stinging slap on the face of the ISI by effectively rendering the organization captive to the policies and actions of the government in power rather than being determined by its own senior cadre of advisors and agents as had been done previously.

In effect, disbanding the political wing of the ISI was seen as a move for the Pakistani government to take direct charge of ISI activities, and stop being hostage to the machinations of the ISI itself. In the past, the political wing of the ISI was thought to be responsible for the removal of Benazir Bhutto, the trial by fire of Nawaz Sharif, the removal of president General Pervez Musharraf and most recently the assassination of Benazir Bhutto herself. It was for this reason that the ISI took great pains to ensure that her death was blamed on an accident (head hitting the door handle) rather than an assassin's bullets because the difference is the one between martyrdom and destiny.

(The existence of such a political organization that in effect polices the government on behalf of a sinister group of senior insiders is something of a puzzle in democracies across the Western world but is a matter of resigned acceptance in many countries including Russia and most communist countries including China and Vietnam. Across the Islamic world such political wings are active in countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran under the guise of the religious police.)

For all intent and purposes it appears that the operations against targets in Mumbai were planned months in advance for execution at an appropriate time; the direct action of the Pakistani government against the ISI may have provided just such a trigger. It is also possible that the anger of al-Qaeda at India for the loss of a pirate mother ship in the past two weeks was a factor in pushing the action.

Whatever the reason for the "Go" command, the more disturbing elements are the implications for the Pakistani government itself. It is unlikely that the governments of the US, UK, Israel and India will take the involvement of agents within the Pakistani government in the Mumbai bombings lightly. However, that anger is beside the point because it is not clear to me that the Pakistani government can actually survive any course of action against these embedded agents.

With its credibility badly damaged in the eyes of the world, the government will have to rush towards a compromise position with the very people it sought to dislodge, namely forces friendly to Islamic terrorism within the agencies of the government including the army and the ISI. In return for promises of going easy, the government would get nominal visibility in future plans.

Then-president Musharraf came to a similar arrangement in the months following 9/11 and US actions against Afghanistan. In return for face-saving bans on terrorist outfits that gathered funds and hired Pakistanis for their operations, he allowed the outfits to expand their soft programs, including Islamic education, pushing back women's rights and broadening the run of the Taliban in border areas with Afghanistan. This worked for a reasonable period of time until finally the US government lost patience with the foot-dragging on operations against al-Qaeda/Taliban fighters nesting within Pakistan. That in turn caused the Americans to act against Musharraf, and bring in Bhutto, albeit with unimaginable consequences for the latter.

In all this, there was also a history lesson that was completely missed, namely the events of 1999 when then prime minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, proposed peace; this led his then head of the army Musharraf and a handful of top officers to plot the onset of a war with India by using irregular units of the Pakistani army in the guise of Islamic militants that attacked a forward Indian army unit in Kashmir; the resulting battle led not only to a threat of a nuclear strike by Pakistan but also eventually to the replacement of Sharif by Musharraf, after Sharif was forced to settle for peace by the US and other countries for the illegal actions of the army.

What is different this time around is that instead of the army being at loggerheads with the government, a small group within the ISI appears to have achieved the ability to destabilize both the government and the Pakistani army. For security experts, this was an obvious conclusion to reach when Musharraf was pushed out of power, and when Zardari started his peacemaking routine with India. My discomfort stems from the fact that no one in power across the US and India saw it coming.

To any dispassionate observer, it is easy to conclude that Pakistan is now a failed state on the lines of Somalia and Afghanistan where the government writ runs only in limited areas while everywhere else in the country is dominated by warlords. The only national institution in Pakistan is its army, although the push against Musharraf and the actions of the Taliban against specific army units point to cracks within that could well result in final breakdown of its command structure. It goes without saying that only the al-Qaeda/Taliban combine stand to take advantage of such a breakdown of the army command structure, using the opportunity to seize control of nuclear weapons.

Now, just to state the obvious from my perspective, there isn't anything particularly bad about people belonging to a particular religion or ethnic group securing nuclear weapons capability. The problem with al-Qaeda and the Taliban taking control of these weapons of mass destruction though are that the groups put the survival of their own people second to the achievement of longer-term principles. This casual disregard for the lives of their own people - well witnessed in Afghanistan, Iraq and other theaters of al-Qaeda/Taliban operations - is what makes the idea of them seizing nuclear weapons so much more of a strategic nightmare.

Seeing the events of the Thanksgiving massacre unfold in Mumbai, I was reminded of an awful joke from Israeli television during the first Gulf War in 1990, after Saddam Hussein launched daily Scud missile attacks on the Jewish state. Told that the wild targeting and the inbuilt inaccuracy of the Scud missiles meant that the chances of anyone actually dying from such an attack were broadly the same as winning the national lottery, one comic deadpanned, "Yes, but you didn't tell me there were so many draws every day."

That sick joke must have gone through the minds of more than one person in Mumbai over the past few days as the latest attacks add to the recent history of terrorism against people in the city that started with the serial bombings of 1993 that killed more than a thousand people. More recently, there have been sporadic attacks using bombs in taxis and trains that have killed over 500 people.

A security expert on television made the point that the terrorists had chosen soft targets such as hotels and hospitals, but this comment only caused me to laugh mirthlessly. For it appears to me that the Indian government long ago beat the terrorists to that job, by making not just Mumbai but other big Indian cities also soft targets for terrorism.

In the months after 9/11 in the US, as well as the terrorist attacks on Madrid it became clear that the ultimate objective of al-Qaeda and its related groups was to destabilize multi-ethnic democracies everywhere. Being the only one of its kind in Asia, it would have been foolhardy for India not to see itself as a target even before taking into account specific issues such as the simmering Kashmir insurgency, its relative proximity to the US and lastly the large Muslim population that lives in its secular rather than theocratic framework that directly challenges the orthodox ideology of al-Qaeda.

Yet and almost alone among all such democracies, the Indian government refused to change its homeland security apparatus in the months following the terrorist attacks on the Indian parliament in 2001, as well as deeper provocations such as the attacks on Mumbai in later months.

There is no national body coordinating counter-terrorist intelligence across state lines; this would be tragic in a monolingual country like the United States but completely unfathomable in a multi-ethnic multilingual country like India. There is no apparent infrastructure to enable responses to crisis situations that aren’t conventional military attacks such as the Kargil war mentioned previously in this article.

Much has been made of the commercial importance of Mumbai, a fact that even economists like me only understand when looking at the domicile of India’s largest companies and its richest people. An overwhelming majority of India's richest 100 people live and work in Mumbai, a journalist friend recently pointed out that over a quarter of the country’s revenue from taxing salaries arose from companies domiciled in this one city.

In any other emerging market leave alone democracy, Mumbai would automatically have been accorded protected status with governments bending over backwards to improve infrastructure and ensure security. None of these things have happened though, due to the curious and illogical domination of the Indian political spectrum by communists. As I wrote in another article for Asia Times Online (India’s real terrorists May 17, 2008), the role of communists in pushing back efforts to modernize and protect Mumbai cannot be overstated.

Israel's Defense Minister Ehud Barak made the point on Friday that India's special forces unit that dealt with the siege at the top hotels in Mumbai did not appear to be well prepared, nor could they be considered sufficiently well trained for such complex operations. This is a matter not just of concern for Indians, but also an invitation to question the absence of coordination with security experts from Israel and the United States. Interestingly, while India is one of the largest buyers of defense equipment from Israel, it has thus far failed to secure much training in anti-terrorism from Israeli and American experts.

The reason isn't hard to find - efforts to enlarge such cooperation with Israel and the United States inevitably run into opposition from a motley crew of communists across the country. While their opposition to the US on ideological grounds is well known (as shown by the recent blocking of the nuclear deal with the US even though the positive effects of securing safe power stations running on nuclear fuel is obvious to any industrialist), it is interesting to note that protests against "Zionism" are usually led by the same communists. The arguments were first aired by the USSR at the height of the Cold War, and India’s communists are the only ones in the world to still subscribe to that world view.

Driven as much by envy of the industrious people of the city as by its relative prosperity and ability to attract the best talent from around the country, communists have steadily pushed against infrastructure improvements. Much of the security ills of the famously diverse city arise from the under-investment on infrastructure and inability to corral the criminal groups that operate openly in the city.

On the heels of this attack, India has once again made some cosmetic changes by replacing its most senior politician in charge of security with Finance Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram. Given that I have not been impressed with the country’s ability to manage its finances over the past five years, it is unlikely that the government will do much to improve.

There are only two courses of action open to the Indian government; firstly to launch a strike against Pakistan-based training camps for Islamic terrorists such as those belonging to the banned Laskhar-e-Taiba and the Jaish Mohammad; this course of action risks opening up a full scale war with Pakistan. The second course of action would for the government to do precisely nothing but to passively sit around awaiting another terrorist attack on the country’s citizens.

While I fear the first course of action, I am well inclined to believe that it is the second course of action that will most likely emerge. In terms of protecting the well-being of its citizens as I have noted previously on many occasions, India is not China.

As per the observations on this report, Pakistan's military age population is far greater than those of other Muslim military powers in the region. With about 20 million men of military age, Pakistan today has as much manpower as Turkey and Iran combined, and by 2035 it will have half again as many.

Half the country is illiterate and three-quarters of it subsists on less than $2 a day, according to the World Bank. That is to say that Pakistan's young men are more abundant as well as cheaper than in any other country in the region. Very poor and ignorant young men, especially if their only education has been in Salafi madrassas (seminaries), are very easy to enlist in military adventures.

The West presently is unable to cope with a failed state like Somalia, with less than a tenth as many military-age men as Pakistan, but which nonetheless constitutes a threat to world shipping and a likely source of funding for terrorism. How can the West cope with the humiliation of Pakistan's pro-American president and the inability of its duly-constituted government to suppress Islamist elements in its army and intelligence services? For the moment, Washington will do its best to prop up its creature, President Asif Ali Zardari, but to no avail. The alternatives will require the West to add several zeros to whatever the prevailing ceiling might be for acceptable collateral damage.

The hottest place in the world!

By M H Ahssan & John Wilson

During the recently concluded American elections, vice president-elect Joe Biden made the widely criticized point that president-elect Barack Obama would be tested very soon after ascending to the job. It appears from recent events that his particular prophesy has been fulfilled, and rather earlier than even he had imagined, namely, even before Obama takes on the job of president. It may be no exaggeration to point out that much like September 11, 2001, charted the course of the George W Bush administration, the Mumbai massacre on Thanksgiving 2008 could well chart the course of the Obama presidency.

Firm evidence with respect to the participation of Pakistani government agents in the latest terrorist outrage in Mumbai that left nearly 200 people dead is still unavailable as I write this article; however, the apparent presence of a naval vessel carrying the terrorists to the city's shore as well as the targeting of patently Western and Jewish people in Mumbai points outside the pattern of terrorism that Mumbai has witnessed thus far; namely that of killing locals in mass numbers through the use of explosive devices planted on taxis and trains. I return to the failures of the Indian government in the second half of this article, after first dealing with the immediate consequences for Pakistan should the involvement of its citizens be proven over the near term.

There is a second possibility that I discussed with my Asia Times Online colleague Spengler, namely that the attacks on Mumbai were a response to the anti-piracy actions of the Indian navy that resulted in the sinking of a Somali pirate mother ship last week. The mother ship was a Thai fishing trawler that the pirates had seized a short while before. It is not much of a secret that Somali pirates are well aligned with al-Qaeda for their training and weapons; it is also possible that an important al-Qaeda functionary was killed in the Indian attack.

Based on the complicated set of facts in front of us, it seems logical for now to conclude that the Mumbai operations were the product of meticulous planning and action taken almost exclusively by non-locals to prevent the risk of information leaking to Indian police if locals had been taken into confidence. The most logical source of such people would be the Islamic terrorist continuum operating under the auspices of al-Qaeda and loosely aligned with renegade elements of the Pakistani government itself, namely the Inter-Services Intelligence or ISI; the notorious state-within-state.

Much as everyone discusses the carnage in Mumbai, I cannot escape the feeling that execution was hurried along; the use of even a slightly larger force with more deadly weapons could well have created a multiplication of damage and casualties in Mumbai. That suggests that the operation was executed prematurely: precisely what one should expect if planners had somehow suspected being exposed and their carefully planned actions aborted entirely. It is for this reason that I suspect the Pakistani government’s actions against the ISI as the primary trigger for this terrorist attack.

From a longer-term perspective, it shocks me that more Western agencies including the US and UK governments do not take full cognizance of the size of the challenge in Pakistan. US neo-conservatives for example highlight Iran as the major threat to the planet, despite the fact that its 60 million people are relatively well-off, demographically in decline and most importantly a Shi'ite people surrounded by inimical Sunni groups.

In contrast, Pakistan is a country possessing nuclear weapons and hosting over 150 million people skewed towards the young. Its share of young, unemployed and restless people with a penchant for religious extremism since the early 1980s has steadily risen to the point where calling the country the leading breeding center for terrorism globally wouldn’t be too far-fetched. All of these factors have led to the undermining of civilian government, while the country's elite slide into accommodation with religious fanatics from al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

A few weeks back, I wrote an article (Triangulating an Asian conflict Asia Times Online, September 6, 2008 ) that discussed the potential for Pakistan slipping deeply into the Taliban sphere of operations, in turn imperiling its neighbors, including most urgently India and less probably China over the longer term. What looked like a thesis has now come fully into the realm of probability.

Thus, the indomitable force of Islamic fundamentalism that emerges from Pakistan will have to confront the immovable objects of Han and Hindu resurgence. It is well likely that the first course of action will be against the well known enemy of India rather than the scarier opponent in China, but that is a relatively minor detail in that it only applies over the relative near term.

Of course, the primary thrust of that article was not so much the existence of these threats, but the regional media's casual disregard for the security situation with column inches being devoted instead to the wardrobe choices of the Republican vice-presidential nominee, Sarah Palin. In that article, I juxtaposed the emerging Taliban threat to Pakistan in the context of its worsening economic fundamentals, even as the resurgence of Hindu nationalism made the idea of rapprochement unattainable.

One of the key changes ushered in by President Asif Ali Zardari was the broadening of ties with India, leaving out for now the thorny issue of Kashmir but focusing instead on improving trade and infrastructure while making a common cause against Islamic terrorists. This made sense not only because Zardari owed his ascent to the assassination of his wife, former premier Benazir Bhutto, but also because sidelining the army by achieving peace with India would help to secure his own future.

Proceeding in that vein, and acting finally on a key recommendation by the US government that had been made as early as 2006, earlier last week it emerged that the "political" wing of the ISI had been disbanded. Now of course, much of the ISI isn't supposed to exist in the first place, therefore one uses ground contacts to determine just how serious such changes actually are; in this case it appears that the government's action was seen as a stinging slap on the face of the ISI by effectively rendering the organization captive to the policies and actions of the government in power rather than being determined by its own senior cadre of advisors and agents as had been done previously.

In effect, disbanding the political wing of the ISI was seen as a move for the Pakistani government to take direct charge of ISI activities, and stop being hostage to the machinations of the ISI itself. In the past, the political wing of the ISI was thought to be responsible for the removal of Benazir Bhutto, the trial by fire of Nawaz Sharif, the removal of president General Pervez Musharraf and most recently the assassination of Benazir Bhutto herself. It was for this reason that the ISI took great pains to ensure that her death was blamed on an accident (head hitting the door handle) rather than an assassin's bullets because the difference is the one between martyrdom and destiny.

(The existence of such a political organization that in effect polices the government on behalf of a sinister group of senior insiders is something of a puzzle in democracies across the Western world but is a matter of resigned acceptance in many countries including Russia and most communist countries including China and Vietnam. Across the Islamic world such political wings are active in countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran under the guise of the religious police.)

For all intent and purposes it appears that the operations against targets in Mumbai were planned months in advance for execution at an appropriate time; the direct action of the Pakistani government against the ISI may have provided just such a trigger. It is also possible that the anger of al-Qaeda at India for the loss of a pirate mother ship in the past two weeks was a factor in pushing the action.

Whatever the reason for the "Go" command, the more disturbing elements are the implications for the Pakistani government itself. It is unlikely that the governments of the US, UK, Israel and India will take the involvement of agents within the Pakistani government in the Mumbai bombings lightly. However, that anger is beside the point because it is not clear to me that the Pakistani government can actually survive any course of action against these embedded agents.

With its credibility badly damaged in the eyes of the world, the government will have to rush towards a compromise position with the very people it sought to dislodge, namely forces friendly to Islamic terrorism within the agencies of the government including the army and the ISI. In return for promises of going easy, the government would get nominal visibility in future plans.

Then-president Musharraf came to a similar arrangement in the months following 9/11 and US actions against Afghanistan. In return for face-saving bans on terrorist outfits that gathered funds and hired Pakistanis for their operations, he allowed the outfits to expand their soft programs, including Islamic education, pushing back women's rights and broadening the run of the Taliban in border areas with Afghanistan. This worked for a reasonable period of time until finally the US government lost patience with the foot-dragging on operations against al-Qaeda/Taliban fighters nesting within Pakistan. That in turn caused the Americans to act against Musharraf, and bring in Bhutto, albeit with unimaginable consequences for the latter.

In all this, there was also a history lesson that was completely missed, namely the events of 1999 when then prime minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, proposed peace; this led his then head of the army Musharraf and a handful of top officers to plot the onset of a war with India by using irregular units of the Pakistani army in the guise of Islamic militants that attacked a forward Indian army unit in Kashmir; the resulting battle led not only to a threat of a nuclear strike by Pakistan but also eventually to the replacement of Sharif by Musharraf, after Sharif was forced to settle for peace by the US and other countries for the illegal actions of the army.

What is different this time around is that instead of the army being at loggerheads with the government, a small group within the ISI appears to have achieved the ability to destabilize both the government and the Pakistani army. For security experts, this was an obvious conclusion to reach when Musharraf was pushed out of power, and when Zardari started his peacemaking routine with India. My discomfort stems from the fact that no one in power across the US and India saw it coming.

To any dispassionate observer, it is easy to conclude that Pakistan is now a failed state on the lines of Somalia and Afghanistan where the government writ runs only in limited areas while everywhere else in the country is dominated by warlords. The only national institution in Pakistan is its army, although the push against Musharraf and the actions of the Taliban against specific army units point to cracks within that could well result in final breakdown of its command structure. It goes without saying that only the al-Qaeda/Taliban combine stand to take advantage of such a breakdown of the army command structure, using the opportunity to seize control of nuclear weapons.

Now, just to state the obvious from my perspective, there isn't anything particularly bad about people belonging to a particular religion or ethnic group securing nuclear weapons capability. The problem with al-Qaeda and the Taliban taking control of these weapons of mass destruction though are that the groups put the survival of their own people second to the achievement of longer-term principles. This casual disregard for the lives of their own people - well witnessed in Afghanistan, Iraq and other theaters of al-Qaeda/Taliban operations - is what makes the idea of them seizing nuclear weapons so much more of a strategic nightmare.

Seeing the events of the Thanksgiving massacre unfold in Mumbai, I was reminded of an awful joke from Israeli television during the first Gulf War in 1990, after Saddam Hussein launched daily Scud missile attacks on the Jewish state. Told that the wild targeting and the inbuilt inaccuracy of the Scud missiles meant that the chances of anyone actually dying from such an attack were broadly the same as winning the national lottery, one comic deadpanned, "Yes, but you didn't tell me there were so many draws every day."

That sick joke must have gone through the minds of more than one person in Mumbai over the past few days as the latest attacks add to the recent history of terrorism against people in the city that started with the serial bombings of 1993 that killed more than a thousand people. More recently, there have been sporadic attacks using bombs in taxis and trains that have killed over 500 people.

A security expert on television made the point that the terrorists had chosen soft targets such as hotels and hospitals, but this comment only caused me to laugh mirthlessly. For it appears to me that the Indian government long ago beat the terrorists to that job, by making not just Mumbai but other big Indian cities also soft targets for terrorism.

In the months after 9/11 in the US, as well as the terrorist attacks on Madrid it became clear that the ultimate objective of al-Qaeda and its related groups was to destabilize multi-ethnic democracies everywhere. Being the only one of its kind in Asia, it would have been foolhardy for India not to see itself as a target even before taking into account specific issues such as the simmering Kashmir insurgency, its relative proximity to the US and lastly the large Muslim population that lives in its secular rather than theocratic framework that directly challenges the orthodox ideology of al-Qaeda.

Yet and almost alone among all such democracies, the Indian government refused to change its homeland security apparatus in the months following the terrorist attacks on the Indian parliament in 2001, as well as deeper provocations such as the attacks on Mumbai in later months.

There is no national body coordinating counter-terrorist intelligence across state lines; this would be tragic in a monolingual country like the United States but completely unfathomable in a multi-ethnic multilingual country like India. There is no apparent infrastructure to enable responses to crisis situations that aren’t conventional military attacks such as the Kargil war mentioned previously in this article.

Much has been made of the commercial importance of Mumbai, a fact that even economists like me only understand when looking at the domicile of India’s largest companies and its richest people. An overwhelming majority of India's richest 100 people live and work in Mumbai, a journalist friend recently pointed out that over a quarter of the country’s revenue from taxing salaries arose from companies domiciled in this one city.

In any other emerging market leave alone democracy, Mumbai would automatically have been accorded protected status with governments bending over backwards to improve infrastructure and ensure security. None of these things have happened though, due to the curious and illogical domination of the Indian political spectrum by communists. As I wrote in another article for Asia Times Online (India’s real terrorists May 17, 2008), the role of communists in pushing back efforts to modernize and protect Mumbai cannot be overstated.

Israel's Defense Minister Ehud Barak made the point on Friday that India's special forces unit that dealt with the siege at the top hotels in Mumbai did not appear to be well prepared, nor could they be considered sufficiently well trained for such complex operations. This is a matter not just of concern for Indians, but also an invitation to question the absence of coordination with security experts from Israel and the United States. Interestingly, while India is one of the largest buyers of defense equipment from Israel, it has thus far failed to secure much training in anti-terrorism from Israeli and American experts.

The reason isn't hard to find - efforts to enlarge such cooperation with Israel and the United States inevitably run into opposition from a motley crew of communists across the country. While their opposition to the US on ideological grounds is well known (as shown by the recent blocking of the nuclear deal with the US even though the positive effects of securing safe power stations running on nuclear fuel is obvious to any industrialist), it is interesting to note that protests against "Zionism" are usually led by the same communists. The arguments were first aired by the USSR at the height of the Cold War, and India’s communists are the only ones in the world to still subscribe to that world view.

Driven as much by envy of the industrious people of the city as by its relative prosperity and ability to attract the best talent from around the country, communists have steadily pushed against infrastructure improvements. Much of the security ills of the famously diverse city arise from the under-investment on infrastructure and inability to corral the criminal groups that operate openly in the city.

On the heels of this attack, India has once again made some cosmetic changes by replacing its most senior politician in charge of security with Finance Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram. Given that I have not been impressed with the country’s ability to manage its finances over the past five years, it is unlikely that the government will do much to improve.

There are only two courses of action open to the Indian government; firstly to launch a strike against Pakistan-based training camps for Islamic terrorists such as those belonging to the banned Laskhar-e-Taiba and the Jaish Mohammad; this course of action risks opening up a full scale war with Pakistan. The second course of action would for the government to do precisely nothing but to passively sit around awaiting another terrorist attack on the country’s citizens.

While I fear the first course of action, I am well inclined to believe that it is the second course of action that will most likely emerge. In terms of protecting the well-being of its citizens as I have noted previously on many occasions, India is not China.

As per the observations on this report, Pakistan's military age population is far greater than those of other Muslim military powers in the region. With about 20 million men of military age, Pakistan today has as much manpower as Turkey and Iran combined, and by 2035 it will have half again as many.

Half the country is illiterate and three-quarters of it subsists on less than $2 a day, according to the World Bank. That is to say that Pakistan's young men are more abundant as well as cheaper than in any other country in the region. Very poor and ignorant young men, especially if their only education has been in Salafi madrassas (seminaries), are very easy to enlist in military adventures.

The West presently is unable to cope with a failed state like Somalia, with less than a tenth as many military-age men as Pakistan, but which nonetheless constitutes a threat to world shipping and a likely source of funding for terrorism. How can the West cope with the humiliation of Pakistan's pro-American president and the inability of its duly-constituted government to suppress Islamist elements in its army and intelligence services? For the moment, Washington will do its best to prop up its creature, President Asif Ali Zardari, but to no avail. The alternatives will require the West to add several zeros to whatever the prevailing ceiling might be for acceptable collateral damage.

Saturday, August 08, 2015

Costliest Deal: Mumbai's Penthouse Sold For Rs.202 Crore

Even as Mumbai's real estate market reels under a stressful period with slowing sales velocity and with buyers sitting on the fence, waiting for prices to drop, a one-off deal in the island city's luxury market for Rs 202 crore is making headlines.

According to confirmed reports, a sea-facing triplex penthouse measuring 17,000 square feet in South Mumbai's Napean Sea Road has been sold to a prominent industrialist for a whopping Rs 202 crore. This works out to be one of the most expensive transactions in the country as the buyers is paying Rs 1.20 lakh per square foot.

The apartment is on the 20th, 21st and 22nd floors of the Residence, being built by the Runwal Group and offers views of the the Arabian Sea and the Queen's Necklace and has 21 car-parking slots as part of the transaction.

Friday, November 28, 2008

Indomitable spirit of Mumbaikars

By M H Ahssan & Alex D'souza

Mumbai citizens cannot be blamed for feeling that they are under continuous siege. People stayed up most of Wednesday night and spent Thursday shaken to the core by the ongoing reports of continued assaults. Schools, colleges and many offices were closed, the streets were deserted, the city was almost hiding from itself, it seemed. On Thursday morning, there were signs of life on the streets — buses running, taxis plying — but beneath that calm was a palpable numbness.

All this is completely understandable. The scale of the attack by the terrorists was not only unprecedented but also unimaginable. Terrorists with assault weapons were roaming the streets, shooting people at will in the heart of the city — the nerve centre of the city’s business district. Commuters and passengers at the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, people around Metro cinema, diners at Leopold CafĂ© and the residents and guests at Mumbai’s two most famous luxury hotels — the Oberoi and the Taj — were all victims. This is what we see in all those Bollywood films the city churns out in large numbers; no one thought that fiction would become a horrible fact of life. If Mumbai offers you one freedom more than any other Indian city, it is the freedom to wander around anywhere at anytime, at will and at whim. The terrorists stole this very basic cornerstone of Mumbai life from the citizens.

But after the numbness passes, Mumbai must wake up to realise that this theft of our spirit was only temporary. We cannot allow shameless terrorists to get away with their vile intentions. Mumbai has not been beaten by the bomb blasts of 1993 or the subsequent assaults by man and nature. At each point, the city has risen the next day — true, there is a compulsion too, since everyone must work for a living. But we do know that to succumb to fear will be to give in to what the terrorists want. The scale of this attack is horrendous, that is undeniable. The fact that the fight at the two hotels and at Nariman House continued through Thursday is also horrific. But this fear cannot be our ruling deity.

Here, the government has to do its duty to instil a sense of confidence. This is done in several ways, physical and psychological. Why close down the stock markets — they are a sign of confidence in not only the city but the country itself. Every effort must be made to get back to a normal routine even though we don’t know what “normal” will be any more. Will we now have to look around fearfully when we go to a restaurant? The trauma will not disappear, but we cannot let it weigh us down.

Through all the disasters that have visited Mumbai, the spirit of the Mumbaikar has asserted itself. After the flood of 2005, it was people who helped each other, opening their homes, hearts and bank balances. For all that Mumbai is called apathetic it is in fact a very giving city: it just does not wear its heart on its sleeve. But when the call comes, Mumbaikars rise to the occasion. It is that which we want to see, so that we can all take courage from each other and find that strength and determination to go on. The time has come for Mumbai to put its heart on display again. It is hurting, but it is still beating strong and true.

Tuesday, December 02, 2008

Mumbai Massacre Story Unfolds in Terrorist’s Interrogation

By Sherry Minto & Alex D'souza

For the past week, newspaper readers across the world gazed at photographs of the dark young man who, sack slung over his shoulder, was caught on closed-circuit camera minutes before he opened fire at commuters at a busy Mumbai railway station.

Based on interviews with key officers involved in the investigation and on the interrogation records of the terrorist, The Hindu has been able to assemble key parts of the story behind the face.

Mohammad Ajmal Amir Iman (wrongly identified earlier as Kamaal and Kasav) began his journey to Mumbai on September 15, 2008. He was part of a group of ten men who had spent months training in marine combat and navigation skills in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and Punjab.

Lashkar military commander Zaki-ur-Rahman Lakhvi, Iman has told investigators, showed them detailed maps of south Mumbai, and films of the targets they had been tasked to hit. Iman and his partner ‘Abu Umar’ — whose name, he learned, was in fact Mohammad Ismail — were tasked with attacking the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus.

Iman and the other terrorists were set to leave for Mumbai on September 27.

For reasons he claims to be unaware of, they were ordered to hold back. Late on November 22, Lakhvi finally gave the team a heads-up. At 4:15 a.m. on November 23, Iman and Ismail rowed out to sea along with four other groups: men Iman knew as Abu Akasha and Abu Umar; ‘Bada’ [Big] Abdul Rehman and Abu Ali; ‘Chhota’ [small] Abdul Rehman and Afadullah; Shoaib and Umar.

Each man was equipped with a Kalashnikov rifle and 200 rounds of ammunition and grenades. The group also had at least one state-of-the art Garmin global positioning system set, and several mobile phones fitted with SIM cards, which have now been determined to have been purchased in Kolkata and New Delhi. Three men had larger bags, packed with five timer-controlled Improvised Explosive Devices.

Near Indian coastal waters, the men hijacked a fishing boat. On reaching Mumbai, they rowed the last few nautical miles to Budhwar Park in an inflatable dinghy. From Budhwar Park, they travelled on to their targets by hailing taxis. Iman and Ismail reached CST as planned, and opened fire on the assembled commuters. While Ismail was killed when policemen at the site returned fire, braving grenades thrown at them, Iman was injured and is now in the Mumbai hospital.

Mumbai police officials were able to defuse two of the IEDs planted at the Taj Mahal hotel and a third at the Oberoi hotel, even as fighting broke out. This police action saved dozens of lives. However, two bombs went off in taxis used by the group, possibly after being abandoned in the vehicles.

Iman has told interrogators that right through the fighting, the Lashkar headquarters remained in touch with the group, calling their phones through a voice-over-internet service. In all likelihood, Indian investigators were able to intercept these calls, which would then form part of a compelling body of evidence to corroborate Iman’s account. In addition, Mumbai police sources said, investigators have succeeded in reconstructing the group’s journey through the Garmin GPS set that has been seized.

Friday, October 21, 2011

Importing Efficiency: Can Lessons from Mumbai's Dabbawalas Help Its Taxi Drivers?

Mumbai has 150,000 licensed taxi drivers. It has 5,000 dabbawalas, organized porters who carry cooked lunches to office workers. The former, along with about 450,000 auto-rickshaw (three-wheeler taxi) drivers, are constantly in the news for reports of bad behavior, overcharging and even violence. The dabbawalas, on the other hand, are icons of efficiency. They have even made it to the Harvard Business Review as a case study.

Taxis are vital to the city, as public buses cannot cope with rider demand. Mumbai’s local trains transport more than 6 million people each day, according to figures provided by the Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation (MSRDC). At the station of embarkation from the local train, many commuters take a share-a-cab (four to a taxi) to reach their final destination. Anthony Quadros, president of the Mumbai Taximen’s Union, estimates that there are 1.2 million regular taxi users in Mumbai. In this city, nothing is certain but death and taxis.

The dabbawalas don’t have an equivalent in other cities. The 100-year-old organization takes cooked food from people’s homes and supply centers (which could be a housewife-turned-home entrepreneur) and delivers the meals to offices. In this realm, a mistake carries stiff consequences, particularly because religion dictates which foods many people can or can't eat. But the dabbawalas are very close to a no-mistake regime and they have built a great deal of trust.

“The dabbawalas even carry forgotten spectacles and mobile phones,” says Pawan Agrawal, CEO of the Mumbai Dabbawala Education Centre, an offshoot of the Dabbawala Association. “Sometimes, customers even send home their salary with the empty tiffin box. That’s customer service.” Agrawal, who is a spokesperson for the dabbawalas and has done a study on the group's logistics and supply chain management efforts, says that the number of customers in Mumbai has crossed 200,000.

On a superficial level, the two cohorts seem to have a lot in common. Both come from marginalized and oppressed socio-economic groups. Their average education is up to the eighth grade. They belong to a low-skill, working class category and service the city’s middle class. Why, then, are the two groups' reputations so radically distinct?

“The difference stems from the difference in their cultural backgrounds,” says Ramesh Kamble, a professor of sociology at Mumbai University. In India, there are still some professions that are dominated by certain communities. In many Indian cities -- Delhi and Kolkata, for instance -- taxis are run by owner-operators and there traditionally was a preponderance of turbaned Sikhs from Punjab. Today, particularly in Mumbai where the people tend to be a shade more entrepreneurial and adventurous, many of those drivers have moved away, some to the U.S. and Canada.

In Mumbai, most of the taxi drivers are now migrants from the north Indian states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh (UP). This springs into public consciousness every time the parochial political parties in the state start a “Maharashtra for Maharashtrians” campaign. The first target of the agitating mobs is often the taxi driver. The dabbawallas, on the other hand, belong. According to Agrawal, all but six of the 5,000 dabbawalas come from a particular community of Maharashtrians.

“North India is extremely feudal, with a hierarchical and patriarchal culture. Reclaiming that culture becomes necessary to find space in that group at the place of migration,” says Kamble. “However, in Maharashtra, since the 1920s we have had various kinds of movements, such as the textile workers’ movement, the Dalit [low caste] movement and the feminist movement. The dabbawalas are also deeply influenced by the Bhakti [devotion] movement. Their efficiency is not entirely a management marvel; it is rooted in their cultural values. The same work ethic exists among porters at Mumbai’s railway stations because these working classes have similar cultural contexts.”

But not all seem to agree with the cultural hypothesis. Stefan H. Thomke, a professor of business administration at Harvard Business School and author of a case study titled, "The Dabbawala System: On Time Delivery, Every Time," believes that while the fact that new members are recruited from 30 villages in and around Pune contributes to the organization’s performance, there are many other critical factors that reinforce each other and must be considered. “Most importantly, the dabbawala’s performance can only be understood if we study the entire system -- their culture, management, organization and processes -- and how these factors interact with each other,” Thomke notes. “You cannot copy one single factor ... and hope to replicate performance without regard to others.”

The dabbawalas themselves say that the charge of being a non-inclusive organization is misplaced. Most people believe that you need to belong to the Warkari Sampraday (loosely translated as the Pilgrim Group) to be a dabbawala. Not true, according to Agrawal. The only recruitment criterion is a “guarantee” -- essentially, a verbal assurance of the candidate’s character -- by an existing member. “Most people tend to refer their friends or family members who belong to the same community. It has just worked out like that.”

Advantages of Community
But Agrawal says having employees from the same community has several benefits. “Our values, inclinations and psychology are similar. So there is better understanding and teamwork," he notes. "It doesn’t require talent; it’s just common sense. We wouldn’t be Six-Sigma certified without that coordination. In fact, since we began with one customer and one dabba [lunchbox] in 1890, this has become almost like a family business.”

Quadros of the taxi drivers' union says the one-community culture makes it easier for leaders to manage and retain their employees. “We don’t have that kind of control over our taxi drivers. It’s very difficult, especially with the newer generation.... They drive taxis for about five to 10 years, earn what they can and then do something else. They have no interest in the taxi trade or helping to improve it. The dabbawalas are not migrants; that helps.”

But Varsha Ayyar, an assistant professor in the School of Management and Labor Studies at the Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS), notes that even migrant groups have a sense of community. There is also a tendency to join the same profession when they come into a city. Working with others from the same village gives migrants a sense of security when they first arrive. They help to get them a job; a construction worker would be most cognizant of vacancies in his field, for example. And they act as informal mentors, particularly when the newcomer is a relative. In Mumbai, there is a large area known as Sonar Bangla in which illegal Bangladeshis have settled. They number several hundred thousand and tend to stick together.

Migration doesn’t explain everything, continues Ayyar. “The difference is that dabbawalas have more of a sense of autonomy and accountability. The system itself demands that,” she says. “Taxi drivers [in Mumbai] are often not owners of the taxis; there is no sense of ownership and they have to make a minimum amount of money each day, even if it means tampering with the meter.” According to Quadros, taxi drivers are vulnerable. If a driver parks illegally, or merely in the wrong spot, to drop off or pick up a passenger, he often has to bribe the police if caught. Regular extortion for real or imagined transgressions means that drivers must earn more than what is registered on the meter. Fights with passengers, who often know what the exact fare should be, are inevitable. And this adds to the atmosphere of acrimony.

Sense of Social Coherence
But Bino Paul GD, an associate professor at the TISS School of Management and Labor Studies, attributes part of the culture of the dabbawalas to their tremendous sense of social coherence with the city -- they live with their families, eat home-cooked meals and lead respectable lives. “Those factors are more important than community. Taxi drivers have none of these advantages. That seriously affects their morale,” says Paul. Taxi drivers often live in slums with 10 or 15 people to a room. Working conditions are tough -- as mentioned earlier, among the toughest in the world. They don’t have parking space or restrooms. “A lot of them belong to religious minorities,” notes Paul. “They lead anonymous, invisible lives compared to the dabbawalas.”

Then why become a taxi driver at all? That’s a question that could be asked in any large city. “Reservation wage,” says Paul, using a theory from labor economics. “That is the market wage below which people won’t enter the labor force. The reservation wage of Maharashtrians is much higher than that of taxi drivers. Also, there are push and pull factors that facilitate migration. Poverty is a major push factor.”

It’s a tough life. Taxi drivers work 12 to 16 hours a day, seven days a week. They make around US$60 to US$100 a month. Dabbawalas work nine hours a day, six days a week and make US$160 to $US180 a month. They supplement that income by US$80 to US$100 per month doing other jobs, such as delivering newspapers or milk. Some are also part-time taxi drivers. “For [dabbawalas], work is worship,” Agrawal says, citing the group’s credo, “We believe that by serving food, we are serving God. We don’t work for money.”

For the taxi driver, money is a key frustration. “[If a driver doesn’t get enough fares], he gets angry,” Quadros notes, adding that the formula for calculating taxi fares has not been revised by the government since 1996.The taxi drivers’ job, by its very nature, means moving from place to place. Toward the end of a shift, the driver has to maneuver to get back where he started from. In Mumbai, taxis are on the roads 24 hours a day, with one driver replacing the other when his duty is over. The dabbawala on the other hand has a fixed route; his schedule is as regular as a newspaper carrier's. He can tell you where he will be at any given time. The regularity makes for discipline, experts say.

But what about the sheer numbers of taxi drivers as compared with the dabbawalas? Does this have anything to do with their group behavior? Paul of TISS does not think so. “That there are so many more taxi drivers than dabbawalas is not relevant to how well they are able to enforce discipline. When it comes to property rights in terms of ownership or control over vehicles, power lies in a few hands. There are a few [people] that regulate the whole activity, a collective of some interest.”

According to Paul, whether it is taxi drivers or dabbawalas, power structures exist within both organizations. The only difference, he points out, is that dabbawalas have a more formal power structure that is known to everybody. In the case of taxi drivers, there are multi-stakeholder informal power structures.

Is there anything that the taxi drivers can learn from the dabbawalas? Harvard's Thomke views the groups' divergent behavior as a nature vs. nurture battle. “I believe that nature is one input, among many inputs, but it is the nurture -- or the system -- that explains excellent service performance." While he is unfamiliar with the Mumbai taxi trade, Thomke suggests a thought experiment: if the dabbawalas were to run the taxi system, what would they change?

Agrawal says that the taxi drivers' basic organizational structure should be reconsidered. The dabbawalas have several hundred group leaders that are the core of the organization. Each heads groups of 10 to 25 members and is responsible for all their activities. “How can one leader control and be responsible for thousands of drivers?” asks Agrawal. “They should make groups of 20 to 30 drivers reporting to a leader who can properly manage them and inculcate values of honesty and efficiency.”

But Quadros doesn’t think that approach will work. “It is difficult to imbibe the best practices of the dabbawalas,” he says. “Even if I hold a meeting, very few people will show up.”

Saturday, March 30, 2013

'Too Many Spooks Spoil The Case'

Liaquat Shah’s case is a symptom of the colossal anti-terror mess. Dozens of agencies, turf wars, power centres, crossed wires. Is the NCTC the answer?

On22 March New Delhi woke up and counted its blessings. Officers of the Delhi Police Special Cell claimed they had averted a major terror strike by arresting Hizbul Mujahideen commander Liaquat Shah on the Indo-Nepal border near Gorakhpur in Uttar Pradesh. A cache of arms and ammunition, including AK rifles and grenades, too had allegedly been recovered from a guesthouse in old Delhi. As 24×7 news channels showed a haggard-looking man, shouting his innocence, in the grip of gun-toting Special Cell men, the National Capital Region and perhaps the whole country heaved a sigh of relief. Memories of the twin blasts that rocked Hyderabad on 21 February were still fresh in their minds.

The police claimed that Liaquat, a resident of Kupwara in Jammu & Kashmir, had slipped into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir in 1997 and received arms training. They said Liaquat had returned to oversee a terror attack to avenge the hanging of 2001 Parliament attack convict Afzal Guru.

The terror story ruled the airwaves for a few hours before it exploded in Delhi Police’s face. As soon as news of Liaquat’s arrest went public, his family and the J&K Police debunked Delhi Police’s claims. According to the J&K Police, Liaquat was a reformed militant coming home to start a new life. His relatives claimed they had notified the cops on 5 February 2011 about Liaquat’s planned surrender. The route that he had taken, entering India through Nepal, is the most preferred one for reformed militants and many who availed of the state’s surrender policy had used it.

J&K Police also claimed that two policemen had gone to Gorakhpur to pick up 9-10 people, including Liaquat, and had kept the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Delhi Police in the loop. When the handover happened, the J&K Police allege that the Delhi Police didn’t allow them to take Liaquat into custody. Two days later, he was paraded as a terror mastermind.

However, a Delhi Police officer begged to differ and made some counter-claims.

• If the J&K Police had received the surrender application in February 2011, then why did they file an FIR against Liaquat in March for waging war against the nation?
• Why is the J&K Police refusing to reveal the identity of the two personnel who had gone to pick up the contingent?

The Delhi cop also wondered whether his colleagues were foolish enough to jeopardise an operation in which both the IB and the J&K Police were kept in the loop.

The Kashmir Valley, which was already reeling under curfews imposed after Guru’s hanging, erupted in protest. Chief Minister Omar Abdullah was quick to remind the Centre that Liaquat’s arrest might deal a big blow to its flagship programme aimed at bringing back reformed militants who had crossed over to POK. PDP leader Mehbooba Mufti added that Kashmiris are nabbed without evidence and treated as fodder for rewards and medals.

Two days after Omar made the demand, the Union home ministry announced that the National Investigation Agency (NIA) will probe the curious case of Liaquat.

This is not the first time such claims and counter-claims have exposed the lack of coordination between various intelligence agencies. And it won’t be the last.

As a home ministry official puts it, “Intelligence agencies have a ruthless desire to put one’s interest before everything and make sure they get all the credit. The nation’s interest can go to hell for all they care.”

So, how does one explain Liaquat’s arrest? Was it due to a bad intelligence input or an insatiable greed on the part of the security agencies to have a terror arrest against their names so that their annual confidential report looks good? There are close to 23 security agencies, 35 state anti-terror cells and special units operating in India on hundreds of cases in which people have been branded as terrorists, only to be found innocent after a trial extending from five years to eternity. By that time, the officer concerned has moved on in his life, with a gallantry medal pinned on his chest for exemplary courage. INN has relentlessly chronicled the plight of such innocents, who were falsely implicated. INN has also tracked the alarming chaos and difficulties faced by India’s anti-terror establishment. 

When P Chidambaram took over as home minister after the 26/11 attacks, it was seen as a welcome relief. He touted the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) as a magic wand that will rid Indian intelligence agencies of their turf wars. Four years later, the NCTC has turned out to be the biggest bone of contention between the Centre and the states. The fate of Chidambaram’s pet project will be known at the internal security meeting of the chief ministers to be held in Delhi on 15 April. So, with the NCTC’s dilution, are we once again taking one step forward and two steps back in the fight against terror?

“If everybody in the intelligence community had shared inputs, 70 percent of the terror attacks would not have taken place,” says an intelligence officer. “But then, given the stakes involved, it is also asking for the impossible.” This sums up the attitude of the intelligence agencies, who are busy fighting a turf war rather than the war against terror.

When two blasts rocked Dilsukhnagar, a crowded locality in Hyderabad, on 23 February, terror made its first visit to India in 2013. The twin blasts killed 17 people and injured more than 100. What followed was something that has played out again and again after every terror attack.

Within no time, the Union home ministry issued a statement that it had shared intelligence inputs with the Andhra Pradesh government, which they “failed” to assess and act upon. Not wanting to be left out of the action, Delhi Police Special Cell officers told friendly journalists that two Indian Mujahideen (IM) operatives had confessed in late 2012 that Dilsukhnagar was one of the areas where they had done a recce. The officers claimed they had passed on the information. But the AP Police rubbished those claims, saying the intel inputs were not that specific.

Forty-eight hours later, the NIA took over the probe. A crucial piece of information emerged when CCTV footage revealed a man visiting the spot on a bicycle. He was seen leaving a bag and fleeing just minutes before the blasts. Going by the modus operandi, the NIA suspect that IM operatives Tabrez and Waqas, who were part of the 13/7 Mumbai attack, had a hand in this operation as well.

However, 12 days before the blasts, something interesting had happened in Mumbai. On 11 February, the Mumbai Anti- Terror Squad (ATS) had announced a reward of 10 lakh each for information on four IM operatives alleged to be behind various terror strikes across India in the past couple of years, including the 2012 Pune blasts. They were Yasin Bhatkal, the founder-leader of IM and one of India’s most-wanted terrorists, Asadullah Akhtar alias Tabrez, Waqas alias Ahmed and Tahseen alias Raju bhai. For a long time it was believed that Tabrez and Waqas were Pakistanis, but the Mumbai ATS claimed that they were, in fact, Indians.

But the Mumbai ATS failed to disclose that had it not been for a major goof-up, involving the Delhi Police, IB and Mumbai ATS, three out of the four IM operatives would have been behind bars and maybe the lives of the 16 people in Hyderabad could have been saved.

Chronicles of a Terror Foretold
Five cases where lack of coordination among the security agencies cost the country dear 

1. Hyderabad 2013 The 21 February blasts in Hyderabad could have been averted if the Mumbai Police had not arrested Naqi Ahmed Wasi in January 2012. Wasi, a Delhi Police informer, was on the verge of leading the police to Indian Mujahideen operatives Waqas and Tabrez, when he was nabbed for his alleged role in the 2011 serial blasts that rocked Mumbai. Security agencies suspect that Waqas and Tabrez were instrumental in the Hyderabad blasts

2. Kolkata 2009 Indian Mujahideen founder-leader Yasin Bhatkal was arrested by the Kolkata Police in 2009 on charges of carrying fake currency. But he was set free after only a month in jail as he could convince the police that his arrest was a case of mistaken identity. Unfortunately, the police had no way of cross-checking with a national database

3. Mumbai 2008 Despite having concrete intelligence, the investigators could not join the dots, leading to audacious terror attacks on 26/11. The Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) knew of the training and sea movements of Lashkare- Toiba terrorists and the IB had a list of 35 cell phone numbers, but those leads were not pursued. The role of the Mumbai ATS also came under the scanner for its inability to access the information

4. Kargil 1999 The IB had 45 specific intelligence inputs. The most concrete input received in June 1998 said that Pakistan was building bunkers, but it was not shared with everybody. The then RAW chief Girish Saxena was livid enough to put his displeasure on record, saying that the turf war had cost the country dear

5. Purulia 1995 In the Purulia arms drop case, where automatic weapons and ammunition were dropped from an aircraft in West Bengal to be used by a militant group, RAW had the information at least a week prior to the incident. “We gave the information to the home ministry 4-5 days in advance. The ministry sent it by registered post to Calcutta,” says a former RAW official

On 20 November 2011, the Delhi Police Special Cell announced that they had busted a homegrown terror module and arrested six people. They were Mohd Qateel Siddiqi, Mohd Irshad Khan, Gauhar Aziz Khomani, Gayur Ahmed Jamali and Abdul Rahman (all from Bihar) and Mohd Adil (from Karachi). This module was allegedly behind the terror attacks at German Bakery in Pune, Chinnaswamy Stadium in Bengaluru and the Jama Masjid in Delhi.

It was a joint operation by the Delhi Police Special Cell and the IB, but what was not revealed in the press conference was the identity of the seventh person, Naqi Ahmed Wasi Shaikh, who was also arrested. Naqi was a resident of Darbhanga district in Bihar and owned a leather-processing unit in Byculla, Mumbai.

Naqi told the Special Cell that he knew about the hideout of Bhatkal and two other IM operatives in Mumbai and could lead the police to it. Though Bhatkal and his accomplice had vacated the place, they were yet to collect their advance of 1 lakh. The Special Cell had put the phone line of Rubina, the landlady, on surveillance. On 1 January, they got a lucky breakthrough when one of the “Pakistanis” made a call to Rubina, who asked him to call back in an hour. The suspect called after three hours but Rubina told him that she needed more time to return the money. The call was traced to a phone booth in Dadar. The sleuths were confident that they were on the verge of effecting a big breakthrough.

On 23 January, the Mumbai ATS announced to the world that they have arrested two people from Bihar in connection with the 13/7 Mumbai blasts. One of them was Naqi. A stunned Special Cell then leaked the news that Naqi was their informer, triggering a war of words between the Special Cell and Mumbai ATS. The moment Naqi’s arrest was made public, all the clues simply disappeared.

This is touted as a classic case of how lack of coordination, inflated egos and the constant game of one-upmanship are compromising the fight against terror.

However, this was not the only embarrassing story that emerged out of that breakthrough. During the course of interrogation, the revelations made by Mohd Irshad stunned and embarrassed the Delhi Police. Irshad told them that Bhatkal had lived in New Delhi for 8-9 months in 2011.

Bhatkal was married to Irshad’s daughter and was living in the industrial belt of Meer Vihar, in west Delhi’s Nangloi area. When the police raided the area, they found a small ordnance and weapon factory. The locals told police that Irshad and Bhatkal mostly kept to themselves and didn’t interact much with others. The police believe that Bhatkal was in the city even after the 2011 Delhi High Court blast.

But if you thought that the intelligence agencies’ tryst with embarrassment and Bhatkal ended here, think again.

In late 2008, on an alert given by the IB, the Kolkata Special Task Force busted a fake currency racket and arrested Bhatkal. He claimed that he was Mohammad Ashraf from Darbhanga in Bihar and showed a voter’s ID card as proof. The address and other information checked out to be true. After a month in jail, he was let off.

However, when the footage of the German Bakery blast was released by the IB, the Kolkata Police was shocked to find that the person they thought was a petty thief was India’s most-wanted terrorist.

Intelligence officers and security experts agree that in cases like these, if even a little cooperation is extended, big results can be achieved. Bhatkal is not the only case where lack of coordination botched up the case, it’s just the latest.

“The 2006 Mumbai train blast is yet another example of how the lack of coordination led to this situation,” says a senior IB officer. “RAW was aware of the movement of the LeT module, which came to do the recce, and even the IB knew this. However, none of them shared the information with the higher-ups and therefore a golden chance was lost to prevent that attack.”

Months before the 1999 Kargil War, the IB had 45 specific intelligence inputs. In June 1998, the IB had intelligence that Pakistan was building bunkers but they did not share the information with anyone. The result was there for everyone to see.

The disconnect is also illustrated by Riyazuddin Nasir’s arrest. In 2008, a sub-inspector in Bengaluru saw Nasir carrying several car number plates and enquired about it. Unable to get a satisfactory reply, he booked him under a vehicle theft case. In a chance encounter, the SP crosschecked Nasir’s details with the IB, and found that they had arrested one of the country’s most-dreaded terrorists.
Even the 26/11 attacks, one of the most audacious that the country has ever seen, is not without its share of goof-ups.

“We had a lot of information about 26/11 and that too well in advance,” says SD Pradhan, former chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee and former deputy National Security Adviser (NSA). “In 2006, RAW knew that 150 LeT men were undergoing training in water tactics. In June 2008, we got inputs that the Taj Mahal hotel and Leopold CafĂ© were going to be attacked. But the biggest problem was that these inputs were with different agencies — RAW or IB or DIA. In mid-November, another input was given to the Coast Guard, Indian Navy and the Mumbai Police that 10-12 people were coming towards Mumbai from Karachi. They scanned the coast but didn’t find anything. Another alert was sounded on 19 November, but they thought they had already checked. There was plenty of intelligence to be acted upon. If only somebody had connected the dots.” Even these inputs were not shared with the NSA.

Incredibly, highly-placed sources have told INN that the cell phone numbers used by the 10 LeT terrorists were available with the IB at least five days before the attacks. The sources shared the contents of a ‘secret’ note that mentioned 35 cell phone numbers. Of the 35 SIM cards, 32 had been bought from Kolkata and three from New Delhi by LeT’s “overground workers”, and sent to POK by mid-November. The precise contents of the ‘secret’ note could not have been more direct. “The numbers given below have been acquired from Kolkata by overground workers and have been sent through Pakistan-trained militants based in Kashmir to POK,” the note said. “These numbers are likely to emerge in other parts of the country… and need to be monitored and the information taken from these numbers regarding the contents of the conversation and call detail records are required for further developing the information. The monitoring is possible at Kolkata.”

Sources reveal that this crucial piece of information was received by the IB on 21 November, at least five days before Ajmal Kasab and his nine accomplices got off the inflatable dinghies on the evening of 26/11. Both the prime minister and the home minister were aware that the numbers were available, but they were not being monitored. The lapse is all the more critical because at least three of the 32 numbers contained in the secret note were the exact same cell numbers that the terrorists used to keep in touch with their handlers in Pakistan. It is possible that the terrorists only activated their cell phone numbers after reaching Mumbai but why were the numbers not put under surveillance despite the knowledge that they had been sent to terrorists in POK?

Former Uttar Pradesh DGP Prakash Singh agrees that had a national commission like the one formed by the US after 9/11 been appointed by India after 26/11, several heads would have rolled.

After 26/11, the then home minister Shivraj Patil resigned and Chidambaram took charge and advocated the NCTC’s formation. However, the plan ran into rough weather. It was scuttled by at least seven non-Congress CMs. The biggest stumbling block proved to be the NCTC’s power structure. That it would be reporting to the IB director and have the power to arrest people without informing the local police made non-Congress CMs see red. After stiff objection, the Centre decided to place the NCTC under the home ministry and clarified that whenever any arrest is made, it will inform the local police. Besides, the DGPs of respective states will be on the NCTC board, so that any action will have their consent or be in their knowledge.

When Sushil Kumar Shinde took over, he sounded out a conciliatory message that until all the CMs’ concerns are addressed, the NCTC won’t become a reality.

Experts like Pradhan feel that since the Indian model of NCTC has been borrowed lock, stock and barrel from the US, there was no need for Chidambaram to change it. The US NCTC makes it abundantly clear that the agency will have no power to arrest or assume operational responsibilities. “The NCTC is a very powerful body. The states are legitimately worried. Only the KGB had the power to arrest and needless to add, it was grossly misused,” he says.

VK Singh, former Joint Secretary (technical wing), RAW, narrates how multiple agencies work at cross-purposes. “After I took over, I had a chat with the army. We knew what equipment the Pakistan and Chinese forces were using and I offered to exchange information. When I told my superiors, they didn’t buy the idea.

“The aim of the NTRO (National Technical Research Organisation) was to bring all technical resources under one umbrella. Everyone is doing the same job, monitoring radio or microwave link. Besides duplication, it’s resulting in a wastage of effort. The aim almost became a reality during APJ Abdul Kalam’s time but RAW refused to play ball. The IB and army also did the same and we were back to square one.”

But former RAW chief Vikram Sood questions the very need for NCTC. “Whenever we are in a crisis, we create a new agency,” he says. “After 1962, we had the ARC and SSF. After the Mizo mess in 1965- 66, we created RAW. In 1971, we won the Bangladesh war, so nothing was created.

In 1999, after Kargil, we created the NTRO. After 26/11, the NCTC proposal came up, which has still not taken shape. Have you thought through the concept? It has to be a bottoms-up, not a top-down system.”

A serving senior IB officer agrees with the potential of misuse. “Even in the IB, there are various stories of misuse,” he says. “After 1977, the Shah Commission had documented the IB’s misuse during Emergency, and this is when the agency didn’t have any power to arrest. So you can understand the fear of these states when the powers of arrest and independent investigation are given to the IB.”

Security experts are also of the opinion that instead of creating more bureaucratic hurdles and agencies, the government should concentrate on beefing up the existing system. “How will the NCTC be helpful in preventing attacks?” asks noted security expert Ajai Sahni. “Show me anything the NCTC brings to the table that does not already exist in the IB or the Multi- Agency Centre (MAC). All they are doing is cannibalising existing institutions to create a new and weak institution. In a country with 1.2 billion people, how can you be successful when you have barely 300-400 people committed to anti-terror intelligence gathering in the IB?”

The crippling shortage of manpower in the IB is also manifest in the response of Minister of State, Home, RPN Singh in the Rajya Sabha on 12 February. Reflecting the apparent state of disarray, he said, “Despite a sanctioned strength of 26,867, the IB has only 18,795 personnel. Nearly 1,500 slots in the deputation quota could not be filled due to non-availability of suitable officers.”

The figures mean the IB is functioning with only 70 percent of the required manpower and the gap is increasing every year. The minister added that the “actual induction figures are much less because many selected candidates don’t turn up”.

But experts like Prakash Singh are in favour of setting up the NCTC as they feel that without it the individual agencies will keep indulging in turf wars. “If the states feel that the NCTC is encroaching on their territory, then why do they ask for Central forces after terror attacks?”

Intelligence experts also question the need for vesting investigative powers with the NCTC when the NIA already exists. The NIA was created in 2008 to ensure that all terror-related investigations are streamlined. Four years later, the NIA is still grappling with internal issues. The government’s seriousness about its creation can be gauged from the fact that the agency was initially operating out of a shopping mall in south Delhi. The agency also got a taste of the turf war during the probe into the 2011 Delhi High Court blast when the police was left fuming after the home ministry transferred the case to the NIA.

“A major flaw in the current proposal is that the sub-structures needed for the NCTC’s functioning have not been included,” says Pradhan. “It must be understood that the mere creation of the NCTC won’t suffice. Unless the sub-structures are created at the state and district levels, it won’t be able to function efficiently.

“There is a need to create district-level collation centres (under district police chiefs) for examining the collected inputs from thanas, which are needed for counter- terrorism. Such inputs should be sent to the subsidiary MACs for examination and integrating related information. These centres should be chaired by the state DGs to ensure that they are fully aware of the developments and place their resources for further action or developments of leads.”

Following the outrage over Liaquat’s arrest, the Centre has announced a new policy framework for the rehabilitation of surrendered militants, as the arrest is seen as a symbol of the lack of coordination among security agencies. In the coming months, the Centre is expected to consult with the states to firm up the policy.