Pakistan’s “good terrorists” are a hard-working lot, one must say. After barely a fortnight’s vacation forced on them by national mourning over the attacks by the “bad terrorists” who massacred 132 children in a Peshawar school, they are back in action – on the high seas and on the mountains of Jammu & Kashmir.
Their actions on the Samba international border – intended to provide a diversion for pushing push more of the “good terrorists” into this country – have been met with resolute retaliation by our defence forces, but they have nevertheless sent more of them by sea to try and find other routes to mayhem.
That the Coast Guard chased them and forced them to blow themselves up after failing to get them to surrender shows the level of determination in these jihadi forces.
Even though some reports have raised doubts about whether the Pakistani fishing vessel that ended up at the bottom of the Arabian Sea on 31 December may merely have been carrying contraband (diesel/liquor), the chances are that the boat carried explosives and/or people who were out to harm India. Simple reason: smugglers do not usually blow themselves up.
Also, the most important question is this: even assuming forensic evidence from the boat shows that it was merely carrying contraband, should the Indian Coast Guard have been proceeding on that assumption? The first duty of the police is to ensure that they do not get killed by rogues. So they are in the clear, any which way you see the issue.
On the other hand, if reports that another vessel from Pakistan was tailing the one that was blown up are true (read here), one cannot but shudder at the prospect of what risks the country would have been subjected to if the boat had been allowed to proceed further towards out coasts. Consider the dangerous possibilities: an explosives-laden vessel blowing up in Indian ports, or even near naval ships. A boatload of terrorists decanted on some Gujarat or Maharashtra shore for killing people a la 26/11? Especially, if the explosives can be triggered by remote control.
At the very least, we have to thank the Coast Guard for taking preventive action, even if it meant some collateral damage. It is impossible to avoid collateral damage in a war-like situation.
This is really the point: we are not formally at war with Pakistan, but we are always in a tense, war-like situation with them, since Pakistan’s aim is to use all means at its disposal to damage us by using so-called non-state actors. Terrorists always have the advantage of deciding the time and place of action; at best we, as defenders, can try and figure that out through better intelligence (which seems to have been the case here, for the National Technical Research Organisation (the electronic ear India uses to check what is crackling on potentially hostile mobile phones) did indicate some kind of nefarious activity was underway.
So to cast doubts on our own forces if they may occasionally get it wrong is not necessary. In fact, killing potential threats in the bud is a part of their brief. This is what ensures sound sleep for citizens.
The imperatives for India, as we already know, are eternal vigilance and improved intelligence. More than that, we need a crystal clear understanding of what the Pakistani deep state is all about – resolute antagonism to India. No matter what we think of civil society in Pakistan – they are just like us, they too want peace, etc – what matters in Pakistan is not civil society, but the army and the ISI and their band of “good terrorists.”
This is not going to change any time soon. If it does, we will know it. The preceding tell-tale signs would be the following:
One, the Pakistani army comes under full civilian control, with no say in foreign or economic policy, vis-à-vis India, Afghanistan or the US. These are areas the Pakistani army controls directly, even if it is civilian governments that implement their policies. If we can see this for 10 years, we can be sure that the deep state has been folded back. But right now it is the army which runs the state.
Two, the distinction between good and bad terrorists is fully buried by Pakistan, with all organisations supported by the army – the Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the Jaish-e-Mohammed, etc – being formally disbanded and their leaders sent to prison. But we are seeing the exact opposite: after Peshawar, Hafiz Saeed of the JuD was busy threatening India; the LeT commander, Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi, got bail, and even now it is not certain the will go back to jail. In fact, even jail was more like a paid vacation for him, with the government and army allowing him to father a child during his alleged incarceration.
Three, China – Pakistan’s eternal supporter when it comes to India – starts forcing Pakistan to lower its terror quotient. But this is not what China is doing right now. It continues to use Pakistani terror to deflate India’s economic rise, and prevent it from challenging China’s supremacy. The Chinese army is resident in some parts of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir – which hardly shows a willingness to get Pakistan to pipe down.
Four, soft issues like allowing free trade with India, and easier visas for Indians will be early markers of a shift in Pakistani attitudes. None of this is happening. India is far freer with its visas for Pakistanis than Pakistan is for Indians wanting to travel there. Not that anyone would want to go there, but even journalists do not get to go there for work easily, and have their whereabouts checked all the time.
There is no “aman ki aasha” on the horizon.
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