The infiltration in Keran is a pointer to the next round of jihad in Kashmir. INN Live, the first media team to reach the battle zone, reports from Gujjar Patri, the closest accessible spot on the LoC.
The road to Shalbhat seemed haunted. There had been no sign of life for miles. The sound of a narrow stream gushing down the mountains by the road and the faint growl of a bulldozer from a distance inspired no confidence. The only reassuring sign was the lumbering columns of Army trucks ferrying troops and ammunition to Shalbhat, a ruined cluster of seven hamlets atop the mountains on the Line of Control in Kupwara.
Shalbhat witnessed an intense standoff between the Indian Army and a group of about 30 infiltrators, the biggest since the Kargil intrusion in 1999. Initial reports suggested that the infiltrators, backed by Pakistani forces, had descended on Shalbhat and occupied some Indian posts nearby. Their first clash with the Army was on the night of September 23, and the Gorkha Rifles killed some of them. Five Indian soldiers were wounded in the operation. Rifleman Raj Dolu, who was being treated at the Army Hospital in Srinagar, said he was wounded when the Army ambushed a heavily armed group of militants.
The Army recovered some bullet-proof vests from the infiltrators. “Wearing them the infiltrators would survive direct bullet hits on the frontal portion of their bodies,” said an Army officer. The Army also seized medicines, candies, dry fruits, pickles and cigarettes with Pakistani markings on them.
INN Live was the first media team to reach Gujjar Patri, the closest accessible spot in the battle zone. The standoff had entered the 13th day. The Army had mobilised a brigade and closed all possible escape routes except the one leading to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir across the LoC.
During the standoff, the militants made fresh infiltration bids from several points in the area. Seven of them were killed in two such attempts. The Army also called in paratroopers to take on the hiding militants. It had earlier used service helicopters for reconnaissance but the thick vegetation made it impossible to track anything on ground. Also, there were concerns that militants might be carrying surface-to-air missiles.
The Army called off the operation on October 8. “The search operation has been called off but the Army has strengthened its counter infiltration deployment,” said Lieutenant General Sanjiv Chachra, general officer commanding-in-chief of the Northern Command. He emphasised on the sanctity of the LoC and said the Army would not allow it to be violated.
Chachra said there had been many infiltration attempts in the 15 days and the Army had specific intelligence on them. “We were prepared. Some of the infiltrators were killed, while some attempts were foiled. We have recovered 59 types of weapons, including seven AK rifles,” he said. The Army has reasons to believe that the infiltrators were backed by the Pakistani army, which was deployed at a shouting distance from the Indian posts on the border.
INN Live team started its journey to the battle zone on a tough-terrain vehicle. But the terrain proved too tough for the vehicle and trekking was the only alternative. After three kilometres, however, an Army contingent near Gujjar Patri politely asked us to return.
The Chalkmari mountains, where the Army maintained a camp at Putakhan Gali, were visible from the spot. Behind Chalkmari lay Jumagarh, a village close to the LoC. You reach Shalbhat after four more hours of trekking.
Though the Army did not allow the media to come close to the battle zone, INN Live spoke to soldiers who had returned from the battlefront, people of nearby villages and Army porters. People call Shalbhat barbad gaam (ruined village), as it has been uninhabited since its residents moved to PoK in the 1990s. “There is no life,” said Ahmed Khwaja, a resident of Jumagarh. “All houses have been destroyed. It has been 25 years now. Only a shrine remains.” Supplies to the forward Army posts at Shalbhat are ferried by ponies and porters from Jumagarh.
The residents of Zirhama, a village 110km north of Srinagar on the way to Shalbhat, said the infiltrators either had occupied the Indian posts or were hiding in the thick forest cover. Though the Army had denied the reports that militants had occupied Indian posts at Shalbhat, the prolonged standoff indicated otherwise. Also, the way the infiltrators held on so long pointed to the logistical support from Pakistan.
The infiltrators' preparation and persistence suggest they wanted to fight the Army inside the Indian territory, inflict some damage and withdraw to PoK. Another theory is that they wanted to turn Shalbhat into a launching pad for infiltration. That would have put the Army at a tactical disadvantage, considering the proximity of the Pakistani posts. General Bikram Singh alluded to the possibility when he said the operations would take time and he did not want casualties on his side. “Also, the post of the Pakistani army is just across. They can fire on our post. So, we will have to exercise all precautions in carrying out such operations,” said the Army chief.
Shalbhat has long been among the traditional infiltration routes with areas like Kanthwali, Warsun and Trehgam. “From 1990 to 1995, militants came in through a secret route from Naidkur via Dunari,” said a villager. “They would come as if they were on a picnic.” Though the Army eventually figured it out, it had taken a long while to do so.
In the 1990s, life was on the edge in border villages like Zirhama and Jumagarh. “See that girl washing clothes in that stream; even that was not allowed for several years at the height of militancy,” said Khaliq Ahmed, a villager, as soldiers on the Army trucks passing by waved at children sitting by the stream.
The Army's 28 infantry division in Kupwara had mobilised troops from brigades under its command before the standoff. Many senior officers, including brigadiers and colonels, had been in Shalbhat since the night of September 23.
Since its first contact with the infiltrators, the Army had mobilised a brigade in and around Shalbhat with the intention of plugging all escape routes. The one leading to PoK, however, could not be blocked. A soldier, who had returned from the operation, spoke to INN Live on condition of anonymity and described the situation as tense and confusing. “The infiltrators fired every time the Army tried to close in on them,” he said. Another soldier said there was a clash close to the loader post of the Army. “It is an important post where the Army stocks its stuff,” he said. The soldier, however, refused to respond to questions on the infiltrators occupying the post. “You please talk to some senior officer,” he said.
Unconfirmed reports said the infiltrators, dressed in Pakistani army uniforms, moved into two Army posts—Khukri and Kullar—when the troops of 20 Kumaon were being replaced by 3/3 Gorkha Rifles. Attacking during rotation of troops is an old trick of the Pakistani army.
There are pressure points on the LoC that both Indian and Pakistani armies use to their advantage. The Keran sector is where the Pakistanis command some heights. The area has emerged as the most preferred route of infiltrators because of the effective counter-infiltration tactics used elsewhere by the Army. The fence on the LoC also acts as a deterrent. The river Kishanganga (called Neelum in Pakistan) is a natural divider between India and Pakistan at many places on the LoC. There is little chance of infiltrators sneaking into the India without getting caught or killed after crossing the river. But in Keran, the Kishanganga winds into PoK and the LoC runs through thick forests at 10,000 feet above sea level.
In Shalbhat, militants often infiltrate with the help of guides, said a villager. “Most of these guides are double agents. They intimate the Army about the infiltration in advance. But they will not lead all militants into Army traps. This way they keep the trust of both sides and earn rewards,” he said.
After the first encounter, the Army mounted aerial surveillance in the entire Keran sector. The use of air power was ruled out as it was unlikely to achieve the goal. Though special forces and paratroopers were deployed, the Army played a waiting game. The idea was to wear down the militants, hoping they would retreat to PoK. However, the possibility of the Army utilising pressure points against Pakistan on the LoC to force the withdrawal of militants was not ruled out.
The infiltration in Keran is a pointer to what lies ahead. It is learnt that the United Jihad Council, a defunct amalgam of militant groups based in Muzaffarabad, PoK, has been revived. UJC chief Syed Salahuddin had the backing of a team close to the Pakistani army and the Inter-Services Intelligence, said sources, and the UJC had been asked to be ready for the next round of jihad in Kashmir. Though the manpower will mostly be provided by Pakistani terror outfits Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, Kashmiri terror group Hizbul Mujahideen will coordinate the attacks to give them a local colour. There are reports that militant outfits are on a covert recruiting spree in Kashmir, and they are cashing in on the anti-India sentiments among the youth after the hanging of Afzal Guru in the parliament attack case.
Beating the infiltration
- The Army's anti-infiltration operation in the Keran sector along the Line of Control was called off on October 8 after two weeks of gunfire.
- The Army had specific intelligence about multiple infiltration attempts since the last week of September. Some infiltrators were killed.
- Unconfirmed reports said infiltrators, dressed in Pakistani army uniform, moved into two Indian posts—Khukri and Kullar—when the soldiers from 20 Kumaon were being replaced by 3/3 Gorkha on September 23.
- Most of the senior officers including brigadiers and colonels in the area moved to Shalbhat, when infiltrators were first noticed.
- On September 24-25, movement of about 30 militants observed.
- The terrain was rugged, forested and at a height of almost 10,000 feet.
- Entire area effectively cordoned off by the Army, pinning down the militants.
- A brigade mobilised to prevent militants from reaching the hinterland. All possible escape routes closed except one leading to PoK just across the LoC. Paratroopers, 9 para and 4 para, also called in to take on the hiding militants.
- Militants made fresh infiltration bids from several points in the area during the standoff.
- Thick vegetation made it impossible for helicopters to track anything below.
- Fear that militants might have surface-to-air missiles was also a deterrent.
- 59 different types of weapons, including seven AK-47 rifles, recovered.
- The Army now plans to launch intelligence-based specific operations.
(With the inputs from: Dawood Jilani, Aniket Sharma & Kajol Singh)
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