From being India’s pride, Air India was almost grounded. Jitender Bhargava, the man who had a ringside seat, tells INN Live what propelled him to write 'The Descent of Air India' - the new book just released.
What made you write this book?
Air India’s descent from an internationally recognised iconic brand to a pale shadow of its former self is unprecedented. Those designated to manage it, or were its prime stakeholders, contributed most to its current state. That makes it even more unfortunate.
Various stakeholders contributed in varying measures, beginning with the government, as the owner; the ministers of civil aviation, bureaucrats managing the ministry, the board of directors, chairmen and managing directors in the past three and a half decades, senior management personnel and unions. Some by their actions, others by the complicity of silence.
As Air India’s executive director for 13 years, I had a ringside view of what was happening and felt it was a saga worthy of narration. Why did it fail to maintain its status as a premier airline having started much earlier than today’s leading airlines? What were the factors that hindered its growth or pushed it down? Who caused them? What were the major turning points? All this has been covered.
I have tried to capture the essence of Air India’s descent over the years so that the government as the airline owner can wake up to reality even now and act to reverse the trend (though I believe it is a lost cause now).
So that lessons are drawn to prevent other public sector undertakings from meeting a similar fate, and also to ensure that those guilty of making Air India crumble are brought to justice.
When did the decline begin?
First, when JRD Tata, the airline founder, was unceremoniously booted out as chairman by the government in 1978.
It led to Air India becoming more and more unprofessional due to growing governmental interference, appointment of bureaucrats to run the company even though managing an airline required different skill sets; the unions being allowed to have a free run by successive weak managements.
Work practices and employees’ attitude towards passengers remained embedded in the monopoly era of pre-1980s, whereas the need was for transforming with changing times. The second turning point was in 2004 when several decisions led to financial crippling. An acquisition order for 68 aircraft in 2005 that Air India could neither afford nor gainfully deploy was followed in 2007 by the merger between Air India and Indian Airlines.
Though the government took the decision to merge the two airlines it refused to take (responsibility) for making it a success. It ignored several key recommendations critical to the success of the merger.
Is it time up for state-owned carriers?
Whilst there is no denying that government-owned companies have severe handicaps in terms of slow decision-making processes, Air India has been singularly unfortunate to have got too much of all this with scant regard for its commercial interests and concern for its future.
Though there are many airlines in the world that are still government-owned, these governments have followed a strict hands-off policy and left the management to professionals. Government ownership is therefore per se not an obstacle but blatant interference and lack of professionalism is. Air India has suffered on these counts.
What is the future for Air India?
The future does appear bleak because none of the stakeholders is conscious of the depth to which the airline has been sunk. Piecemeal efforts of the government, even as the operational environment is becoming more and more hostile, are making the prospect of survival very, very difficult. Tragically, the government still appears to be unconcerned.
While announcing the new Foreign Direct Investment policy in September 2012, which allowed acquisition of up to 49 per cent equity stake by foreign airlines, it specifically barred any such investment in Air India. Politicians are unlikely to let go control little realising that if they continue to meddle, they may be left with no airline to control very soon.
Privatisation was an option a decade ago but no longer. The airline has been stripped of all its assets and saddled with huge losses and mounting debt, making it a less than attractive proposition for any entrepreneur. To make Air India survive in a hostile environment a series of decisions will need to be taken but regrettably the government of India lacks vision for Air India.
What were the high points of your career in Air India?
Though the airline was already on a downward trajectory when I joined in August 1989, there was still hope to regain a part of the lost glory. In my 20 years, I handled several key portfolios and these additional functions enabled me to demonstrate my skills, take bold decisions for introducing new systems and practices and control costs deemed critical from the airline’s perspective. In an inertia-bound company, the changes and the pace at which they were sought to be introduced angered the unions who demanded my transfer by threatening strikes. One can understand the vision of union leaders being limited, they having a vested interest in working less and getting paid more, but the attitude of chairman/managing director who decided to move me out under duress was inexplicable.
Having begun my career as a journalist in the early 1970s I had a penchant for putting my views in writing. In my two decades with the airline I wrote no less than 100 letters to successive managements stressing the need to improve work practices. These letters were not just critical of what was wrong with the way the airline was being managed but highlighted the changes that were needed and also suggested the way out.
Many of these letters are part of the book to lend credibility to what I am asserting and also to highlight that the management missed the opportunities to act even when someone within the airline was cautioning them. I will, however, bemoan the fact that I will always be perceived to be part of the management that preferred to do nothing. I will be seen as a part of the management team that took the airline down even if I was not a party to their decisions and had resolutely opposed them internally.
I will also never be able to rid myself of the regret that an illustrious brand such as Air India was allowed to fall upon hard times.
What are the lessons that can be gleaned from your book?
If the stakeholders are sincere, the book offers numerous lessons. The government needs to recognise one simple fact: Air India was a great airline when it was being managed by professionals and failed when being run as per whims and fancies of political masters and bureaucrats. So lesson No 1—allow Air India to be managed professionally.
Every government has safeguarded the interest of its home carriers. Do the same for Indian carriers. That’s lesson No 2. Public sector undertakings are not the personal fiefdoms of the ministers or bureaucrats, so don’t treat them that way. Allow them to be national assets. That’s lesson No 3.
Unions and employees can’t be the final arbiters of an airline’s future. The management should assert its right to manage because ensuring the airline’s survival is their responsibility. That’s lesson no 4.
Looking at what the government has done to Air India, it should learn and ensure that it does not repeat the same blunders in other government enterprises.
How tough is it to be a PR professional, especially if you have to defend a government undertaking?
Defending a government undertaking is undoubtedly tougher because they have greater accountability to the people..
As the public face of Air India for two decades I had to battle the media virtually on a daily basis. However, I did not confine my role to merely replying to media queries but took it to the highest level — representing the company on television programmes and addressing press conferences.
Another debilitating aspect of PR in government undertakings is that PR strategy changes with the man at the helm rather than the chairman adapting to the corporate PR philosophy evolved with the company’s interests in view.
No comments:
Post a Comment