In security, knowledge is an asset only if it leads to an action. When you have the knowledge but failed to act, you have plenty more to explain. Home minister Sushilkumar Shinde’s statement that the government had information about a potential terrorist attack does not mitigate the failure to prevent the Hyderabad blasts.
If the government were caught totally unaware, it would have been an intelligence failure. But when it had leads that should have been – but were not – developed for a proactive or preventive action, it is a failure of the system. When it happens over and over again, the logical conclusion is that either the government lacks the political will to fight terrorism or is devoid of capacity and skills to meet the threat. At the present moment, both appear to be true.
Following the 26/11 attack, it appeared that the government was serious about building up national capabilities to meet terrorist threats. In the attack’s immediate aftermath, it took a tough stance against Pakistan. But as time passed, it kept diluting its position. At Sharm el-Sheikh in July 2009, the status quo was almost restored and the demand for action against the perpetrators of the Mumbai carnage became a mere ritual.
The home minister at the time, P Chidambaram, did initiate measures to streamline the counterterrorism apparatus. While he succeeded in making the existing capacities operate at near optimum level, despite his efforts, his programmes to establish the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), strengthen the Multi Agency Centre and operationalise the National Intelligence Grid failed to take off. He gingered up the states to respond more vigorously to intelligence alerts but failed to establish institutional mechanisms, evolve standard operating procedures and build up the capacities of the states to develop ground intelligence capabilities.
His shift to the finance ministry brought about a qualitative change for the worse. The new home minister, Sushilkumar Shinde, focussed more on politicising terror – hoping to reap a political harvest – than augmenting national counterterrorism capabilities.
Preliminary investigations into the Hyderabad blasts suggest that locally available chemicals such as ammonium nitrate were used to manufacture the improvised explosive devices that were detonated by timers. The modus operandi bears resemblance to past serial explosions in Hyderabad, Jaipur and Ahmedabad.
Shinde’s statement following the blasts suggests that the government was receiving definite inputs in the past few days pointing towards the likelihood of a terror strike. This came days after the United Jihad Council, an umbrella organisation of anti-India terror groups based in Pakistan, had vowed to take ‘revenge’ for the hanging of Parliament attack convict Afzal Guru on February 9. Some reports also indicate that the Indian Mujahideen operatives arrested from Hyderabad in October last year had carried out a recce of Dilsukhnagar where the blasts took place. Timing the blasts to coincide with the opening day of the budget session of Parliament indicates a planned move, probably aimed at causing political friction.
Jihadi organisations have often found Hyderabad a safe launching base. In the recent past, the environment was also vitiated by communal rhetoric such as the hate speech by Akbaruddin Owaisi. The blasts were a result of meticulous planning; at least a dozen individuals would have been involved in the planning, procurement, logistics and execution. The strike could have been averted if the state government had followed the intelligence trail and refined the leads to actionable intelligence.
At the macro level, such terror strikes have occurred with repeated frequency in Indian cities since 2007, claiming hundreds of lives. Sadly, the politicisation of terror has only weakened the national capacity to combat the menace. It gets worse when people holding responsible positions, such as Shinde, choose to make irresponsible remarks and deflect the national attention from real threats. In recent years, there have been several instances when politicians have found it fit to dabble in votebank politics instead of presenting a united front in times of crisis.
It is time to move past this; there is an urgent need for capacity building to fight terror. To begin with, the process of setting up the long-pending NCTC – which will streamline action against terrorism – must be expedited. Political consensus should be achieved by engaging in meaningful dialogue on the proposed NCTC Act and allaying any fears on part of the state governments that setting up of the body would be tantamount to interference in their internal matters.
Though the NCTC has some shortcomings, it will make sharing of intelligence and follow-up operations efficient, faster and better coordinated. Further, it will have the powers to requisition the services of the NSG or any other special force for undertaking counterterrorist operations. In effect, it means that should the NCTC have reliable intelligence, it can co-opt central forces to complement the local police and make up for their deficiencies in trained manpower, equipment, logistics etc.
Taking advantage of its nationwide jurisdiction, the information gathered by the NCTC during search operations or initial questioning of the suspects can then be used to mount supplementary operations in any part of the country, taking the help of the local police to meet legal requirements.
Hyderabad shows again that political parties must recognise the need to delink national security from electoral considerations and demonstrate a strong resolve to fight against terror.
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