Wednesday, April 01, 2009

A wide open poll, or new coalitions?

By M H Ahssan

Despite uncertainties, the electoral dice seems loaded against the NDA, though the UPA isn’t in a happy state either.

When the BJD recently walked out on the BJP in Orissa, many called the move a game-changer adverse to the NDA, which had already lost numerous allies and been pared to onethird its original size. Since then, the Congress’s seat-adjustment talks with the Samajwadi Party, Rashtriya Janata Dal and Lok Janashakti Party in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar broke down. The three have formed a “fourth front”. The PMK in Tamil Nadu has quit the UPA and allied with the AIADMK-MDMK. Is this also a gamechanger, this time against the Congress?

Honestly speaking, the answer is not quite, although it’s a setback to the Congress-UPA. The AIADMK-led alliance will, as expected, gain at the expense of the DMK-Congress combine, but it’s unlikely to sweep the election given that the latter command a 35-40% vote. In UP and Bihar, the UPA will bleed from the Congress’s blunder in vetoing a national alliance. But the Congress was anyway slated to do relatively poorly in the two states. The SP-RJD-LJP arrangement is less a rival alliance than a pressure-group without synergy between its bases. No, the UPA hasn’t unravelled, not yet.

At any rate, these developments take the current turbulence, uncertainty and political promiscuity one step further. Parties are courting one another across alliances, abandoning the rules of coalition politics. The central question is if the churning will modify existing coalitions, or trigger a more basic transition from a decade-long era of pre-election alliances to expediency-driven post-poll alliances.

The answer isn’t clear, but three trends are plain. The UPA had an early edge, but may be losing it. If the Congress wins roughly the same or higher number of seats as in 2004 (145), the UPA should be able to form the government. But this isn’t assured. Second, the NDA is in disarray. Its core, the BJP, is in retreat. It’s desperately using communal hate-speech to stem its decline, with uncertain results. Its most important ally, the Janata Dal (United), is uneasy about staying within the NDA after the election.

Third, the non-Congress non-BJP Third Front has received a boost both from direct accretions and the SP-RJD-LJP front. It’s drafting a programmatic document which might give it some coherence. But this hotchpotch still lacks a holding party which can make it more durable than the V P Singh-led National Front (1989-91) or the United Front (1996-98). The Left is the Front’s progenitor, midwife and mentor — combined. But its seat-tally is likely to decline. The Front can’t come close to power unless the Telugu Desam, AIADMK and BSP do exceptionally well, and stay with it. These are big ifs.

Varun Gandhi’s venomous attack on Muslims represents one of the most nauseating episodes of the present campaign and a new low in the history of communal politics. His use of a super-derogatory term for Muslims, and his exhortation to forcibly sterilise them — a throwback to his father’s Emergency role — violate the election law and the Indian Penal Code. Such hatespeech belongs to the discourse of fascism and is profoundly anti-democratic.

This isn’t the first time the BJP has used anti-Muslim appeals to win votes. The Election Commission has over the years disqualified 3,423 people from contesting elections for “corrupt practices”, many related to communalism. Gandhi’s is a rare case where a candidate’s speeches are videotaped; producing irrefutable evidence. But the EC has no power to disqualify him until after a court convicts him. Disqualification after a candidate has vitiated the climate and harvested hatred can only partially remedy the original offence.

THE NDA isn’t going places. The BJP has antagonised the JD(U) by fielding from Bihar two loud critics of chief minister Nitish Kumar: Shatrughan Sinha and Rajiv Pratap Rudy. Kumar is building bridges with Muslims, especially backward-caste Muslims and doesn’t want communally tainted BJP leaders to campaign in Bihar. He has also refused to give a ticket to George Fernandes, the JD(U)’s most pro-BJP-RSS leader.

BJP campaign strategist Arun Jaitley has revolted against party president Rajnath Singh. L K Advani is unable to assert his authority. The BJP is floundering and substituting internet-based gimmickry for strategy. It will probably lose several seats in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra and Karnataka. It did remarkably well in these states in 2004, but its base has eroded. It’s unlikely to recoup through small gains in Gujarat, Jharkhand and Haryana.

The UPA isn’t in a happy state either. The Congress’s arrogant refusal to make seat adjustments has created a huge mess. In UP, it was remarkably inflexible towards the SP. But its nemesis came in Bihar, where the RJD-LJP offered it only three seats out of 40. It retaliated by nominating Sadhu Yadav and deciding to go solo in 37 constituencies. The Congress’s fate depends on whether it can make up in other states its likely heavy losses in Tamil Nadu and Andhra.

The Third Front can’t go far unless it’s seen as programmatically credible. This won’t be easy: all its constituents barring the Left stand tainted by past association with the BJP-NDA, including the BSP, which has thrice shared power with the BJP in UP. A convincing common manifesto asserting the Front’s commitment to secularism and inclusive economic policies could help — but probably not enough to turn the election around even if Mayawati improves on her 2004 score (16) and wins 25-35 seats in UP.

More important, the social energies that drove the non-BJP-non-Congress forces in the 1980s and 1990s have been significantly depleted. Optimistically, a Third Front with 100-120 seats could attract some NDA parties and form a government with the UPA’s support. But there are red lines here. The BJD, Akali Dal, AGP and TDP will find it difficult to accept Congress support. If the BSP joins the Front, the SP won’t. It the Left is in it, the Trinamool Congress will be out. If the RJD is in, the JD(U) will keep out.

The instability and uncertainty endemic in this hazy scenario won’t be resolved unless there’s a reworking of relations between plebeian forces and social movements, and political parties’ programmes and policies.

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